JULY 11 — The renewed armed exchanges between the United States and Iran in and around the Strait of Hormuz are not simply the result of another ceasefire collapsing. Trump in his tempestuous style as declared “the ceasefire over.”
Such a situation arises because what has repeatedly been previously called a ceasefire has never amounted to a comprehensive political settlement.
At best, Washington and Tehran have constructed temporary pauses during which each side continues trying to alter the balance of power before the next round of negotiations over the next 60 days.
As the clock ticks down, both sides will want to increase their leverage.
The latest escalation followed attacks on three commercial vessels transiting or approaching the strait.
Washington blamed Iran and responded with strikes against Iranian targets. Tehran then attacked American military infrastructure in neighbouring Gulf states.
Tanker traffic slowed sharply, oil prices rose and the threat assessment for commercial shipping was raised to “severe.”
Yet the two sides have also agreed to continue talking. President Donald Trump announced on July 10 that discussions could resume even while declaring that the previous ceasefire was no longer operative.
Qatar and Oman have again become indispensable diplomatic intermediaries.
This is not peace. It is coercive bargaining conducted with missiles, sanctions, drones, naval deployments and threats to commercial shipping.
The fundamental problem is that the United States and Iran do not agree on what the armistice is supposed to achieve.
Washington believes any pause should restore freedom of navigation, prevent Iran from attacking commercial vessels, restrain its nuclear programme and reduce Tehran’s ability to threaten American forces and Gulf partners.
Iran, however, sees the Strait of Hormuz as one of its few remaining instruments of strategic leverage. It knows that the United States possesses overwhelming conventional military power.
Tehran cannot match Washington carrier for carrier, aircraft for aircraft or dollar for dollar. But Iran does not need to dominate the entire Gulf militarily.
It needs only to demonstrate that the costs of excluding, sanctioning or attacking it will be internationalised.
That is why Hormuz remains central.
Iran’s message is that if it cannot export its energy securely, neither should its adversaries assume that their energy exports will move without interruption.
Every tanker delayed, every insurance premium increased and every shipping company forced to reconsider its route turns Iran’s geographical position into political leverage.
The United States responds because it cannot allow Iran to establish a de facto right to determine which vessels may use an international waterway.
Nor can Washington reassure its Gulf partners while appearing hesitant when their tankers, terminals or military installations are attacked.
Thus, each side considers retaliation necessary for credibility.
Iran believes restraint without reciprocal concessions will be interpreted as weakness. The United States believes non-retaliation will invite more attacks.
Both therefore escalate in order to restore deterrence. But because each side defines deterrence differently, one side’s attempt to restore stability becomes the other side’s justification for retaliation.
This is the classic security dilemma, except that it is unfolding around one of the most economically sensitive maritime arteries in the world.
The June memorandum of understanding was always fragile because it contained ambitious political expectations without sufficiently strong mechanisms for verification, adjudication and enforcement.
It sought to reopen the strait and restart nuclear negotiations, but it did not eliminate the profound disagreement over Iran’s right to enrich uranium, American sanctions, regional military deployments or Tehran’s claimed authority over maritime passage.
Even the economic concessions were reversible. Washington had authorised certain Iranian oil sales until August 21, only to revoke that arrangement after the tanker attacks and shorten the wind-down period to July 17.
This reveals the weakness of transactional diplomacy. A licence granted today can be withdrawn tomorrow.
A shipping corridor declared safe this week can become a battlefield the next.
A memorandum may reduce immediate violence, but without a recognised procedure for investigating violations, every explosion becomes an opportunity for accusation and counterattack.
Attribution itself is increasingly difficult. Missiles, drones, naval mines, proxy forces and unattributed air strikes create a fog in which governments can retaliate before responsibility has been conclusively established.
Recent attacks inside Iran were not immediately claimed, even as Iranian officials accused regional states of facilitating American operations.
Such ambiguity may provide tactical deniability, but it is strategically dangerous.
When several armed forces, intelligence agencies and proxy networks operate within the same compressed geographical space, escalation can occur without either Washington or Tehran initially intending a full confrontation.
The International Maritime Organization has verified at least 46 attacks against international shipping around Hormuz since the conflict began on February 28.
In July, it again condemned attacks on ships and reported that hundreds of vessels and roughly 6,000 seafarers remained stranded in the Persian Gulf.
These are not abstract geopolitical manoeuvres. Civilian sailors, energy consumers, manufacturers and food-importing countries bear the consequences.
The United States and Iran also remain trapped by their domestic political narratives.
American leaders cannot easily concede that Iran has acquired leverage through attacks on shipping.
Iranian leaders cannot accept an arrangement that appears to place the country’s coastline, oil exports and nuclear programme under permanent American supervision.
Both governments therefore need agreements that they can present not as compromises but as victories.
This encourages inflated claims, maximalist language and constantly changing benchmarks.
Each concession must be disguised as coercive success. Each pause is consequently vulnerable to the next incident.
The solution cannot be another loosely drafted truce resting primarily on the personal assurances of political leaders.
What is required is an institutionalised maritime arrangement involving Iran, Oman, the Gulf Arab states, the United States and the International Maritime Organization.
It should establish verified shipping channels, rapid investigation procedures, military communication lines, rules governing naval proximity and a mechanism through which disputed incidents can be examined before retaliatory action begins.
Nuclear negotiations must proceed separately but concurrently.
Loading maritime security, sanctions relief, uranium enrichment, regional missiles and political recognition into a single bargain makes the agreement too heavy to survive.
For Asean, the lesson is sobering. The region may be geographically distant from Hormuz, but it is economically exposed to every disruption there.
LNG supplies, petrochemicals, aviation fuel, fertilisers, shipping costs and electricity prices can all be affected.
Asean governments must therefore stop treating strategic reserves as an optional national policy.
Reserves of crude oil, LNG, LPG and essential industrial inputs must become part of a coordinated regional resilience strategy.
Energy sources must be diversified, emergency-sharing arrangements strengthened and alternative supply corridors developed.
Malaysia and other medium-sized powers should maintain relations with Iran, the Gulf Cooperation Council states, the United States, China, Japan, South Korea and India simultaneously. This is not indecision. It is strategic prudence.
Hormuz demonstrates that the greatest danger does not always come from an intentional decision to begin a major war.
It can emerge from repeated limited actions that each side considers controlled, proportionate and necessary.
The United States and Iran keep lapsing into armed exchanges because neither has decided whether the purpose of force is to prepare the conditions for diplomacy or to replace diplomacy altogether.
Until that distinction is made, every armistice will remain an interval, every memorandum a temporary shelter and every commercial vessel a potential instrument in a much larger contest.
* Phar Kim Beng is a professor of Asean Studies and director, Institute of Internationalisation and Asean Studies, International Islamic University of Malaysia.
** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.
