AUGUST 18 — The latest American tirade against Oman is strategically uncalled for. 

More seriously, it risks attacking one of the few diplomatic bridges still standing between Washington and Tehran at precisely the moment when the Strait of Hormuz desperately needs diplomacy rather than another layer of coercion.

On August 17, US President Donald Trump threatened Oman during an interview with Fox News if Muscat were to obstruct American objectives over the Strait of Hormuz.

The threat came as the 60-day negotiating period established under the US-Iran Memorandum of Understanding expired without a comprehensive settlement. The anger is strategically misplaced.

Oman is not the principal source of the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz. Nor is it behaving as an adversary of the United States. Quite the contrary. 

Oman is one of the few states that has continued attempting to construct an exit ramp from a confrontation that has already imposed enormous costs on the global economy.

Iran and Oman have been working on arrangements for maritime transit through the Strait. 

Iranian officials have said an understanding has been reached on the map of a transit route, although such an arrangement should not be confused with a comprehensive agreement to reopen the entire Strait under terms acceptable to all sides.

This distinction matters.

The Strait of Hormuz is not merely another maritime passage. Before the current disruption, roughly one-fifth of global oil and gas shipments passed through this narrow waterway. 

Its prolonged disruption therefore carries consequences extending far beyond Iran, Oman and the United States.

Asian economies feel these pressures particularly acutely.

China, Japan, South Korea, India and the economies of Asean remain heavily exposed to the stability of Gulf energy supplies. Higher transportation costs, insurance premiums and energy prices eventually travel through supply chains into manufacturing costs, electricity bills, aviation, logistics and household expenditure.

This is precisely why Oman should be treated as a strategic asset rather than subjected to threats.

For decades, Muscat has cultivated something increasingly rare in West Asian diplomacy: the ability to maintain working relationships with parties that frequently refuse to speak directly to one another. 

Oman has been a longstanding intermediary between Washington and Tehran, and its usefulness comes precisely from the fact that it is not completely absorbed into the strategic position of either side.

Destroying that diplomatic space would be remarkably counterproductive.

Mediators cannot perform their function if they are expected merely to transmit the demands of the strongest party. 

Their value lies in possessing enough credibility with opposing sides to identify compromises that direct negotiations cannot produce.

This is the strategic significance of Oman.

Indeed, if Washington disagrees with the emerging Iran-Oman arrangement for Hormuz, it has every right to negotiate against provisions it considers unacceptable. 

The United States can insist on freedom of navigation, challenge excessive Iranian control over shipping routes, demand international guarantees and mobilise its Gulf partners behind an alternative framework.

But threatening Oman is another matter entirely.

It transforms a disagreement over the architecture of maritime security into a dispute with the mediator itself.

That is poor diplomacy and even poorer strategy.

There is also a larger contradiction. Washington wants the Strait of Hormuz reopened. 

Oman is attempting to negotiate mechanisms that could contribute towards reopening maritime traffic. 

Iran remains indispensable to any durable arrangement because geography cannot be wished away.

Iran and Oman physically straddle the Strait.

Whatever Washington thinks about Tehran, the permanent security of Hormuz ultimately requires some mechanism through which Iran, Oman, the Gulf states and the major maritime powers can coexist. 

Naval power can deter attacks. It cannot by itself manufacture a sustainable political settlement.

The expiry of the 60-day US-Iran negotiating framework makes Oman’s role more important, not less. The Memorandum of Understanding was intended to provide space for a broader settlement, but Washington and Tehran remain far apart and have accused one another of violating earlier understandings.

When formal diplomacy begins collapsing, intermediaries become indispensable.

There is another danger to threatening Muscat. Other middle powers will be watching.

Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and other states have played various roles in trying to contain the wider conflict. 

If mediation becomes something for which states can be publicly threatened whenever their proposals diverge from Washington’s preferred outcome, fewer governments will want to assume the political risks of mediation.

The result would not be greater American leverage. It could produce diplomatic isolation at the precise moment when Washington needs more channels of communication.

American power has historically been most effective when military strength has been combined with alliances, diplomacy and institutional legitimacy. Coercion works best when embedded within a wider political strategy.

Threatening everyone simultaneously eventually diminishes the distinction between allies, mediators and adversaries.

For Asaen, there is an important lesson here too.

Southeast Asia has an enormous interest in the peaceful reopening and long-term stability of the Strait of Hormuz. 

Asean should therefore support credible diplomatic initiatives by Oman and other intermediaries while maintaining the principle that freedom and safety of commercial navigation cannot become permanent instruments of geopolitical coercion.

Malaysia, in particular, should appreciate Oman’s predicament.

Middle powers rarely possess the military capacity to impose settlements. 

Their strength lies instead in creating diplomatic spaces where larger powers can retreat from maximalist positions without appearing to capitulate.

This is something Asean itself has practised repeatedly.

Oman’s diplomacy therefore deserves encouragement and careful scrutiny, not intimidation.

None of this means accepting whatever arrangement Tehran proposes. 

Any Hormuz settlement must protect safe navigation, avoid institutionalising unilateral control of an international energy artery and provide sufficient confidence for shipping companies, insurers and energy traders to return.

But these are arguments for harder negotiations.

They are not arguments for attacking the mediator.

The United States should consequently recalibrate its approach towards Oman. Washington can disagree vigorously with Muscat while recognising that Oman remains one of the few governments capable of talking seriously to Iran when direct US-Iran diplomacy is faltering.

The Strait of Hormuz cannot remain hostage to permanent confrontation. 

Six months of disruption have already demonstrated the extraordinary vulnerability of the global economy to a narrow maritime chokepoint.

The objective now should be to multiply diplomatic channels, not destroy them.

Oman is trying to keep one such channel alive.

Washington should work with it, bargain hard with it and, where necessary, disagree with it.

But a strategic power should know the difference between an opponent and an intermediary.

Oman is not the problem.  Just a day prior to the massive decapitation of the religious and political leaders in Iran on February 28 2026, Oman clearly privileged the importance of diplomacy. Not war.

Spurred by its easy victory in Venezuela a month prior, Trump and Peter Hegseth the Secretary of War chose the wrong and worst option instead. The world has been reeling ever since.

At this dangerous juncture, the important role of Oman could well be an indispensable part of the arch of the whole solution in the Strait of Hormuz.

At delicate moments such as the above, it further bewilders the mind of many that PAS is oblivious to the importance of true Muslim unity. Not just ethno Malay centrism.

* Phar Kim Beng is a professor of Asean Studies and a director at the Institute of International and Asean Studies, International Islamic University Malaysia.

** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.