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Failures in the Straits of Hormuz will goad all powers to put a premium on the Strait of Malacca in future — Phar Kim Beng

MARCH 19 — The Strait of Hormuz, long regarded as one of the most vital chokepoints in global energy security, is now at the center of an unmistakable geopolitical reckoning. 

What was once a narrow maritime passage defined by geography has become a direct test of political will, collective security, and the credibility of global powers to safeguard the arteries of international trade.

President Donald Trump’s call for China, France, Japan, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and other affected nations to send naval vessels into the Gulf marks a decisive shift. It is not merely an appeal — it is a strategic summons. 

The message is clear: the burden of securing the Strait of Hormuz must no longer fall on the United States alone.

This call reflects a deeper reality.

The disruption of Hormuz is no longer a regional issue confined to the Gulf. It is a systemic threat to the global economy. 

When nearly one-fifth of the world’s oil supply transits through a single narrow waterway, any sustained instability becomes intolerable.

Yet, the responses from key powers reveal a gap between recognition and resolve. The United Kingdom continues to deliberate with allies. 

France, under President Emmanuel Macron, has expressed willingness to deploy naval forces, but strictly within the confines of escort missions and only after the most intense phase of conflict subsides. 

Such positions underscore a reluctance to commit fully to the enforcement of maritime security at a time when decisive action is required.

This hesitation will not contain the crisis. It will deepen and broaden it.

As long as Hormuz remains exposed to disruption — whether through asymmetric tactics, residual command fragmentation, or calculated brinkmanship — the global system will begin to reorganize itself.

Energy-importing nations will not wait indefinitely. They will adapt. They will reroute. They will reinforce alternative corridors.

A map showing the Strait of Hormuz is seen in this illustration taken June 22, 2025. Much of the world’s fertiliser is made in the Middle East, with one-third of global trade in it passing through the Strait of Hormuz, a narrow shipping route along Iran’s coast that has largely been shut since the conflict began. — Reuters pic

In this strategic recalibration, the Strait of Malacca will rise from importance to indispensability.

Already one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world, the Strait of Malacca connects the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea, serving as the primary conduit for energy flows into East Asia. 

For China, Japan, and South Korea, it is nothing less than an economic lifeline. 

Any shift away from Hormuz instability will intensify reliance on Malacca as the central artery of global commerce.

But this elevation comes with consequences.

The more the world depends on Malacca, the more it will attract attention, presence, and pressure from major powers. Naval deployments will increase. 

Surveillance operations will intensify. Strategic competition will not diminish—it will relocate.

What is now unfolding is not a simple redistribution of maritime traffic. It is the emergence of a new hierarchy of chokepoints, where Malacca stands at the apex.

For Southeast Asia, this transformation carries profound implications.

Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore — custodians of the Strait of Malacca — will find themselves at the center of a global maritime convergence. 

The expectations placed upon them will grow, as will the stakes. Ensuring the safety, efficiency, and neutrality of the strait will no longer be a regional responsibility alone. It will become a matter of global urgency.

At the same time, the influx of external naval presence must be managed with utmost care. 

The securitization of Malacca cannot come at the expense of regional autonomy. Asean's long-standing principles of neutrality and centrality must not only be preserved — they must be strengthened.

This requires a deliberate strategy. Coordinated patrols among littoral states must be enhanced.

Maritime domain awareness must be expanded through technological investment.

Engagement with external powers must be structured, transparent, and anchored in Asean-led frameworks.

The objective is clear: to prevent the Strait of Malacca from becoming an arena of rivalry while ensuring that it remains a secure and open passage for global trade.

The crisis in Hormuz has exposed a fundamental truth about the contemporary international system.

Chokepoints are no longer isolated vulnerabilities. They are interconnected nodes in a fragile network. When one fails, the pressure shifts — rapidly and relentlessly — to another.

Trump’s call for a coalition of naval powers is therefore more than a response to immediate instability. 

It is an acknowledgment that the security of global trade routes must be shared, not monopolized.

But unless this call is matched by decisive and collective action, its implications will extend far beyond the Gulf.

Failure in Hormuz will not remain in Hormuz.

It will compel nations to reprice risk, redirect flows, and reconfigure strategy. 

It will elevate the Strait of Malacca into the central pillar of global maritime stability — while simultaneously exposing it to unprecedented scrutiny and competition.

For Malaysia, this moment demands clarity and leadership. 

It must engage major powers without being subsumed by their rivalries. It must protect its sovereignty while contributing to global stability. 

And it must recognize that the future of its own security is inseparable from the fate of the world’s most critical sea lanes.

In the final analysis, what fails in the Strait of Hormuz will not simply disrupt the present. It will redefine the future.

And in that future, the Strait of Malacca will stand as the ultimate guarantor — or the next fault line — of the global order.

* Phar Kim Beng, PhD is the Professor of Asean Studies at International Islamic University of Malaysia and Director of Institute of International and Asean Studies (IINTAS).

** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.

 

 

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