AUGUST 26 — On the 18th of August on Instagram, a picture was posted by Malaysian actress Mira Filzah of her donning the Indian Lehenga, jewellery and mehendi. She was singing a Devdas song and posing for an advertisement for contact lenses that is soon to be released. Whilst she has over a million views on her Instagram advert with tonnes of messages supporting her on her post, on the internet she was heavily criticised. The harsh allegations held her a perpetrator of cultural appropriation.
Cultural appropriation is the act of copying or using the customs and traditions of a particular group or culture, by somebody from a more dominant or powerful group in society. Essentially, it is the taking of something produced by members of one culture by members of another. The concept of culture refers to the language, customs, basic values, religion, core beliefs, arts and activities of a group of people. Cultural appropriation is diverse, says Erich Matthes in his 2016 article “Cultural Appropriation without Cultural Essentialism?”. It might be thought to include occurrences as varied as the representation of cultural practices or experiences by cultural “outsiders”; the use of artistic styles distinctive of cultural groups by non-members; and the procurement or continued possession of cultural objects by non-members or culturally distant institutions. As per Mathhes, when the abstract schémas above are filled in with details from actual events, we often find misrepresentation, misuse, and theft of the stories, styles, and material heritage of people who have been historically dominated and remain socially marginalized. If a non-Orang Asli makes and sells Orang Asli craft, that is cultural appropriation. If a non-Punjabi dances Bhangra and makes a living off it, that too is cultural appropriation. Ordinarily, this should not be an issue. As conversations go, assimilation is an integral part of being Malaysian. But problems arise if we were to misrepresent, misuse and in some way insult Orang Asli craft or traditional Punjabi dances. These would be offensive, even harmful and it is that which makes cultural appropriation wrong.
The social value of the act and the value of free expression are important considerations in accepting or condemning cultural appropriation. Some cultural appropriations may be defended on the grounds that they have redeeming social value. James Young in his 2005 article “Profound Offense and Cultural Appropriation” says sometimes art contains a degree of social value that can counter-balance the offense felt by the members of a culture whose has been appropriated. Young cites Shakespeare’s plays as an instance where the work clearly engaged in subject appropriation when he represented the Jews, Moors and others. Jews have registered their offence against the The Merchant of Venice and its treatment against Shylock. Nevertheless, the plays that resulted from Shakespeare’s cultural appropriation have a degree of social value that far outweighed their offensiveness. This is no different to our domestic contexts vis-à-vis artists like Datuk Ramli Ibrahim, a Malay who dances and promotes Odissi and Bharatanatyam which are Indian classical dances; and Datuk Bernard Chandran, an acclaimed designer of Indian and Chinese parentage whose repertoire of haute couture include traditional Malay attire. For the goodness that these artists have contributed to their genres, we recognise them having outweighing social values, although what they engage in is, strictly speaking, cultural appropriation. We accept them because it is not offensive cultural appropriation.
When a qualm arises over an offensive incident of cultural appropriation, it is born from the relationship between harmful expression and systems of oppression and marginalisation. In this case, the outrage over Mira’s attire is rooted in her appropriating the elegance of Indian attire. The advertisers [and Mira, no less] do this by consciously separating the aesthetic value of the elegance from the ethnicity for the sole purpose of selling a product. The advertiser could have employed an ethnic Indian to wear the same attire, but it was more pleasing to the market when a fair-skinned lady, of a majority-dominated culture wore the attire. The outrage of ethnic Indians stem from them viewing these actions as a takeover of part of their culture and identity. To use the aesthetics of Indian culture without recognising the community that it was appropriated from, was in some form, wrong.
But we need to ask ourselves, how offensive or harmful are these actions or is it the exercise of freedom of expression to which we should not get sensitive over. Perhaps we are just triggered by these inconsequential series of events that actually represent a larger picture of systemic discrimination.
As Matthes puts it, cultural appropriation is just one way in which underlying social inequalities can evince themselves through acts of expression and representation. The social ridicule that the ethnic Indian faces, the discrimination, the subjection to the ‘special position’ of the Malays and the natives are cumulative effects of entrenched constitutional and institutional practices. The furore over Mira’s cultural appropriation cannot be seen in isolation of these contexts, but as another means of exploiting the ethnic Indian by appropriating their culture. Yet the ethnic Indian must understand that discriminatory institutional practices and the mere execution of marketing strategies, as were Mira’s actions, are distinct things. They entail different culpabilities on different parties.
Cultural appropriation is not a legal wrong; it does not transgress any laws. At most, the party appropriating makes a moral wrong. People have the liberty to appropriate culture without the backlash or interference of any legal system. It is thus up to the social system to regulate its morality. The question is how to assign moral responsibility to agents who are privileged within an oppressive system. Matthes says, especially since harms that are a function of artistic expression and representation are ones we may be particularly hesitant about regulating, we may be better served by focusing on ameliorating the harmful effects, which is itself part of the task of combatting the ultimate harmful cause — namely, working to eliminate systematic social marginalization.
Thus, the battle is not with Mira or the advertisers. This mass outrage is a symptom of a larger problem, that being social marginalisation and institutional discrimination. This outrage should be harnessed towards working to eliminate these state transgressions, not squabbling about who should or shouldn’t wear what.
*This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.
