NOVEMBER 30 — In the past few decades, defence spending of Beijing has risen steadily in absolute terms that it has transformed its military from a regional force into a formidable global power, reshaping the strategic balance in the Indo-Pacific. Although it is still below the US in percent of GDP, it is far larger in cash terms than almost every other country, even surpassing western European militaries.
The amount of money invested not just in quantity but in high-end capability: People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was the second country after the United States to field an operational fifth-generation stealth fighter jet when the Chengdu J-20 entered service, signalling a qualitative leap in its air-combat and strike capabilities.
Development of next-generation aircraft to rival Western fifth-generation platforms has also been widely reported.
At sea, PLA Navy vessels and carrier task groups, spearheaded by Liaoning, Shandong and the newly launched Fujian, are increasingly conducting longer deployments, as well as more high-tempo exercises, projecting the ambition into a strategic intent to extend their reach toward Hawaii and even Alaska in future.
This trajectory explicitly underscores ambition of Beijing to challenge US dominance and secure a blue-water navy capable of global operations far beyond its traditional near-shore waters and the “First Island Chain” (FIC).
The FIC strategy traces its origins to the early Cold War era, when US planners sought to contain the expansion of communist influence in Asia, linking a string of islands and archipelagos off East Asia’s coast, running from the Kurils and the Japanese archipelago through the Ryukyus, Taiwan and the northern Philippines down toward Borneo. This chain of islands is a natural barrier that could restrict the movement of Soviet and Chinese naval forces into the wider Pacific.
The concept was simple yet powerful: by controlling key chokepoints and maintaining forward bases along this chain of islands, the US could project power while denying adversaries access to critical sea lanes.
With advanced long-range missiles, stealth fighter jets and a rapidly growing blue-water navy, which provide integrated anti-access/area-denial capabilities, Beijing has significantly eroded the geographic constraints of the First Island Chain, resulting in US military presence in the Western Pacific facing unprecedented challenges.
For American strategists, two urgent questions must be answered: Can the existing security architecture withstand China’s surge in capability, or does it require a fundamental overhaul to maintain deterrence?
US planners have been reinforcing alliances, prepositioning new systems and exercises, as well as deploying longer-range strike capabilities to the region.
The defence strategists in Washington DC are now seriously focusing on the challenge of containing PLA naval and air power inside, by military cooperation and strengthening defence technological collaboration.
In an unprecedented move, the US has agreed with South Korea to build nuclear-powered attack submarines, with construction slated for the Hanwha-owned Philadelphia Shipyard. With this, South Korea gains access to sensitive nuclear-propulsion technology, including uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing rights.
Strategically, this is a clear signal aimed at China. Seoul’s future nuclear submarine force will not only bolster deterrence in a high-tension region but also provide a powerful undersea intelligence capability.
In peacetime, these subs could monitor and shadow Chinese submarine and surface vessel activities with endurance and stealth that diesel submarines cannot match. The information collected, including characteristics of unique nuclear reactor noise and propulsion systems of vessels and submarines, is important intelligence that can be shared with the US and other countries.
In short, by providing the sensitive nuclear submarine technology to South Korea to guard the western Pacific, the US can free up its resources for other strategic places around the world.
The Philippines, which is at the south of the chain, has significantly deepened its defence cooperation with the United States, reflecting growing strategic anxiety over Chinese actions in the South China Sea.
Under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), Manila has granted American forces access to multiple Philippine bases – including Luzon, Palawan, and other forward sites – allowing the US to preposition troops, equipment, and infrastructure for rapid deployment.
In the most recent annual Balikatan exercises, at least two cutting-edge US systems made their debut on Philippine soil: the Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS), carrying anti-ship Naval Strike Missiles mounted on JLTVs, and the Marine Air Defense Integrated System (MADIS) for counter-drone operations.
The deployment of NMESIS to Batanes and northern Luzon, which are strategic chokepoints between Taiwan and the Philippines, dramatically improves the US–Philippine ability to deny hostile naval access and monitor PLA vessels in real time.
Meanwhile, Typhon missile launchers, capable of firing Tomahawk cruise missiles and SM-6 interceptors, have also been moved to Luzon, giving the alliance a land-based, long-range strike and air/sea defence capability.
Beyond Washington, Manila is also active in expanding its network of defence partners. In late 2025, the Philippines and Canada signed a Status of Visiting Forces Agreement (SOVFA), allowing mutual training, force deployments, and capacity-building operations. The agreement builds on a 2024 Defence Cooperation Memorandum of Understanding, with the aim to strengthen interoperability, especially in humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and maritime security.
Manila is also in talks with other countries including France and New Zealand to further diversify its security partners. It is a clear shift towards a more multilateral and resilient defence posture in the Indo-Pacific.
In addition to its intensifying relationship with the United States, the Philippines has also significantly expanded its defence cooperation with Australia and the United Kingdom – a clear signal that Manila is broadening its security partnerships in response to mounting pressure from Beijing.
Manila and London inked a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on defence cooperation in January 2024, which covers a broad spectrum of security matters such as military training and education, maritime domain operations, peacekeeping, disaster response, and research into defence technology. Both sides are also exploring collaboration on a Status of Visiting Forces Agreement (SOVFA), which would formalise British troops to rotate through Philippine bases for exercises and capacity-building.
Taiwan, which was not formally part of the First Island Chain due to historical reasons, has been quietly learning hard lessons from the Ukraine–Russia war. Faced with a much larger adversary in Beijing and constrained by financial resources, Taipei has adopted an asymmetric warfare doctrine that emphasises mobility, stealth, and cost-efficient lethality.
One of the most significant developments is its determination to push for indigenously built diesel-electric submarines. With the first sea trial completed in mid-2025 and a second trial to be carried out in December 2025, it is a platform designed specifically for stealthy, coastal interdiction and deterrence.
At the same time, Tuo Chiang-class missile corvettes – small, highly manoeuvrable vessels equipped with anti-ship capabilities – are to be deployed in numbers.
Missiles are another core plank of defending the island.
Through the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST), Taiwan is producing a wide array of indigenous systems: long-range anti-ship cruise missiles (Hsiung Feng series), ground-based ballistic or air-defence missiles (Sky Bow III), and loitering munitions and drones.
Taipei’s defence posture reflects a “porcupine” strategy, utilising many small but hard-to-neutralise systems (such as mobile shore-based missiles, mines, and drones), rather than concentrating in a few large platforms. For example, lessons from Ukraine demonstrate the large potential of sea drones: uncrewed boats worth only tens of thousands of dollars, loaded with high-performance explosives, could be sufficient to harass or deny vessels worth millions of dollars.
In recent years, Taipei is emphasising more resilience. The All-Our Defence Mobilization Agency was established to coordinate not just the military but also civilian sectors for whole-of-society defence.
In addition, Han Kuang exercises, an annual event designed to simulate high-intensity cross-strait conflict, are becoming more realistic.
The Han Kuang 40 exercise in 2024 marked a clear shift toward real-combat conditions, abandoning scripted scenarios in favour of unscripted, adaptive responses.
By 2025, Han Kuang 41 expanded even further in scale and complexity, spanning over 10 days, incorporating a wider spectrum of scenarios, including grey-zone harassment, drone swarms, large-scale cyberattacks, joint anti-amphibious defence, civilian–military infrastructure integration, and port/airport resilience under sustained missile strikes. Some Taiwanese media outlets reported that foreign military advisers were in low-profile roles to provide assessments, refine command-and-control procedures, and enhance interoperability.
Last but not least, Japan.
The country was once constrained by its postwar pacifist constitution and limited to purely defensive self-defence forces, but is now moving decisively to upgrade its strategic capabilities in partnership with the United Kingdom.
With China’s growing air and naval power projection, Tokyo has recognised that its traditional posture is in urgent need of updating. In August 2025, defence ministers of Japan and the UK committed to an “Enhanced Global Strategic Partnership” covering joint exercises, technology sharing, and cooperation in new domains such as space and cyber.
HMS Prince of Wales aircraft carrier made a historic port call in Tokyo in 2025, underlining forward engagement of London in the Indo-Pacific. During this deployment, the UK Carrier Strike Group conducted a joint naval exercise with Japanese warships, with an F-35B stealth jet from the British carrier landing aboard Japan’s JS Kaga.
In a bilateral training over the summer in the Sea of Japan, the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) and the Royal Navy/Royal Air Force deployed F-35As and F-15s, as well as F-35Bs respectively. In September 2025, Japan deployed aircraft in RAF Coningsby, UK, in a historic mission of “Atlantic Eagle”.
The developments outlined here show that the First Island Chain is no longer a static Cold War structure, but a dynamic and actively reinforced security architecture.
The United States is clearly doubling down on its frontline allies – South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines – to anchor deterrence across the chain. Washington is trying to counter PLA’s growing ability by exploiting a ‘responsibility-sharing method’.
Rather than shouldering the burden alone, the US increasingly emphasises burden-sharing, distributed firepower, and intelligence integration, with the aim of resources integration, as well as complicating Beijing’s military calculations and restoring credibility to deterrence along the First Island Chain. Extraordinary strategic partnership between Japan and the United Kingdom demonstrates that like-minded powers are converging around a shared assessment of the China challenge.
The updated FIC is evolving from a line of containment into a multilayered coalition.
It is not designed to provoke conflict, but to raise the costs of coercion and preserve stability in an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific.
* Phar Kim Beng is Professor of Asean Studies, Director of Institute of Internationalization and Asean Studies, International Islamic University of Malaysia. Jitkai Chin is from the Department of Chemical Engineering, Universiti Teknologi Petronas, and an expert committee member in Centre of Strategic Regional Studies.
** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.
