JANUARY 26 — Malaysia is often described as politically stable, even resilient.
It is not a country prone to coups, nor one that easily succumbs to the collapse of constitutional order.
Yet it is equally true that Malaysia has never been instinctively shaped to be governed by coalitions.
This is the central paradox of contemporary Malaysian politics: stability without simplicity, continuity without cohesion.
Whether it is branded as the Madani Government or the Unity Government, Malaysians have yet to fully internalise the sheer difficulty of sustaining a coalition in a deeply plural, federal, and regionally uneven polity.
Coalitions are not simply about forming governments after elections; they are about managing contradictions—ideological, ethnic, regional, and institutional—on a daily basis.
They require constant negotiation, political humility, and a tolerance for ambiguity that voters themselves often lack.
In a coalition, parties of different ideological hues and interests must coexist. They do not merely compete for power; they must share it.
This means incorporating contradictions rather than eliminating them, postponing maximalist demands, and accepting incremental progress instead of sweeping victories.
Such arrangements are politically exhausting and electorally unrewarding in the short term, especially in a society accustomed to strong executive leadership.
Malaysia’s present coalition is especially fragile because it lacks a dominant party.
Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim leads a government in which his own party, PKR, does not enjoy a commanding numerical edge in Parliament.
The brief moment in 2018—when PKR came closest to achieving such leverage—has not been replicated.
Since then, every coalition Anwar has had to assemble has been built on compromise rather than command.
Compromise, however, is rarely celebrated in Malaysian political culture.
Each concession made to keep the coalition intact is quickly framed as weakness.
Each attempt to neutralise spoilers—whether ideological hardliners, ethno-religious populists, or factional opportunists—is interpreted as indecision or betrayal. Unsurprisingly,
Anwar is often the first to feel the sting of criticism, even when the alternatives are far more destabilising.
Comparative politics offers sobering perspective.
Research on coalition governments in Europe shows that since 1945, fewer than 45 per cent of such governments have completed a full four- or five-year term.
When Italy—long emblematic of coalition instability—is included, the figure rises beyond 50 per cent.
Coalition government, for lack of a better word, is one of the toughest political constellations to construct and sustain.
It requires not just political arithmetic, but political maturity.
Malaysia’s case is further complicated by an unresolved tension between being a federation and being a nation-state.
As Anwar enters the fourth year of a five-year tenure, too little attention has been paid to Malaysia’s uneven political geography.
Malaysia is not a unitary state masquerading as a federation; it is a federation with deep asymmetries in development, identity, and political power.
Previous prime ministers largely governed Malaysia as if Putrajaya alone conferred legitimacy.
The federal executive became the gold standard of authority, with checks and balances often more procedural than substantive.
State governments—particularly those outside the Klang Valley—were frequently managed through patronage or fiscal leverage rather than treated as equal partners within a constitutional framework.
Anwar’s approach marks a subtle but important departure.
He has attempted to reassert Malaysia as a constitutional polity in which federal and state governments recognise their respective divisions of labour.
This is not merely administrative reform; it is a philosophical shift.
It demands restraint from the centre and responsibility from the states—qualities that are difficult to institutionalise in a polarised political environment.
The difficulty is magnified by the persistent temptation to mobilise race and religion as shortcuts to political legitimacy. Ideological excesses in these domains muddy the waters of governance.
They divert attention from the harder task of consolidating Malaysia as a fair and equitable nation—one that treats its citizens judiciously across ethnic, religious, and regional lines, from Perlis to Sabah and Sarawak.
When politics is reduced to identity mobilisation, federalism becomes fragile and coalition governance becomes combustible.
Running Malaysia in Southeast Asia adds yet another layer of complexity.
The region is geopolitically crowded and economically unforgiving.
Malaysia must balance relations with the United States and China, operate within Asean’s consensus-driven constraints, and remain attractive to global capital while safeguarding domestic cohesion.
Coalition governments, by nature, are slower and more deliberative.
Yet Southeast Asia rewards speed, clarity, and policy coherence.
Economic management under a coalition is therefore especially challenging.
Public expectations often overlook the fact that many economic variables are shaped externally.
The ringgit, for instance, recently dipped below the psychological threshold of RM3.9923 to the US dollar before crossing RM4.00 again—the first time in seven years.
Currency movements of this nature are driven less by domestic politics than by global monetary tightening, US interest rate dominance, and capital flows.
To attribute them solely to coalition governance is analytically lazy and politically misleading.
The deeper issue is not whether the Unity Government has done “enough,” but whether Malaysians themselves have adjusted their expectations to the realities of coalition rule.
Coalitions demand patience from voters, discipline from politicians, and honesty from commentators.
They require an acceptance that governance in a plural, federal society will always be uneven, negotiated, and incomplete.
Malaysia’s challenge, therefore, is not that it is governed by a coalition, but that it is still learning how to live with one.
Governing a federation of thirteen states, managing profound social diversity, navigating Southeast Asia’s strategic turbulence, and holding together a fragile coalition is not a trivial undertaking.
It is one of the hardest political experiments any country can attempt.
Before Malaysians repeatedly affirm that the Unity Government has failed to do more, they must first acknowledge the tall order it confronts.
Coalition governance is not a sign of weakness; it is a test of political maturity. When the media does not understand the intricacies of a Coalition government, leading to constant stream of criticism, the media, potentially, the academia, have become complicit in perpetuating the gold standards of governance that cannot be immensely attained. Therein the brewing dissatisfaction from the civil society too.
Before one could say “stop,” the strategic narrative on reforms and keeping the trajectory has been totally muddled.
Malaysia is undergoing that test in real time—and the outcome will shape whether it ultimately succeeds as both a federation and a nation.
* Phar Kim Beng is professor of Asean Studies and director of the Institute of International and Asean Studies, International Islamic University of Malaysia.
** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.
