SEPTEMBER 2 — When Timor-Leste formally joins the Association of South-east Asian Nations (Asean) at the October 2025 Summit, Asean will reach a symbolic milestone: 11 members stitched together under one regional roof.
For Malaysia, holding the Group Chair of Asean and Related Summits in this pivotal year, the inclusion of Asean’s youngest democracy is more than a ceremonial gesture. It coincides with a deliberate widening of Asean’s external outreach. Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has not only overseen Asean’s internal consolidation but also extended Asean’s gaze outward — to Brics, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).
This outward push is not accidental. It reflects both Asean’s reading of the times and Malaysia’s instinct to position the region as a convenor of competing worldviews.
By engaging with Brics, Asean signals its recognition of the shifting gravity of global economics toward the Global South.
By attending and inviting GCC representatives, Asean acknowledges the energy-security-finance nexus linking South-east Asia to the Middle East. And by connecting with the SCO, Asean places itself within the Eurasian security dialogue, where China, Russia, India, and Central Asia grapple with terrorism, connectivity, and great-power rivalry.
Sewing the fabric of multilateralism
What Asean and Malaysia are attempting, however modestly, is to sew together patches of multilateralism in an era where unilateralism and zero-sum competition dominate. The vision is not to replace the United Nations, but to compensate for its paralysis.
The UN Security Council, a constellation of five permanent members, now behaves less like a steering committee for global order and more like a cockpit of great-power tantrums. From climate change to credit crunches, the Council is often the least likely forum to forge consensus.
Herein lies Asean’s wager: if the old institutions cannot adapt, new interlocking regionalisms must be woven together.
Asean’s dialogues with Brics, GCC, and SCO are embryonic threads of such a fabric. The goal is to create a world not beholden to one hegemon or one “rules-based order” defined narrowly by a single power bloc, but to a multipolar order with multiple entry points for cooperation.
This effort matters because the idea of a “rules-based order” is increasingly contested.
For Washington and Brussels, the phrase still connotes universal norms grounded in liberal democracy and free markets.
For Beijing, Moscow, and parts of the Global South, it has become a euphemism for Western dominance. Asean cannot afford to take sides in this clash of narratives. Its best option is to enlarge the circle of dialogue, to show that coexistence is not impossible even when consensus is elusive.
The weight of new responsibilities
Yet this outreach brings its own burdens. If Asean were to deepen ties not just with Brics, GCC, and SCO but also with the African Union and perhaps the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), it would shoulder responsibilities far heavier than its current capacity. Asean’s hallmark has been caution, consensus, and non-interference.
By opening too many fronts, Asean risks overpromising while underdelivering. Managing expectations — its own and those of external partners — will be critical.
Asean has long thrived by being a middle space: neither a power bloc nor a pawn, but a forum where rival powers can at least talk. To sustain this role, it must balance ambition with restraint.
Too much ambition risks exposing Asean’s institutional weakness; too much restraint risks making it irrelevant in the fast-moving chessboard of multipolar politics.
The reality is that Asean is being pulled in multiple directions. The United States wants a firm Southeast Asian anchor for its Indo-Pacific strategy. China seeks to draw Asean further into its orbit through trade, infrastructure, and security dialogues. India, Russia, and the Middle East powers now court Asean in ways that were unthinkable a decade ago. Asean’s widening external linkages are both an opportunity and a trap. If managed wisely, they can enhance its strategic centrality. If mismanaged, they can fracture ASEAN from within.
Signs of the times
Ultimately, Asean’s broadening diplomacy reflects the sign of the times: the search for alternatives.
The world is witnessing the erosion of trust in existing multilateral institutions, the sharpening of great-power competition, and the splintering of global supply chains.
In such turbulence, Asean is trying to stitch together islands of dialogue — no matter how small — into archipelagos of stability.
What remains to be seen is whether Asean has the political will and institutional muscle to sustain this experiment.
Timor-Leste’s admission shows Asean’s capacity to grow, but growth without governance will not guarantee relevance.
If Asean succeeds, it will demonstrate that middle powers and small states can shape the architecture of global politics by building bridges across continents and cultures.
If it fails, the region risks being trapped in the binary choices of great-power rivalry, with no room left to manoeuvre.
Malaysia’s Group Chairmanship in 2025 has shown at least one thing: the region understands the stakes.
In a world defined by rivalry, survival lies not in isolation but in weaving as many connections as possible, however fragile the threads may seem.
* Phar Kim Beng, PhD is the Professor of Asean Studies at International Islamic University of Malaysia and Director of Institute of Internationalisation and Asean Studies (IINTAS).
** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.
