Asean is weaker when GCC is in turmoil: The Philippines cannot be blamed — Phar Kim Beng

MAY 9 — Asean today faces one of the most dangerous geopolitical environments since the end of the Cold War.

Wars in West Asia, prolonged instability in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region, disruptions in the Red Sea, uncertainty surrounding the Strait of Hormuz, and the intensifying rivalry between the United States and China are converging simultaneously.

Under such conditions, Asean’s internal cohesion inevitably weakens.

This is why blaming the Philippines for strengthening its security cooperation with te United States for that matter with Japan is strategically simplistic and analytically unfair.

The real issue confronting Southeast Asia is far larger than Manila’s foreign policy choices.

Asean itself becomes weaker whenever the GCC region descends into turmoil because the economic and strategic lifelines of East and Southeast Asia remain deeply tied to stability in West Asia.

This dependency is structural rather than temporary.

East Asia still imports roughly 84 per cent of its crude oil and 83 per cent of its liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the broader Gulf region.

China, Japan, South Korea, and Asean all rely heavily on uninterrupted maritime flows through the Strait of Hormuz and surrounding sea lanes.

When tensions escalate in the Gulf, the consequences are immediate for Southeast Asia.

Oil prices surge. Shipping insurance costs rise. Freight routes become uncertain. Inflation spreads across food, transportation, electricity, and manufacturing sectors.

The disruptions are no longer confined to the Middle East alone.

The Strait of Hormuz handles close to 20 per cent of global oil flows.

Even the possibility of prolonged closure or intermittent disruption creates panic across international markets.

For Asean economies already struggling with post-pandemic fiscal constraints, such shocks become deeply destabilizing.

Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, and the Philippines all remain vulnerable to imported inflation arising from Gulf instability. The impact goes beyond hydrocarbons.

Almost one-third of globally traded urea and ammonia-based fertilizers are connected to the broader Gulf supply chain.

Any disruption affects agricultural production across Asean, particularly rice-producing economies such as Vietnam and the Philippines.

Food security therefore becomes directly tied to maritime security in West Asia.

The same applies to helium, an often overlooked strategic resource.

Close to two-fifths of global helium exports are linked to the Gulf region.

Helium is indispensable for semiconductor manufacturing, MRI and CT scan systems, aerospace engineering, and high-end industrial production.

Thus, instability in the GCC region also threatens Asean’s healthcare systems and technological supply chains.

This broader structural vulnerability explains why Asean member states increasingly pursue their own security calculations.

The Philippines must therefore be understood within this wider geopolitical context rather than isolated as a singular problem.

Critics frequently accuse Manila of provoking tensions in the South China Sea by expanding military cooperation with Washington under agreements such as the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA).

Yet such criticisms often ignore the strategic anxieties confronting the Philippines itself.

The Philippines faces maritime disputes in the South China Sea, concerns over freedom of navigation, rising uncertainty in global energy markets, and growing fears that Asean alone may not be sufficient to guarantee its long-term security interests.

No government in Manila—whether under Ferdinand Marcos Jr or any future administration—can ignore these realities.

Indeed, the Philippines is behaving in a manner consistent with how many medium-sized and smaller powers historically react during periods of systemic uncertainty. They diversify partnerships.

They seek external balancing mechanisms.

They avoid excessive dependence on any single actor. This is not unique to the Philippines.

Vietnam continues modernizing its military while carefully balancing relations between China, Russia, India, Japan, and the United States.

Singapore maintains close strategic cooperation with Washington while simultaneously preserving strong economic relations with Beijing.

Indonesia deepens defense cooperation with multiple powers while retaining its traditional doctrine of strategic autonomy.

Even Malaysia itself quietly expands security cooperation with various partners while maintaining Asean centrality as its official diplomatic anchor.

The Philippines is therefore not an anomaly.

Rather, it reflects Asean’s broader struggle to adapt to a far more fragmented global order.

The problem is that Asean was never institutionally designed to manage simultaneous crises of this magnitude.

Asean emerged during the Cold War primarily as a mechanism to prevent intra-regional conflict and preserve autonomy among newly independent states.

Its strengths lie in dialogue, consultation, gradual consensus-building, and diplomatic flexibility.

However, Asean was not built as a collective defense organization like NATO.

Nor was it designed to manage overlapping crises involving energy chokepoints, maritime militarization, technological decoupling, and global supply chain fragmentation all at once.

This explains why Asean increasingly appears divided whenever tensions intensify externally.

The organization’s consensus-driven approach slows decision-making precisely at moments requiring strategic urgency.

Yet Asean should avoid turning the Philippines into a scapegoat for these broader structural weaknesses. Doing so merely deepens mistrust within Southeast Asia.

The deeper reality is that Asean’s external environment has deteriorated dramatically.

The Red Sea remains vulnerable to attacks and disruptions.

The Strait of Hormuz remains exposed to escalation involving Iran, Israel, and the United States.

The war in Ukraine continues affecting commodity and energy markets.

The South China Sea remains heavily contested.

Global supply chains remain fragile.

Under such conditions, Asean member states will inevitably seek additional forms of reassurance outside Asean itself.

This trend may be uncomfortable, but it is understandable.

The answer is not condemnation.

The answer is deeper Asean resilience.

This is precisely why stronger Asean-GCC cooperation has become strategically indispensable.

The GCC is no longer merely an energy supplier to Southeast Asia.

It is now directly linked to Asean’s economic survival, food security, healthcare resilience, shipping stability, and long-term industrial competitiveness.

It should focus on energy transition partnerships, food security frameworks, fertilizer supply stabilization, sovereign investment cooperation, maritime security coordination, and resilient shipping corridors.

The  Asean-GCC-China  engagements in May 2025 also reflect a broader reality: Southeast Asia preferred multipolar cooperation over rigid bloc politics. Yet GCC’s very future is now financially beleaguered by the war. 

Malaysia, as Coordinator of China-Asean Relations from 2025 to 2028 and the immediate past ASEAN Chair in 2025, occupies an especially important diplomatic role. 

But when Washington DC is bogged down by internecine politics with Iran---that have been militarized since February 28 2026----there is a limit to what Asean can achieve.

Even China has banned all forms of energy exports even fertilizers to the rest of the world. This is another proverbial bullet that Asean has to bite head on. China is concerned its own future too since the war can drag indefinitely.

Meanwhile, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has consistently argued for dialogue, multilateralism, and civilizational engagement rather than binary confrontation. 

In Cebu he also urged all sides to expedite the conclusion of the Code of Conduct on the South China Sea by the end of this year. 

Such an advocacy remains necessary since Asean cannot afford to become trapped entirely by great power rivalry. Especially when the broader Gulf region itself remains unstable. 

That said, structural limits of a unilateral -multipolar system are imposing and prohibitive.

Ultimately, Asean becomes weaker not because of the Philippines.

Asean becomes weaker because the international system surrounding Southeast Asia is becoming increasingly volatile, fragmented, and militarized.

Until the GCC region regains stability, Asean will continue facing immense external pressures that no single member state can manage alone.

That is the strategic reality Southeast Asia must now confront collectively rather than defensively.

* Phar Kim Beng is professor of Asean Studies and director, Institute of Internationalisation and Asean Studies, International Islamic University of Malaysia. 

** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.