MARCH 19 — Shortly after taking office, US President Donald Trump sought to address two foreign threats: the influx of illegal drugs from Canada, Mexico, and China, and “large and persistent” trade deficits.

Trump determined that the drug influx had “created a public health crisis” and that the trade deficits had “led to the hollowing out” of the American manufacturing base and “undermined critical supply chains”.

Trump declared a national emergency as to both threats, deeming them “unusual and extraordinary,” and invoked his authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), imposing tariffs to deal with each threat.

As to the drug trafficking tariffs, Trump imposed a 25 per cent duty on most Canadian and Mexican imports and a 10 per cent duty on most Chinese imports. As to the trade deficit (“reciprocal”) tariffs, the President imposed a duty “on all imports from all trading partners” of at least 10 per cent, with dozens of nations facing higher rates.

Since imposing each set of tariffs, Trump had issued several increases, reductions, and other modifications.

Trump’s tariffs were challenged in the lower courts before the challenges were consolidated and heard by the US Supreme Court.

The question presented before the US apex court was whether the IEEPA authorised the US president to impose tariffs.

The short answer is: “No” – by a 6:3 vote with the apex court’s Democratic appointees joining Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Neil Gorsuch and Amy Coney Barrett in the short answer.

Chief Justice Roberts said:

“Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution specifies that ‘The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises.’ The Framers recognised the unique importance of this taxing power—a power which ‘very clear[ly]’ includes the power to impose tariffs.

“And they gave Congress alone [that power]. The Framers did not vest any part of the taxing power in the Executive Branch. The President enjoys no inherent authority to impose tariffs during peacetime.”

So, the IEEPA  does not authorise the president to impose tariffs of unlimited amount and duration, on any product from any country.

Trump has now said that he has “absolute right” to charge tariffs in another form.

“I have the absolute right to charge TARIFFS in another form, and have already started to do so,” he said in a long post on his Truth Social platform.

Trump may have referred to tariffs under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, which he imposed within hours of the February 20 Supreme Court decision.

Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 authorises the US president to impose temporary import surcharges of up to 15 per cent ad valorem to address “fundamental international payments problems”, specifically large and serious balance-of-payments deficits.

Trump’s proclamation for the imposition of the surcharges cites the US$1.2 trillion goods trade deficit, the first-ever negative balance on primary income (2024), and a net international investment position of negative 90 per cent of GDP.

Section 122, however, is explicit that the surcharge is temporary: 150 days from 24 February 2026, expiring 24 July 2026 unless the US Congress extends it.

150 days is the maximum period Section 122 permits without congressional action. In theory though, the President could allow the surcharge to expire, declare a new emergency, and restart the 150-day period, creating a de facto perpetual tariff instrument.

Be that as it may, there are important limitations: (a) cannot exceed 150 days; (b) Congress must act to extend it; and (c) intended to stabilise economic conditions, not serve as permanent trade remedies.

More durable tariffs may be imposed under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974  and Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.

Under Section 301, Congress grants the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) a range of responsibilities and authorities to investigate and take action (e.g., impose a tariff) to enforce US rights under trade agreements and respond to certain foreign trade practices.

As of March 2026, there are four ongoing investigations under Section 301. Congress may still consider the effectiveness of USTR’s Section 301 actions in deterring certain foreign trade practices, the impact of actions taken under Section 301 on the US economy, and whether the authorities are being used in the way Congress intends.

Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 allows the US president to impose restrictions on goods imports or enter into negotiations with trading partners if the US secretary of commerce determines, following an investigation, that the quantity or other circumstance of those imports “threaten to impair” US national security.

As of February 2026, the Trump administration has launched 12 Section 232 investigations and concluded five. The Commerce Secretary found national security threats in all five investigations, and Trump has imposed tariffs in four cases.

Some Congress members have indicated support for the president’s use of tariffs as a tool for pursuing the administration’s economic goals. Others have argued that tariffs negatively impact the economy and that Congress should restrict presidential authorities over trade.

Congress may yet consider whether to bolster, curb, modify, or increase oversight of the president’s use of Section 232.

Like tariffs under Section 122, tariffs under Section 301 and 232 are subject to important limitations, the first of which is that there must be investigations.

The limitations inform us that the US president’s rights are not absolute.

So, if Trump claims “absolute right” to impose tariffs, the Manglish response can be: Got meh?

* This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.