KUALA LUMPUR, Aug 27 — The Inspector-General of Police (IGP) and the government have filed an appeal against the High Court’s decision dismissing their application to quash M. Indira Gandhi’s suit over the authorities’ alleged failure to arrest her ex-husband, Muhammad Riduan, and return her daughter, who was abducted by the convert, 12 years ago.

Indira Gandhi filed the suit on October 28 last year, naming the IGP, the Royal Malaysia Police (PDRM), the Home Ministry (KDN) and the Malaysian Government as the first to fourth defendants.

The IGP, PDRM, KDN and the Government filed the notice of appeal in the Court of Appeal on August 13, after being dissatisfied with the overall decision of High Court Judge Mohd Nazlan Mohd Ghazali on July 16.

Senior Federal Counsel Andi Razalijaya A Dadi, who represents the appellants, when contacted said, a copy of the notice of appeal had been submitted to the counsel representing Indira Gandhi via email on August 16.

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On July 16, Judge Mohd Nazlan dismissed the application of the defendants, on the grounds that the case was not obviously unsustainable to warrant summary dismissal, and ordered that a full trial be held on the defamation suit filed by Indira Gandhi.

In her statement of claim, kindergarten teacher Indira Gandhi, 46, claimed that the IGP deliberately and negligently ignored the Federal Court’s mandamus order for failing to investigate or take appropriate action to recover her daughter, Prasana Diksa, who is now 13 years old.

She claimed that all the defendants had a role to play in making decisions or ordering the PDRM to execute the committal warrant against her ex-husband, as ordered by the Federal Court on April 29, 2016.

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The woman contended that the behaviour of all the defendants had directly caused her separation from her youngest daughter to continue until today, and that their behaviour had also caused Muhammad Riduan to flee.

She is seeking RM100 million in general, aggravated and exemplary damages, as well as a declaration that the first defendant (IGP) had committed the tort of nonfeasance in public office, and the second, third and fourth defendants were also vicariously liable for the tort of nonfeasance committed by the first defendant. — Bernama