JULY 1 — For much of the last two decades, Iran occupied the central place in Israel’s strategic imagination as the principal regional adversary. 

Increasingly, however, influential voices across the Israeli political spectrum are redirecting their attention towards Turkiye.

This shift should not be dismissed as routine political rhetoric or electoral posturing. 

When senior Israeli politicians began to describe Turkiye as “the new Iran,” the international community — and especially the United Nations — must pay attention.

The language is not confined to one faction or one government coalition. 

According to David Hearst at the Middle East Eye, a reputation digital website, he affirmed this anti-Turkiye thread is becoming bipartisan and institutionalised within Israeli strategic discourse. 

Former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, widely considered a possible successor to Benjamin Netanyahu, has warned that Turkiye is emerging as Israel’s next major strategic challenge. 

According to Bennett, Turkiye and Qatar are expanding their influence in Syria and across the wider Middle East, leading him to conclude that “Turkiye is the new Iran.” 

Such statements are notable not merely for their severity but because they reflect a growing consensus among Israeli security circles rather than the views of a political fringe.

The same theme has been amplified by Israeli Diaspora Affairs Minister Amichai Chikli.

Speaking after the weakening of Iran’s regional position, Chikli argued that the age of the “Shia empire” was ending only to be replaced by what he called a “Muslim Brotherhood axis” centred around Turkiye, Syria and Qatar. 

He warned Israelis to “open your eyes now” to this emerging challenge. 

More recently, Chikli suggested that Syria and Turkiye constituted a greater strategic concern than Iran itself.

Such statements matter because ministerial rhetoric often shapes future policy choices. 

The concern becomes greater when these statements are considered alongside Israel’s evolving approach towards minorities in the Middle East. 

In November 2024, before the collapse of Bashar al‑Assad’s government, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar publicly advocated strengthening ties with the Kurds and Druze, whom he described as Israel’s “natural allies.” 

He argued that Israel, as a minority state in the region, should cultivate strategic partnerships with other minorities. 

The Kurds in particular were portrayed as natural partners because of their historical tensions with both Turkiye and Iran.

There is nothing inherently objectionable about building diplomatic relations with minority communities; states are entitled to pursue their foreign policy interests. 

The problem emerges when minority outreach is combined with increasingly hostile rhetoric directed at neighbouring states. 

Such combinations can create perceptions that identity politics and geopolitical competition are becoming intertwined in dangerous ways.

Turkiye is not Iran. Turkiye is a member of Nato, maintains one of the alliance’s largest armed forces, and remains deeply integrated into European economic and security structures. 

It is also an important regional actor in Syria, the Caucasus, the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean. 

Equating Turkiye with Iran ignores fundamental differences in political structure, alliance commitments and strategic objectives. 

Even some Israeli analysts have cautioned that the comparison risks encouraging unnecessary confrontation rather than prudent statecraft.

The risk is that narratives can become self‑fulfilling prophecies. 

If political leaders repeatedly define Turkiye as an existential threat, policy bureaucracies, intelligence agencies and military planners may gradually begin acting on those assumptions. 

Strategic rivalries often escalate not because war is inevitable but because perceptions harden faster than diplomacy can respond.

The Middle East hardly needs another axis of confrontation. 

The region is already burdened by the aftermath of conflicts in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria and Iran. 

Shipping lanes in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea remain vulnerable; energy markets remain fragile. 

Introducing a prolonged Israeli‑Turkiye rivalry would add another layer of instability to an already overstretched regional order.

The United Nations therefore cannot afford to ignore these developments. 

Its role is not to adjudicate geopolitical contests; its responsibility is to ensure that inflammatory rhetoric does not evolve into military escalation. 

Preventive diplomacy is almost always less costly than post‑conflict reconstruction. 

The UN Secretary‑General Antonio Gutierrez, together with major international stakeholders, should encourage dialogue mechanisms involving Israel and Turkiye before mistrust becomes institutionalised. 

If Israel resists, gradual awareness‑building — through public diplomacy and multilateral forums — about the risks of escalating bilateral tensions should be pursued worldwide.

Track 1.5 and Track 2 diplomacy — engaging academics, retired military officials and strategic communities — may prove particularly useful in preventing escalation.

History demonstrates that wars frequently begin with narratives before they begin with missiles. 

The Middle East, or West Asia, has heard too many declarations that one state or another represents an existential threat. 

Too often, such narratives have ended in military confrontation whose consequences extend far beyond the original protagonists.

If influential Israeli leaders increasingly view Turkiye through the same lens once reserved for Iran, the international community has a responsibility to take notice. 

Silence in diplomacy is sometimes interpreted as indifference. In the current region, indifference may prove to be a luxury the world can no longer afford.

* Phar Kim Beng is a professor of Asean Studies and director, Institute of Internationalisation and Asean Studies, International Islamic University of Malaysia.

** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.