APRIL 12 — The departure of US Vice President JD Vance from Islamabad should not be mistaken for the collapse of diplomacy.
On the contrary, it may well signal the transition from visible negotiations to quieter, more consequential phases of engagement.
Diplomacy, especially in times of war, rarely unfolds in linear or transparent ways.
At the heart of the current impasse lies a familiar but deeply contentious issue: nuclear weapons.
Vance has made it unequivocally clear that the United States seeks an affirmative commitment from Iran—not only that it will not pursue a nuclear weapon, but that it will also refrain from developing the technological capabilities that would allow it to do so at short notice.
This is not a minor demand. It strikes at the core of Iran’s strategic doctrine.
Tehran, for its part, continues to insist that its nuclear programme is peaceful. It has repeatedly denied any intention to develop atomic weapons.
Yet this assertion exists in tension with the actions of the United States and Israel, both of which have targeted sensitive Iranian facilities—not only during the current war that began on February 28, 2026, but also in the preceding year.
These strikes are not merely tactical. They are pre-emptive signals rooted in deep mistrust.
Thus, the negotiations are not simply about verification. They are about belief. And belief, in international politics, is far harder to secure than compliance.
Vance’s presence in Islamabad was therefore never meant to produce an immediate breakthrough.
Pakistan, positioned at the crossroads of West Asia, South Asia, and Central Asia, serves as a strategic intermediary—a venue where multiple channels of communication can intersect without the political burden of formal alignment.
His departure, then, reflects neither failure nor abandonment. It reflects the limits of what can be achieved in a single round of talks conducted under the shadow of ongoing military confrontation.
Indeed, some of the most critical negotiations in history have advanced only after public diplomacy appeared to stall.
What follows is often a period of back channel engagement, where state actors and trusted intermediaries explore compromises away from media scrutiny.
There are already indications that such a phase may be underway in European Union (EU), the Arab world and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
The involvement of countries such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt suggests that the negotiation architecture is expanding rather than contracting.
These states bring with them distinct leverage: Turkey as a NATO member with regional credibility, Saudi Arabia as a central actor in the Gulf security framework, and Egypt as a long-standing diplomatic broker in Middle Eastern conflicts.
Their participation underscores a critical point: this is no longer a bilateral issue between Washington and Tehran. It is a systemic crisis with regional and global implications.
The stakes could not be higher. The Strait of Hormuz remains a chokepoint through which a significant portion of the world’s energy supply flows.
Any prolonged disruption has cascading effects—not only on fuel prices, but also on fertilisers, industrial inputs, and food security.
Malaysia and the broader Asean region are not insulated from these shocks.
In fact, research shows that by the second week of the 40 day war between US, Israel and Iran, marked by the retaliations of Teheran, which disrupted the energy and gas facilities, shutting them immediately disrupted the supply chain of many industries abroad.
Since there facilities once shut down take many years to restore them into operational efficiency.
East Asia is deeply exposed to them. It is precisely this interconnected vulnerability that sustains the logic of continued negotiation.
As of now, it appears that the United States, the objective is to prevent nuclear proliferation without becoming entrapped in an open-ended conflict.
For Iran, the imperative is to preserve sovereignty and strategic deterrence without inviting overwhelming retaliation.
These goals are not mutually exclusive. But they are exceedingly difficult to reconcile.
Domestic politics in the United States further complicates the equation.
The approach taken by the current administration will inevitably be scrutinised in the lead-up to the 2026 midterm elections.
Should voters perceive the Iran policy as either too aggressive or insufficiently effective, political recalibration will follow.
Yet such recalibration does not necessarily derail diplomacy. It may, in fact, create new openings.
Historically, American foreign policy has demonstrated a capacity to oscillate between confrontation and negotiation without abandoning its core strategic objectives.
This flexibility—sometimes criticised as inconsistency—is in reality a source of resilience.
Iran, too, has shown an ability to endure pressure while keeping diplomatic channels ajar.
This mutual endurance is what keeps the peace process alive, even when progress appears elusive.
To interpret Vance’s departure as the end of negotiations is therefore to misunderstand the nature of diplomacy itself.
Negotiations do not end when officials leave the room. They evolve, fragment, and reassemble across different platforms and actors.
Islamabad may no longer host the immediate talks involving JD Vance. But the process it facilitated is far from over. Jared Kushner and Steve Witkolf the Special Envoy of President Donald Trump remain on site to negotiate with Iran.
The peace process in Islamabad will drag on beyond April 20 2026 while other countries such as Egypt and Turkey affected deeply by the war will continue to do their bits in diplomacy.
For Asean, and for Malaysia, the lesson is both urgent and clear. Stability in West Asia is not a distant concern. It is a direct determinant of economic security, supply chain continuity, and regional resilience.
The region must therefore support all efforts—formal and informal—that sustain dialogue.
In geopolitics, the most important negotiations are often those that continue when the world assumes they have already failed.
* Phar Kim Beng is a professor of Asean Studies and director at the Institute of International and Asean Studies, International Islamic University of Malaysia.
** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.
