The strategic importance of the Strait of Malacca is rising, but peace must begin in the Strait of Hormuz — Phar Kim Beng

APRIL 23 — The recent passage of a United States warship through the Strait of Malacca may appear routine.

Indeed, under international law, such transits are permissible and even expected. But timing, as always in geopolitics, is everything.

The warship — identified as the USS Miguel Keith — moved through one of the world’s busiest maritime arteries on April 18, underscoring how the Malacca Strait has once again become a corridor of strategic consequence.

Yet to focus excessively on Malacca alone is to misread the deeper currents shaping global security today.

A strait of stability — for now

The Strait of Malacca is not merely a regional passage. It is a global lifeline.

Stretching roughly 900 kilometres, it connects East Asia to the Middle East and Europe, facilitating about a quarter of global trade.

That a US warship can pass through without incident is not a sign of militarisation — but of stability.

It reflects a functioning rules-based maritime order where even great powers operate within established norms. This is precisely what must be preserved.

But herein lies the paradox: the more stable Malacca becomes, the more its strategic importance rises — not because of itself, but because of instability elsewhere.

The real flashpoints lie westward

While attention is drawn to Southeast Asia, the real epicentres of danger remain the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb. These two chokepoints are not just transit routes.

They are pressure valves of the global economy. The Strait of Hormuz alone carries roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil supply.

Any disruption — whether through blockade, drone attacks, or naval confrontation — reverberates instantly across energy prices, inflation, and food systems worldwide.

Meanwhile, Bab el-Mandeb, linking the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean, has become increasingly volatile due to spillovers from regional conflicts, including attacks on commercial shipping.

In contrast, Malacca is the downstream recipient of these shocks.

When Hormuz trembles, Malacca bears the consequences.

Strategic geography is becoming weaponised

The transit of US naval assets through Malacca must therefore be interpreted within a broader strategic arc.

It is not about Southeast Asia per se. It is about movement — force projection — from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean and ultimately toward the Middle East theatre.

Recent deployments show that US amphibious groups carrying thousands of Marines have transited the same waters en route to the Gulf.

Malacca, in this sense, is less a battlefield than a bridge. And bridges must remain open.

The danger of misplaced focus

There is a growing temptation among analysts and policymakers to securitise the Strait of Malacca — to view every naval movement as a sign of impending confrontation. This would be a grave mistake.

Unlike Hormuz or Bab el-Mandeb, Malacca is governed by cooperative arrangements among littoral states — Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore — who have consistently prioritised safety, navigation freedom, and anti-piracy coordination.

To over-militarise discourse around Malacca risks turning a zone of stability into one of suspicion.

The real strategic priority should be clear: de-escalation must begin where escalation is most acute. That is not Southeast Asia. It is West Asia.

Peace in Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb is non-negotiable

If the international community fails to stabilise the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb, no amount of calm in Malacca will suffice.

Energy flows will remain vulnerable. Supply chains will continue to fragment. Insurance premiums for shipping will surge. Food and fertiliser costs will spike, as is already the case with helium and sulphur.

In short, global economic security will remain hostage to regional conflict.

This is why diplomacy — quiet, sustained, and inclusive — must focus on these flashpoints, not symbolic naval passages in Southeast Asia.

Malaysia’s strategic responsibility

For Malaysia, the message is sobering but clear.

As one of the three littoral states of the Strait of Malacca, alongside Indonesia and Singapore, Malaysia must help ensure that its waters remain neutral, open, and governed by international law.

But the three littoral states must also look beyond their immediate geography.

Malaysia, together with partners, has both the credibility and strategic positioning to advocate for de-escalation in West Asia — particularly through backchannel diplomacy and engagement with mediating states such as Oman and Turkey, even Egypt and potentially Brazil.

The goal is simple yet profound: prevent distant conflicts from turning nearby waters into contested zones.

Stability is a system, not a strait

The passage of a US warship through the Strait of Malacca should not alarm. It should remind. It reminds us that stability in one part of the world is inseparable from instability in another.

Malacca’s growing importance is not a sign of strength alone — it is a reflection of fragility elsewhere.

If peace is secured in the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb, Malacca will remain what it has long been: a conduit of commerce, not conflict.

If not, then even the calmest waters may become strategic fault lines. And by then, it will already be too late.

* Phar Kim Beng, PhD is the Professor of Asean Studies at International Islamic University of Malaysia and Director of Institute of International and Asean Studies (IINTAS).

** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.