MARCH 15 — The upcoming summit of the D-8 Organisation for Economic Cooperation in Jakarta — originally scheduled for April 13-14 2026 — has emerged as a potentially crucial diplomatic platform for easing tensions in the Gulf.
The grouping, founded in 1997 to promote cooperation among major Muslim developing countries, now includes Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Türkiye, with Azerbaijan joining as the ninth member in 2024
Although the summit has been delayed because of the escalating Middle East war, its political significance has only increased.
If convened, the Jakarta meeting could become a rare diplomatic arena where Muslim-majority powers attempt to reduce tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran — two states whose rivalry has historically shaped the geopolitics of the Gulf and the broader Islamic world.
D-8 as an overlooked diplomatic platform:
Unlike Nato, the European Union, or even the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the D-8 has traditionally focused on economic cooperation rather than security politics.
Its founding principles emphasize dialogue, cooperation, and development rather than confrontation.
However, this very characteristic gives the organization a unique advantage in the current crisis.
The D-8 stretches geographically from Southeast Asia to Africa and the Middle East, representing about 1.2 billion people and nearly 60 percent of the global Muslim population.
In other words, it is one of the few platforms where:
- Iran sits alongside multiple Sunni-majority countries
- Southeast Asian Muslim democracies interact with Middle Eastern states
- Dialogue can occur without the heavy influence of Western powers.
This makes the Jakarta summit a potentially neutral forum where tensions between Tehran and Riyadh can be addressed indirectly.
The role of president Prabowo Subianto:
The leadership of Prabowo Subianto is central to the diplomatic potential of the Jakarta summit.
Indonesia, as the largest Muslim-majority democracy, has historically positioned itself as a bridge between different factions of the Islamic world. Jakarta’s diplomatic style emphasizes moderation, multilateralism, and strategic neutrality.
Under Prabowo’s presidency, Indonesia has already demonstrated several advantages as a mediator.
First, Indonesia maintains working relations with both Iran and Saudi Arabia. Unlike many Middle Eastern states, it is not directly embedded in the region’s sectarian rivalries.
Second, Indonesia’s geographic distance from the Gulf allows it to act as a credible neutral convenor.
Southeast Asian Muslim states tend to avoid ideological alignment with either the Iranian revolutionary model or the Saudi monarchical system.
Third, Indonesia’s chairmanship of the D-8 summit provides the institutional authority to shape the agenda.
The summit’s official theme — strengthening solidarity and cooperation in a shifting global order — can easily accommodate discussions on regional stability and energy security.
If managed skilfully, Prabowo could transform the meeting from a purely economic forum into a quiet diplomatic channel for Gulf de-escalation.
The role of Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim:
Equally important is the role of Anwar Ibrahim, who has consistently advocated civilizational dialogue within the Muslim world.
Malaysia occupies a unique diplomatic position.
It is neither a Middle Eastern power nor a peripheral Muslim state.
Instead, it has cultivated strong relations with Iran, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Pakistan, and the Gulf Cooperation Council simultaneously.
Anwar’s leadership style — grounded in intellectual engagement and Islamic reformist traditions — allows Malaysia to approach conflicts not purely through power politics but through normative dialogue among Muslim societies.
Malaysia also brings several practical advantages to the mediation process.
One is its reputation for balanced diplomacy.
Kuala Lumpur generally avoids taking sides in Middle Eastern rivalries, focusing instead on economic cooperation and humanitarian diplomacy.
Another is Malaysia’s experience in multilateral platforms, including Asean and the East Asia Summit.
This experience allows Malaysian diplomacy to facilitate consensus-building among diverse states.
Working together with Indonesia, Malaysia could therefore play the role of co-architect of a Muslim diplomatic initiative aimed at preventing the Gulf crisis from spiralling into a wider regional war.
Why Saudi Arabia and Iran might listen:
There are several reasons why Riyadh and Tehran may be willing to engage indirectly through the D-8 platform.
First, the organisation includes multiple influential Muslim states beyond the Gulf, including Türkiye, Pakistan, Egypt, and Nigeria. This creates a broader Islamic diplomatic environment where neither Iran nor Saudi Arabia can easily dominate the discussion.
Second, the addition of Azerbaijan strengthens the organization’s geopolitical reach into the Caucasus and Eurasia, reinforcing its status as a trans-regional Muslim forum.
Third, the economic agenda of the D-8 provides a practical incentive.
Energy security, trade diversification, and infrastructure connectivity all depend on stability in the Gulf.
Even Iran — despite sanctions and geopolitical pressure — has an interest in preventing its isolation from the broader Muslim world.
Saudi Arabia likewise seeks to avoid a prolonged regional war that would disrupt oil markets and threaten its economic transformation programs.
Thus, the Jakarta summit could create a face-saving diplomatic channel for both sides.
A South-east Asian contribution to global stability:
Perhaps the most significant implication of the D-8 summit is symbolic.
For decades, the Middle East has been dominated by great-power diplomacy involving the United States, Russia, or European states.
A Jakarta initiative led by Indonesia and Malaysia would represent something different: intra-Muslim mediation led by Southeast Asia.
Such an approach could reinforce three broader principles:
- Dialogue rather than confrontation:
- Cooperation rather than proxy warfare
- Economic interdependence rather than ideological rivalry.
If successful, the Jakarta summit could demonstrate that the Muslim world possesses its own diplomatic mechanisms to manage conflict without external domination.
Conclusion:
The D-8 summit in Jakarta, although originally designed as an economic meeting, could evolve into one of the most important diplomatic gatherings of 2026. Assuming it goes ahead.
Under the leadership of President Prabowo Subianto and Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, Southeast Asia may offer a neutral platform where Muslim-majority countries can engage Iran and Saudi Arabia in dialogue.
In an era where the Gulf crisis threatens global energy markets and regional stability, the Jakarta meeting may become far more than a routine summit.
If convened, it could become a pivotal moment of Muslim diplomacy — where Southeast Asia helps prevent the Middle East from descending into an even wider war.
* Phar Kim Beng is professor of Asean Studies and director of the Institute of International and Asean Studies, International Islamic University of Malaysia
** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.
