JANUARY 7 — Full-scale warfare in Yemen may seem distant from Southeast Asia, but the recent turn of events in the Arabian Peninsula demands Southeast Asian strategic attention — especially from Asean’s chairs past, present and future.
What began as a coalition campaign to counter Iranian-aligned Houthi rebels has now morphed into a contest among supposed allies, exposing a fragile Saudi–UAE partnership and complicating the very architecture of Gulf stability.
Last week, Yemeni government forces backed by Saudi Arabia recaptured key governorates in southern Yemen — including Hadramout and al-Mahra — from the United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed separatist Southern Transitional Council (STC).
These territories, crucial for their size and strategic location along the Saudi border, were seized by the STC in late 2025, challenging the authority of Yemen’s internationally recognised government.
Saudi Arabia’s Homeland Shield forces swiftly reclaimed these cities, and government officials described the campaign as “record success.”
Yet the military gains belie deep fractures within the Gulf coalition that has been active in Yemen since 2015.
For years Riyadh and Abu Dhabi marched in tandem against Yemen’s Houthi rebels, who control much of the north with backing from Tehran.
But the rivalry over southern Yemen’s future has forced that alliance into open tension.
Saudi Arabia insists on a unified Yemeni state, wary of separatist momentum that could destabilize its own border regions; the UAE has backed southern autonomy and cultivated influence through the STC.
Those competing visions reached a breaking point in late December 2025, when Saudi airstrikes hit what Riyadh described as a shipment of weapons linked to the STC.
The UAE responded by announcing a withdrawal of its military personnel from Yemen, underscoring disagreement over strategy and burden sharing.
To Asean policymakers and the chairs who have stewarded Southeast Asian regional cooperation, the unfolding Saudi–UAE tensions carry strategic lessons and warnings.
Invariably, when coalitions fracture national interests diverged.
What was once a unified anti-Houthi coalition between Saudi and UAE has now fractured. Saudi and UAE interests in Yemen has begun to diverge.
Riyadh prioritises territorial unity and its own border security; Abu Dhabi has pursued strategic depth through alliances with local actors and autonomy arrangements.
The result is a proxy conflict within a proxy war, complicating efforts to roll back insurgencies and restore governance.
For Asean, which often relies on consensus and coalition building — whether on the South China Sea, Myanmar, or economic initiatives — this is a stark reminder that coalitions must align interests beyond shared rhetoric.
Merely assembling partners against a common threat is insufficient when deeper strategic visions diverge.
Indeed, Asean must navigate Gulf Divides prudently. The emphasis on prudently.
The Saudi–UAE rift illustrates how regional orders can quickly become unstable when allies turn toward competitive agendas.
For Asean, which cultivates relationships across the Indian Ocean to the Gulf, care is needed in managing ties with the GCC — not least because Gulf states play significant economic roles through investment, energy markets, and labour migration.
As Asean has sought to engage the Middle East through mechanisms like the Asean-GCC Dialogue Partnership, diplomatic patience is essential.
Member states should avoid forcing positions in Gulf disputes and instead emphasise inclusive, balanced engagement — a hallmark of Asean centrality. The chairmanship must be adept at comforting the aspired without appearing to take sides.
The situation in southern Yemen shows how local fault lines — in this case, between Yemen’s internationally recognised government and the STC — can become loci of external competition. They are being amplified.
The STC’s declaration of a draft constitution for a future independent south signals deepening secessionist aspirations, even as Riyadh calls for dialogue.
Asean has its own internal cleavages: political models, economic disparities, and strategic outlooks vary widely.
Gulf tensions remind Southeast Asian leaders that external powers will exploit internal divisions unless robust regional mechanisms and political settlements are in place.
To be sure, the fallout from Yemen resonates beyond the Arabian Peninsula.
The Saudi–UAE fissure has implications for broader Middle East diplomacy — from the Red Sea and Horn of Africa to relations with global powers.
Asean must understand that Gulf politics is not siloed; shifts in one theatre can influence energy markets, shipping security, and even Indo-Pacific strategic balances.
This argues for a holistic Asean foreign policy, cognisant of interconnected dynamics between West Asia and Southeast Asia.
Conclusion:
Asean should engage, not entangle
Saudi Arabia and the UAE retain their status as vital economic and strategic partners for Asean states.
Yet the Yemen crisis has shown that Gulf cooperation is not monolithic; alliances can fragment when domestic and regional priorities clash.
For Asean chairs — past, present and future — handling Gulf partnerships requires careful calibration: encourage political solutions, support multilateral processes, and avoid entanglement in divisive rivalries.
In an era of fluid geopolitics, Asean’s strength will be in its strategic autonomy, not taking sides in external feuds that risk eclipsing unity at home.
*Phar Kim Beng is professor of Asean Studies, International Islamic University of Malaysia; Director, Institute of International and Asean Studies.
** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.
