APRIL 11 — The ongoing efforts to negotiate an end to the United States–Iran conflict reveal not only the complexity of diplomacy, but also the shifting cast of political actors shaping its direction.

Among them, one figure has remained conspicuously quiet throughout the war that began on February 28, 2026: JD Vance.

His relative silence has not gone unnoticed in Washington.

Some political observers suggest that this restraint was deliberate, aimed at preserving his standing within a distinct MAGA constituency that is wary of prolonged foreign entanglements.

That positioning has now shifted. Donald Trump has brought JD Vance directly into the negotiation process.

This move reflects a recalibration — from escalation to bargaining.

Vance’s relative distance from the war effort now becomes an asset.

Compared to figures such as Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, he appears less politically burdened, and therefore more flexible in testing compromises.

They have all gathered with their counterparts in Islamabad.

Trump, for his part, remains consistent in his strategic instinct. He is not irrational.

He is negotiating a new maritime order that Israel has brought him into, which he now wants to extricate himself from.

War, in his worldview, is often a prelude to negotiation — a means of accumulating leverage before returning to the table to extract concessions.

Yet even as new actors enter the negotiation room in Islamabad, the structure of the talks remains too narrow.

If the objective is not merely to stop the war but to stabilize the global system that has been shaken by it, then the negotiations must expand beyond the immediate parties. This is especially true for maritime stakeholders.

The crisis in the Strait of Hormuz is not geographically confined.

Its consequences ripple across the Indian Ocean and into Southeast Asia, particularly the Strait of Malacca — the most critical chokepoint in global trade.

In this context, the three littoral states of the Strait of Malacca — Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia — should be formally included as observers in the Islamabad negotiations.

This is not a matter of prestige. It is a matter of systemic necessity to preserve the importance of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore all share.

First, these three countries collectively manage and safeguard one of the busiest and most strategically vital sea lanes in the world.

Any disruption in the Strait of Hormuz will inevitably divert traffic, alter shipping routes, and increase pressure on the Strait of Malacca.

Without their input, any agreement on maritime security risks being incomplete.

Second, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia possess decades of experience in cooperative maritime governance.

Through coordinated patrols, information-sharing mechanisms, and anti-piracy operations, they have demonstrated that sovereignty and collaboration can coexist.

This experience is directly relevant to the current challenge of securing safe passage in contested waters.

Third, their inclusion would enhance the legitimacy of the negotiations.

A process that involves only the primary belligerents risks being perceived as narrow and self-serving.

By contrast, the presence of neutral or semi-neutral observers from Southeast Asia would signal that the negotiations are attentive to the broader international community.

Fourth, these states are not passive observers of global trade. They are active custodians of it.

Singapore, as one of the world’s leading port hubs, depends on uninterrupted maritime flows.

Malaysia and Indonesia, with their extensive coastlines and proximity to key shipping routes, are equally exposed to disruptions.

Their economic stability — and by extension, Asean’s stability — is directly tied to the outcome of these negotiations.

From Hormuz to Malacca: A Connected Maritime System

The strategic linkage between the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca cannot be overstated.

Energy flows from the Gulf pass through Hormuz, traverse the Indian Ocean, and funnel into Malacca before reaching East Asia.

Any instability at the origin point inevitably affects the entire chain.

If Hormuz is disrupted, Malacca becomes congested.

If alternative routes are sought, shipping costs rise.

If security risks increase, insurance premiums surge.

In this sense, the two straits are not separate theatres.

They are part of a single, integrated maritime system.

To negotiate the future of one without consulting the guardians of the other is strategically short-sighted.

Conclusion: Observers Today, Stakeholders Always

The inclusion of Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia as observers in Islamabad would not complicate the negotiations.

It would strengthen them.

It would bring practical maritime experience into the discussion.

It would broaden the legitimacy of the process.

And it would ensure that any agreement reached is grounded in the realities of global trade flows.

At a time when diplomacy must move beyond bilateral bargaining to systemic stabilisation, widening the table is not optional. It is essential.

The lesson of this crisis is clear. Peace cannot be negotiated in isolation.

It must be constructed with all stakeholders in mind.

And for a world whose economic lifelines run through both Hormuz and Malacca, the voices of the littoral states are not peripheral. They are indispensable.

* Phar Kim Beng is a professor of Asean Studies and director at the Institute of International and Asean Studies, International Islamic University of Malaysia.

** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.