APRIL 19 — The recent remarks by Colonel Arm Oke Kistiyanto of Indonesia’s armed forces on the risks of granting overflight access to a major power — implicitly the United States — have generated understandable debate.
His caution that “airspace is a core domain of state sovereignty” and that such access may entail “entrapment risk” reflects a long-standing sensitivity within Indonesia’s strategic culture.
Yet, while analytically grounded, the tone and interpretation of these concerns risk veering into unnecessary alarmis.
Indonesia’s doctrine of bebas dan aktif — free and active foreign policy — has always been premised on autonomy without isolation. In this regard, overflight permissions are neither novel nor inherently destabilizing.
They are routine features of international aviation practice, governed by bilateral agreements, customary international law,
To suggest that any such arrangement automatically compromises sovereignty is to conflate access with control.
Sovereignty, in the modern international system, is not diminished by regulated cooperation.
Rather, it is exercised through the ability to grant, deny, or condition access based on national interest.
Indonesia, as the world’s largest archipelagic state, has long managed complex airspace arrangements, including those involving civilian corridors, military transit, and joint exercises.
The notion that a single overflight agreement would suddenly erode this deeply institutionalised capacity underestimates Jakarta’s bureaucratic and strategic maturity.
The concept of “entrapment risk” likewise deserves careful unpacking.
In alliance theory, entrapment typically arises when a smaller state is dragged into conflicts due to binding commitments with a larger power.
Indonesia, however, is not a treaty ally of the United States. It maintains strategic autonomy precisely to avoid such scenarios.
Any overflight permission would almost certainly be conditional, time-bound, and issue-specific — hardly the basis for involuntary military entanglement.
Indeed, if anything, Indonesia’s cautious engagement with major powers has historically enhanced its diplomatic leverage.
By maintaining open but controlled channels with multiple actors — including the United States, China, and regional partners — Jakarta reinforces its position as a pivotal middle power in South-east Asia.
Over-interpreting routine military or logistical arrangements as precursors to conflict risks undermining this delicate balancing act.
It is also important to situate this debate within the broader geopolitical context.
The Indo-Pacific is increasingly characterised by heightened surveillance, humanitarian assistance operations, and contingency planning for non-traditional security threats — from natural disasters to maritime accidents.
Overflight permissions can facilitate rapid response in such scenarios, particularly in a region as geographically complex as South-east Asia.
To frame them solely through the lens of great-power rivalry is to adopt an unnecessarily narrow perspective.
Furthermore, perceptions matter as much as realities.
Colonel Arm’s concern that other countries may interpret such permissions as alignment is not without merit.
However, this is precisely where diplomatic signalling and transparency come into play.
Indonesia has consistently demonstrated its ability to communicate the intent behind its policies, ensuring that cooperation does not equate to alignment.
Asean’s long-standing emphasis on neutrality and centrality provides an additional buffer against misperception.
There is, therefore, a need to distinguish between vigilance and sensationalism.
Vigilance is essential; Indonesia must carefully evaluate any request that touches upon its sovereign domains.
But sensationalism — framing overflight access as a gateway to strategic subordination — risks distorting public understanding and constraining policy flexibility.
In the final analysis, the strength of Indonesia’s foreign policy lies in its composure. Calmness, not conjecture, should guide the discourse.
The granting of overflight rights, when managed prudently, is a tool of statecraft rather than a threat to sovereignty.
It reflects confidence, not the surrender of human agency. Nor for total acquiescence.
As South-east Asia navigates an increasingly turbulent strategic environment, such composure will be indispensable.
Indonesia, as Asean’s largest member, must continue to demonstrate that sovereignty in the 21st century is not about rigid exclusion, but about calibrated engagement.
* Phar Kim Beng is professor of Asean Studies and director at the Institute of Internationalisation and Asean Studies, International Islamic University of Malaysia.
** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.
