MAY 16 — The Andaman Sea is quietly becoming one of the most strategically sensitive maritime spaces in the Indo-Pacific. For decades, it existed largely outside the intense geopolitical spotlight that illuminated the South China Sea, Taiwan Strait or even the Korean Peninsula.
Today, however, the Andaman region is increasingly caught between the expanding maritime ambitions of India and China, the fragility of global supply chains, and the growing militarisation of strategic chokepoints across Asia.
Asean cannot afford to ignore these developments. India’s ambitious transformation of Great Nicobar Island has become the clearest symbol of this shift.
The roughly US$10 billion project, involving a massive transshipment port, dual-use airport, township, energy infrastructure and tourism facilities, is officially framed as a developmental initiative aimed at boosting connectivity and economic growth. Yet few serious observers doubt the strategic dimensions behind the project.
The Andaman and Nicobar chain occupies one of the most important maritime positions in the world. Located near the northern entrance of the Strait of Malacca, these islands sit astride the critical sea lanes connecting the Indian Ocean with East Asia.
A substantial portion of global trade, energy flows and container shipping passes through these waters every single day.
For India, strengthening its presence there is increasingly viewed as a strategic necessity rather than a luxury. China’s naval modernisation has accelerated dramatically over the last decade.
The commissioning of the Fujian, China’s third aircraft carrier, reflects Beijing’s determination to evolve into a true blue-water naval power capable of sustained deployments far beyond the Western Pacific. Chinese naval operations in the Indian Ocean are no longer occasional symbolic missions.
They are becoming more regular, more sophisticated and more deeply integrated into Beijing’s wider maritime strategy.
From New Delhi’s perspective, failing to strengthen the Andaman and Nicobar Islands would amount to strategic negligence.
India recognises that the Andaman Sea is no longer geographically peripheral. It is now central to the future balance of power in the Indo-Pacific.
The ability to monitor shipping traffic, track submarine movements and potentially influence maritime access near the Strait of Malacca carries enormous strategic value.
This reality has become even more pronounced following the prolonged instability in West Asia and the Strait of Hormuz.
The disruptions caused by tensions involving Iran, the United States and Israel have reminded Asia how vulnerable global energy routes remain. East Asia depends overwhelmingly on imported energy, much of which travels through the Indian Ocean before entering South-east Asian waters.
If the Strait of Hormuz becomes unstable, the strategic significance of the Andaman Sea naturally rises.
Maritime planners across Asia increasingly understand that vulnerabilities in one chokepoint elevate the importance of others.
Yet strategic necessity does not erase legitimate concerns.
The Great Nicobar project sits in one of the world’s most environmentally fragile regions. The island contains dense tropical forests, coral reef systems and highly sensitive ecosystems that support endangered species, including the leatherback turtle.
Indigenous communities such as the Shompen also face potential displacement and cultural disruption from rapid large-scale development.
More troubling still is the geological reality.
The Andaman and Nicobar chain lies along highly active seismic fault lines. The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami demonstrated the catastrophic risks associated with this region. To construct massive ports, airports, military facilities and energy infrastructure in such an environment inevitably raises difficult questions about long-term sustainability and disaster vulnerability.
There is therefore a profound danger that geopolitical competition may override environmental prudence.
Asean should be particularly concerned because the Andaman Sea directly interfaces with South-east Asia’s broader maritime environment. Any intensification of India-China rivalry in these waters would inevitably affect Asean’s strategic equilibrium.
The region has already witnessed how unresolved maritime competition transformed the South China Sea into a persistent zone of tension, militarisation and diplomatic fragmentation. Asean cannot allow another sensitive maritime space to evolve along similar lines.
At the same time, Asean must approach the issue carefully and avoid simplistic binaries.
India is an indispensable strategic partner for South-east Asia. Relations between Asean and India have deepened significantly across trade, defence, technology and connectivity.
Many Asean states welcome India’s greater engagement as part of a broader diversification strategy within the Indo-Pacific.
China, however, remains Asean’s largest trading partner and one of the region’s most important economic actors.
Beijing’s economic integration with South-east Asia is now deeply entrenched across manufacturing, infrastructure, finance and digital technology.
Asean therefore cannot frame the Andaman issue as a choice between India and China. Asean should always work with all since it is guided by open regionalism; the sort that is not anathema to the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (Apec) of which Asean is a key player.
Such a framing would only deepen regional polarisation.
Instead, Asean’s role should be to encourage strategic restraint, environmental transparency and confidence-building measures that reduce the risks of militarisation and miscalculation.
The Andaman Sea should not become another theatre of unmanaged great-power rivalry. This is especially important because the wider Indo-Pacific is already under enormous stress.
The war in West Asia, tensions over Taiwan, despite President Donald Trump’s assertion that he will not back the independence of the Taiwan, disruptions in global trade, intensifying technological competition and rising military expenditures are collectively creating a far more unstable international environment.
In such circumstances, even relatively remote maritime regions can rapidly acquire outsized strategic importance.
The Andaman Sea is no longer geographically distant from Asean’s concerns. It is becoming directly connected to South-east Asia’s future security, trade resilience and environmental stability.
Ultimately, the challenge facing Asia is not whether major powers will compete. Competition is now a permanent feature of the international system.
The real question is whether such competition can be managed responsibly without destroying fragile ecosystems, destabilising maritime routes or provoking new security dilemmas.
The Andaman Sea remains one of the most pristine maritime environments in Asia. That is precisely why regional powers must proceed with caution.
History repeatedly shows that strategic overreach often begins in places once considered peripheral.
The Andaman Sea may soon prove that no maritime space in the Indo-Pacific can remain insulated from the pressures of great-power politics.
The challenge for Asean is to ensure that strategic necessity does not overwhelm environmental wisdom and regional diplomacy before it is too late.
* Phar Kim Beng is a professor of Asean Studies and director, Institute of Internationalisation and Asean Studies, International Islamic University of Malaysia.
** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.
