OCTOBER 26 — In a world increasingly fractured by geopolitical rivalry, protectionism, technological nationalism and strategic distrust, Chinese economist Jin Keyu has offered Beijing something more valuable than another prescription for economic growth.
She has articulated a strategy through which China can remain globally indispensable without insisting on being industrially dominant everywhere.
Her argument, published in TIME on October 23, 2026, deserves serious attention not merely in Beijing, but across Asean, Europe, Africa, Latin America and the United States.
At the heart of her argument is a fundamental proposition: China cannot indefinitely remain the world’s factory.
Instead, it must increasingly become an exporter of industrial knowledge, technological capabilities and productive expertise.
This is not an admission of Chinese decline. It is a recognition of China’s industrial maturity.
For more than four decades, China has benefited from a global economic arrangement in which foreign capital, technology and markets helped transform its enormous workforce into the most sophisticated manufacturing ecosystem in modern history. China learned from the world.
Now, as Jin correctly argues, China must help the world learn from China. The distinction is strategically profound.
China’s economic success has generated a paradox.
The more competitive its electric vehicles, solar panels, batteries, robotics and advanced machinery become, the greater the resistance from countries fearful of losing their own industrial capacities.
The United States has responded through tariffs, export controls and industrial policies designed to reduce dependence on Chinese production. Europe has become increasingly concerned about its industrial competitiveness.
Developing economies, meanwhile, face the uncomfortable prospect of becoming permanent consumers of Chinese technology without acquiring the means to manufacture it themselves.
China’s enormous merchandise trade surplus demonstrates extraordinary manufacturing competitiveness, but it also creates political vulnerabilities.
No major economy can expect others to remain permanently comfortable with industrial dependence. Jin’s contribution is to recognise that economic efficiency and political acceptability are no longer synonymous.
What makes commercial sense in Shenzhen may generate political resentment in Brussels, Washington, Jakarta or Brasília.
Therefore, the next stage of China’s globalisation must be qualitatively different.
Instead of merely exporting electric vehicles, China should help other countries develop their own electric vehicle industries. Instead of simply selling batteries, it should facilitate battery production, recycling and research abroad.
Instead of monopolising advanced manufacturing knowledge, it should cultivate international networks capable of adapting and improving upon Chinese industrial expertise.
This is where Jin’s strategy acquires enormous geopolitical significance.
China would no longer be viewed exclusively as an industrial competitor. It could increasingly become a partner in the productive transformation of other economies.
Such a transformation would not eliminate geopolitical rivalry. Nevertheless, it could reduce the intensity of economic resistance that China’s manufacturing dominance has generated.
Examples already exist. Chinese electric vehicle manufacturer BYD has pursued local manufacturing capabilities in Brazil and Hungary.
In Indonesia, Chinese investment has contributed to an integrated battery industry encompassing nickel processing, battery production and recycling.
These developments suggest that Chinese globalisation can evolve beyond the shipment of finished goods towards the international diffusion of industrial capabilities.
For Asean, the implications are particularly important. The region cannot afford to become merely a marketplace for Chinese industrial surpluses.
Nor should Asean allow itself to become a geopolitical instrument through which the United States attempts to contain China’s technological development. The Asean Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, adopted in 2019, emphasises openness, inclusivity, cooperation and mutual benefit.
Jin’s proposed economic transformation is broadly compatible with these principles, provided technology partnerships genuinely strengthen local industries rather than reproduce new forms of dependency.
Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam and the Philippines should therefore approach Chinese investment with greater strategic sophistication. The objective must not simply be attracting factories.
It must involve acquiring technological capabilities, strengthening local suppliers, training engineers and creating opportunities for domestic enterprises to move up global value chains.
Malaysia, in particular, possesses considerable advantages through its established electrical and electronics ecosystem, semiconductor capabilities and expanding digital infrastructure.
Yet these strengths cannot be taken for granted.
If Malaysia wishes to become a serious participant in the next generation of advanced manufacturing, it must negotiate partnerships that generate lasting technological learning. Investment without knowledge transfer risks producing industrial enclaves rather than national technological advancement.
The same principle applies to artificial intelligence. Jin correctly observes that the greatest economic significance of AI may not necessarily lie in developing the world’s most powerful model.
Rather, it may lie in making sophisticated AI sufficiently affordable, accessible and adaptable for widespread use. This distinction deserves emphasis.
The United States and China are engaged in an increasingly intense competition over advanced semiconductors, computing infrastructure and artificial intelligence capabilities.
Yet for developing countries, the immediate challenge is often less about achieving technological supremacy than ensuring that technology can improve productivity, education, healthcare, logistics and public administration.
Affordable and adaptable AI systems could potentially accelerate development across the Global South.
Chinese models such as Alibaba’s Qwen and DeepSeek, while not necessarily perfect, illustrate the possibilities of technological diffusion, although questions surrounding data governance, cybersecurity and institutional dependence must also be addressed.
Indeed, the democratisation of technological capabilities should not become another route towards digital colonialism.
Countries must retain meaningful control over their data, critical infrastructure and national technological priorities.
China’s long-term success will therefore depend not merely on how widely its technologies are adopted, but on whether their adoption strengthens the autonomy of its partners. This brings us to the deeper strategic wisdom of Jin’s argument.
In international relations, excessive concentrations of power invariably generate balancing behaviour. This principle applies not only to military capabilities but also to industrial and technological dominance.
When one country becomes overwhelmingly indispensable, others begin searching for alternatives, even when such alternatives are economically less efficient.
The United States has demonstrated this through its efforts to diversify critical supply chains away from China.
Europe is pursuing similar objectives through industrial and technological policies. Asean countries, meanwhile, are increasingly conscious of the dangers of excessive dependence on any single external power.
Consequently, China should not confuse economic indispensability with geopolitical security.
An industrial empire that provokes resistance everywhere may ultimately become less sustainable than a network of productive partnerships that allows other countries to prosper. Herein lies the importance of circumscribed power.
China need not control every stage of global manufacturing to exercise substantial international influence.
Indeed, by sharing technological capabilities and cultivating productive partnerships, Beijing could develop relationships that are more durable than those based primarily on commercial dependence.
Such a strategy would also be consistent with China’s frequently stated commitment to South-South cooperation and a more inclusive international economic order.
However, rhetoric alone will not suffice. Beijing must demonstrate that its commitment to shared development extends beyond infrastructure financing and export promotion.
It must be willing to support local research institutions, encourage joint technological development, deepen vocational training and create opportunities for domestic companies in partner countries.
Equally important, China must address its own domestic economic imbalances.
Greater international technological diffusion cannot substitute for stronger household consumption and sustainable domestic economic reform. A successful external strategy must therefore complement internal economic restructuring.
The United States, too, should pay attention. Washington cannot reasonably expect developing countries to reject Chinese technology merely because American policymakers regard China as a strategic competitor.
If Chinese technology is affordable, adaptable and capable of improving local productivity, developing economies will naturally consider adopting it.
The appropriate American response should be to offer credible alternatives, strengthen technological cooperation and compete through innovation rather than rely exclusively on restrictions.
A world in which technological capabilities are widely distributed would ultimately be more economically resilient than one divided into mutually hostile technological blocs.
For Asean, this is especially consequential.
The region’s future should not be reduced to choosing between American technological supremacy and Chinese industrial dominance. Asean must instead develop the institutional capacity to engage both powers while preserving its strategic autonomy.
Universities, research institutes, industrial associations and governments must work together to ensure that technological cooperation produces genuine local capabilities.
The Asean Plus Three framework, involving China, Japan and South Korea, offers an additional platform through which industrial learning and technological collaboration could be strengthened.
Such cooperation would help Asean move beyond the narrow logic of geopolitical alignment towards the broader objective of collective economic resilience.
Ultimately, Jin Keyu has identified a strategic choice confronting China. Beijing can continue seeking ever-greater manufacturing dominance, accepting the mounting political resistance that accompanies it.
Alternatively, it can convert its extraordinary industrial achievements into a foundation for shared technological advancement.
The latter course is more compatible with the economic aspirations of developing countries and potentially more sustainable for China’s own international standing.
By 2050, China’s greatest contribution to the world may not be measured by the number of electric vehicles, batteries or robots it exports.
It may instead be measured by how many countries have acquired the capacity to produce, innovate and compete because of their technological partnerships with China.
That would represent a remarkable transformation in China’s relationship with the international economy.
Jin Keyu has offered Beijing an intellectually coherent and strategically prudent way forward. China should take her seriously. Asean should engage with her ideas.
The United States and Europe should recognise their implications.
For the future of globalisation cannot rest indefinitely on one country manufacturing for everyone else.
It must increasingly rest on the capacity of more countries to manufacture, innovate and prosper together.
That is the strategic wisdom of Jin Keyu’s proposal. And that is precisely why the world ought to pay attention.
* Phar Kim Beng, PhD, is Professor of Asean Studies at the International Islamic University of Malaysia and Director of the Institute of International and Asean Studies (IINTAS).
** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.
