MAY 2 — An open-ended ceasefire in West Asia is not a solution – it is a strategic pause. It is a moment when great powers reassess, recalibrate, and reposition. But the deeper danger lies elsewhere.

The fate of West Asia is now increasingly tied to another battlefield: Ukraine. Without a clear and decisive outcome in Ukraine, Russia will remain trapped in a liminal state – neither defeated nor victorious, but dangerously incentivised to expand its strategic reach elsewhere, including Iran.

This is why Ukraine is not just a European war. It is the hinge upon which the global balance of power now turns.

Russia today is beleaguered but not broken, battered but not completely bushwhacked into defeat. As and when it can, Russia can aid Iran.

Notwithstanding its war effort against Ukraine has dragged into its fifth year, with mounting economic strain, declining public morale, and only incremental territorial gains in the east of Ukraine, Moscow and Teheran can work together.

To be sure, the Kremlin’s inability to secure a decisive victory has undermined its claim to great power status. But this is precisely why Russia will not abandon Iran completely.

As long as the war with Ukraine remains unresolved, Russia cannot convincingly reassert itself as a dominant pole in the international system.

Yet paradoxically, this very weakness makes Russia more dangerous and inclined to support Iran to the hilt.

A Russia that wins clearly in Ukraine would consolidate power, stabilise its domestic legitimacy, and potentially recalibrate its relations with the West from a position of strength.

A Russia that loses outright would be forced into retrenchment.

But a Russia stuck in between – a Russia denied victory yet unwilling to concede defeat – will seek alternative theatres to regain leverage.

In this vein, West Asia is the most immediate candidate. The emerging link is the Caspian Sea, especially when Russia has no major push back from the Trump administration.

With the Strait of Hormuz under strain and maritime flows disrupted, Iran has begun to rely more heavily on northern corridors connecting it to Russia. This logistical shift is not merely economic. 

It is strategic.

It creates a Eurasian axis that binds Moscow and Tehran more closely together at a time when both face Western pressure.

If Russia cannot win decisively in Ukraine, it can still compensate by deepening its role in West Asia.

It can provide putatively or politically provide Iran with intelligence, military technology, logistical support, and diplomatic cover to conduct a longer war.

In return, Iran can help stretch American resources across multiple theatres – from the Gulf to the Red Sea to the Eastern Mediterranean.

This is the essence of strategic substitution.

Russia does not need to defeat the United States directly. It only needs to ensure that Washington is overextended.

A prolonged crisis in West Asia, layered on top of an unresolved war in Ukraine, achieves precisely that outcome.

Recent developments already point in this direction.

Military spending continues to rise globally, driven in large part by the European response to Russia and the broader instability generated by overlapping conflicts.

At the same time, the United States under President Donald Trump has shown signs of recalibrating its commitments, including pauses or fluctuations in support for Ukraine.

This creates an opening.

From Moscow’s perspective, the objective is not simply to win battles, but to reshape alignments.

If Russia can deepen the crisis in West Asia while the United States remains entangled in Ukraine, it increases the likelihood of transatlantic strain. Nato, already under pressure from divergent threat perceptions and burden-sharing debates, could face further fragmentation.

Historically, Russia has viewed Nato expansion as an existential threat. The support that Ukraine receives from Nato in particular – at a time when all its 32 member states plan to boost their defence spending to 5 per cent of their GDP – has made President Vladimir Putin even more determined to prevail, despite losing close to 1 million troops between 2022 and 2026.

The war in Ukraine itself is deeply intertwined with Moscow’s desire to halt – or reverse – this expansion.

There have been up to three Ukrainian drone attacks against Russian oil pipelines in the last one month alone.

Kviv is trying to neuter the ability of Russia to see itself as a major supplier of sour crude to the rest of the world.

If Russia cannot achieve this through military victory in Ukraine, it may attempt to achieve it indirectly by weakening Nato cohesion.

West Asia becomes a tool in this broader strategy.

By aiding Iran – whether directly or indirectly – Russia can escalate tensions in regions critical to global energy flows.

The Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea, and even secondary routes like the Caspian Sea become interconnected theatres of pressure.

The result is not a single crisis, but a cascading series of disruptions that test the resilience of Western alliances.

The goal is not necessarily to provoke a full-scale confrontation. It is to create enough instability that political divisions within Nato widen.

If energy prices spike, if supply chains fracture, and if domestic pressures mount within European economies, the appetite for sustained confrontation with Russia may diminish.

This is where the role of President Donald Trump becomes crucial.

Trump has long signalled scepticism towards traditional alliance structures, particularly Nato.

While his administration has engaged in negotiations to end the Ukraine war, significant gaps remain, including disputes over territory and security guarantees.

For Russia, the ideal scenario is not just a favourable outcome in Ukraine, but a political shift in Washington that leads to a more transactional – and less committed – approach to Nato.

An overextended United States, dealing simultaneously with Ukraine and West Asia, increases the probability of such a shift.

In this context, an open-ended ceasefire in West Asia becomes deeply problematic. It allows Iran to regroup. It allows Russia to reposition.

It allows the conflict to expand geographically, particularly through corridors like the Caspian Sea. And most importantly, it allows the strategic linkage between Ukraine and West Asia to solidify.

The world is thus facing not one war, but a connected system of wars.

Ukraine is the primary theatre where the question of Russian power is being decided.

West Asia is the secondary theatre where Russia can compensate for its limitations. The Caspian Sea is the connective tissue that binds the two.

If Russia secures a clear victory in Ukraine, it may reduce its need to escalate elsewhere.

But if it does not – if the war remains unresolved – then the incentive to deepen involvement in West Asia will only grow.

This is the paradox of contemporary geopolitics.

Peace in one region cannot be sustained if war in another remains unresolved.

A ceasefire in West Asia, without a settlement in Ukraine or progress towards it, risks becoming a staging ground for wider confrontation.

Remember how Russia enlisted the North Korean troops, some 60,000 of them, almost all of whom were elite commandos, to help them thwart the further advances of Ukraine?

Wars in Iran can spread horizontally when the Caspian Sea is connected to Russia to induce Moscow’s involvement.

The Caspian Sea, once peripheral to global strategy, could emerge as a central axis linking two conflicts into one.

Hence looking at the Hormuz and Red Sea, for that matter, the Suez canal alone are not enough.

In such a world, the illusion of peace, as produced by an open ended ceasefire, is more dangerous than war itself.

* Phar Kim Beng is a professor of Asean Studies and a director of the Institute of International and Asean Studies, International Islamic University of Malaysia.

** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.