SEPTEMBER 15 — The latest seizure of Greater Hanish and Lesser Hanish by Yemen’s Houthi rebels, following their capture of Perim Island in the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the port of Mokha, should not be read as another episode in Yemen’s civil war.
It should be read as a direct challenge to the security of global trade.
To be sure, when an Iran-backed militant group takes physical control of islands that overlook one of the world’s most vital shipping lanes, the world moves beyond local conflict.
It enters a phase where geography itself is being used as leverage.
The Bab al-Mandab is narrow, exposed, and indispensable. A significant share of the world’s container traffic and energy shipments transit these waters daily, bound for Europe, Asia, and beyond.
For years the risks here were piracy and sporadic attacks. Now the risk is persistent territorial control by a non-state actor. That changes everything.
Previously, Houthi operations in the Red Sea were intermittent. Drone strikes, missile launches, and vessel seizures created disruption, but they were limited by range and logistics. Island bases alter that equation.
With Greater and Lesser Hanish, along with Perim, the Houthis now have persistent presence.
They gain radar coverage and staging points that allow continuous monitoring of the strait.
They also gain operational depth. Forward positions mean less dependence on the mainland for resupply and launch. Most importantly, they gain psychological leverage.
The mere capability to threaten transit can change shipping behaviour even without a shot being fired.
The capture of Mokha adds another layer. Ports provide logistics, intelligence, and political signalling.
With both coastline and islands under the influence of the Houthi, the group now holds positions on both sides of the strait. That gives them options, and it narrows the options for everyone else.
In maritime economics, uncertainty often costs more than conflict. Shipping lines will reroute, insurance will rise, and delivery times will stretch. Those costs do not stay at sea. They reach consumers.
First, consider energy and trade vulnerability. Oil and goods moving through Bab al-Mandab are central to global supply chains.
Any incident, whether a drone strike, a near-miss, or a warning, would push vessels to take much longer routes around Africa.
That means higher freight rates, tighter capacity, and rising fuel and food prices.
For import-dependent economies across Asia, including Asean, this is not theoretical. It hits households directly.
Second, there is the risk of regional escalation. The Red Sea is already crowded with naval patrols, commercial fleets, and humanitarian corridors.
Placing a heavily armed non-state actor in a permanent position astride the chokepoint increases the chance of miscalculation.
In such narrow waters, a single incident can spiral quickly. There is very little margin for error.
Third, this sets a dangerous precedent. If control of islands and chokepoints yields political and economic leverage, other actors will learn the lesson.
In Southeast Asia we understand how contested maritime spaces can be exploited. Accepting that a militant group can pressure global shipping by seizing territory weakens the principle that sea lanes are a common good.
Yemen’s humanitarian crisis demands attention and aid. But Bab al-Mandab is not a domestic waterway.
It is international. The right of transit passage is protected under international law, yet law requires enforcement and political will.
Asean has consistently defended freedom of navigation. Malaysia, as a trading nation astride the Strait of Malacca, not unlike Singapore, has a direct stake in how the world responds when a chokepoint is threatened.
What happens in the Red Sea sets expectations for how chokepoints are treated everywhere. Silence now invites pressure later.
Alarm should not turn into panic. But calm must not become a form of complacency too.
The world needs collective maritime security. Coordinated naval presence, shared information, and clear rules of engagement can reduce accidents and deter reckless behaviour. The aim is predictability, not escalation.
Asean must also separate shipping security from the Yemeni peace process.
Political talks in Yemen are essential, but freedom of navigation cannot be held hostage to them. The United Nations once succeed in brokering a peace talk in Yemen in 2022.
A dedicated multilateral mechanism involving the UN, the IMO, and major trading nations should treat Red Sea security as a global responsibility again.
Transparency is critical to protect commerce. Real-time reporting on incidents, clear guidance for insurers, and agreed contingency routes will prevent rumours from triggering a supply shock. Asean ports and logistics hubs should be integrated into this information network.
Finally, diplomacy must be backed by clear signals. The Houthis must understand that using seized islands to threaten global trade carries costs.
At the same time, communication channels must remain open to prevent escalation. The objective is not war. The objective is to reaffirm that no group can impose a tax on world trade by force.
Indonesia’s doctrine of _bebas dan aktif_ — free and active — captures the right approach. But there is a need for Asean to be proactive too.
True sovereignty is not about isolation. It is about the capacity to manage access in line with national interest, and to defend the commons that all states rely on.
For Asean, the Red Sea is distant in distance but close in principle. The region of Southeast Asia was built on trade. It is hyper sensitive to energy shocks.
And Asean has spent decades arguing that rules, not power, should govern international waters.
If Asean accepts that territory can be seized to pressure shipping, the member states of Asean would have to accept a world where geography becomes a veto over joint prosperity.
The Houthi advance to the Hanish Islands marks a strategic shift. The threat has moved from episodic harassment to sustained presence. From rhetoric to geography.
This is not a moment for sensationalism. It is a moment for clarity. The world depends on open sea lanes.
The Bab al-Mandab is among the most critical. Leaving it in contested hands without a collective response gambles with inflation, with energy security, and with stability.
Asean, and Malaysia in particular, should speak up. Not as a participant in Yemen’s war, but as a defender of the rules that keep trade moving.
Calmness must guide us. But in this case, calmness must also demand action. Why ?
Precisely because if Asean waits until a major vessel is struck, or until insurance markets effectively close the strait, Asean would have have lost the chance to respond with composure.
The alarm is ringing now. The time to act is before the damage is done.
* Phar Kim Beng is a professor of Asean Studies, and director at the Institute of International and Asean Studies, International Islamic University Malaysia.
** This is the personal opinion of the writers or publication and does not necessarily represent the views ofMalay Mail.
