OCTOBER 11 — Malaysian politics has entered a phase where political cooperation is increasingly determined by institutional survival, constitutional legitimacy and the capacity to govern.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the troubled relationship between the United Malays National Organisation (Umno) and Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS).
Both claim to represent Malay-Muslim interests.
Yet their competing ambitions, institutional predicaments and contrasting political priorities make durable cooperation exceedingly difficult.
Meanwhile, Pakatan Harapan (PH) and Umno have demonstrated that cooperation under Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s Unity Government can produce tangible outcomes, including a 2027 Budget approaching half a trillion ringgit.
Ten political realities explain why an Umno-PAS partnership remains easier to advocate than implement.
First, Umno’s corruption baggage remains a structural obstacle.
Umno cannot escape corruption controversies involving several prominent leaders.
The controversy surrounding former Prime Minister Najib Razak’s conditional pardon has further complicated its political rehabilitation.
PAS has traditionally positioned itself as a party committed to Islamic governance and moral accountability.
Any renewed association with Umno would require PAS to reconcile its moral claims with Umno’s unresolved reputational problems.
Political expediency cannot automatically erase these contradictions.
Second, PN’s registration controversy complicates PAS’s political calculations.
The controversy surrounding Perikatan Nasional’s (PN) registration has introduced further uncertainty into opposition politics.
Whether through deregistration proceedings or their political consequences, the dispute raises questions about PN’s organisational coherence and future electoral arrangements.
PAS cannot easily negotiate a durable national partnership with Umno while its existing coalition relationships remain unsettled.
Umno likewise has little incentive to embrace another complicated political arrangement.
Third, Mohamad Hasan’s Terengganu proposal reveals mutual distrust.
Umno Deputy President Datuk Seri Mohamad Hasan’s suggestion that PAS demonstrate goodwill through a fresh election in one of its strongholds, particularly Terengganu, exposes the difficulties of power-sharing.
For Umno, the proposal tests PAS’s sincerity.
For PAS, surrendering an established electoral advantage merely to accommodate Umno would appear politically irrational.
An alliance requiring one partner to weaken itself before negotiations begin is unlikely to command lasting confidence.
Fourth, PAS’s four state strongholds cannot become bargaining chips.
Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah and Perlis represent important territorial foundations of PAS and its coalition’s influence.
These states provide grassroots mobilisation, administrative experience and political legitimacy.
Umno may demand reciprocal arrangements, but PAS cannot casually redistribute electoral mandates through elite negotiations.
The contradiction is fundamental. Umno seeks greater influence, while PAS expects recognition of its existing strength. Umno wants to return to its own greatness and electoral preponderance while PAS wants the same.
Neither appears prepared to concede political primacy.
Fifth, Negeri Sembilan exposes Umno’s constitutional difficulties.
Umno’s political recovery in Negeri Sembilan should have strengthened its argument that the party can restore stability.
Instead, royal and constitutional tensions have complicated the state’s political environment.
These developments demonstrate that winning elections and consolidating legitimate authority are different exercises.
Umno cannot credibly demand that PAS reorganise its state governments while struggling with institutional complications within its own political stronghold.
Malaysia’s constitutional monarchy also requires restraint. Royal institutions cannot become instruments of partisan convenience.
Sixth, Malay-Muslim unity does not guarantee political compatibility.
Umno emerged from Malay nationalism and developmental statecraft. PAS derives much of its identity from Islamic mobilisation and religiously informed governance.
Their earlier Muafakat Nasional cooperation demonstrated tactical compatibility, not permanent ideological convergence.
Both parties compete for leadership of substantially overlapping Malay-Muslim constituencies.
Neither can indefinitely accept subordinate status without provoking internal resistance.
Political unity becomes especially difficult when both partners believe they deserve to lead.
Seventh, state-level cooperation cannot automatically become federal power-sharing.
State-level agreements can revolve around local electoral calculations and administrative compromises.
Federal government requires decisions over the prime ministership, Cabinet portfolios, economic management, foreign policy and federal resources.
Umno and PAS would also need to accommodate competing coalition partners.
Their difficulties would multiply when negotiations move beyond individual states.
Political arithmetic cannot substitute for institutional coherence.
Eighth, an Umno-PAS alliance could alarm Sabah, Sarawak and moderate Malaysians.
This is perhaps the most underestimated danger.
Sabah and Sarawak are indispensable components of Malaysia’s federation, with distinct religious, cultural and constitutional traditions protected through the Malaysia Agreement 1963 (MA63).
An alliance perceived as consolidating Peninsular Malay-Muslim dominance could deepen suspicions among Gabungan Parti Sarawak (GPS), Gabungan Rakyat Sabah (GRS) and their diverse constituencies.
Neither Sabah nor Sarawak wishes to become subordinate to an increasingly narrow interpretation of national political identity.
The repercussions would extend throughout Peninsular Malaysia.
Moderate Malays who value religious tolerance, constitutional governance and economic competence could become apprehensive about intensified religious-nationalist competition.
Chinese and Indian Malaysians may worry about cultural rights, equal citizenship and their place within national decision-making.
The Orang Asli, already confronting longstanding difficulties involving customary land, economic marginalisation and political representation, could fear further exclusion.
These reactions are not inevitable. Nevertheless, political perceptions carry consequences.
An alliance designed to consolidate Malay-Muslim support could simultaneously alienate moderate Malays, Chinese, Indians, indigenous communities and East Malaysian voters.
Such a partnership might strengthen one electoral constituency while weakening its capacity to command nationwide confidence.
Malaysia cannot be governed sustainably through Peninsular political arithmetic alone.
Ninth, the Unity Government has demonstrated the advantages of practical cooperation.
While Umno and PAS remain preoccupied with territorial influence and political sincerity, PH and Umno have demonstrated that ideological differences need not prevent governance.
Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s 2027 Budget, approaching RM510 billion, when GLICs are included, offers a significant illustration.
Its people-friendly measures include assistance to civil servants, social protection, household support and development commitments.
The RM1,500 special assistance for eligible civil servants, payable in two instalments, demonstrates attention to public-sector welfare.
These commitments do not automatically guarantee electoral support or eliminate fiscal challenges.
Nevertheless, they provide concrete evidence of policy cooperation.
Crucially, the Unity Government also incorporates Sabah and Sarawak’s political representation, providing a broader platform for federal accommodation.
The contrast is striking.
One arrangement has produced a national budget.
The other remains preoccupied with negotiating the distribution of political power.
Tenth, Malaysia needs inclusive governance rather than endless political realignment.
The approaching 16th general election will not necessarily reward whichever coalition claims the strongest ethnic or religious credentials.
Malaysians face rising living costs, economic uncertainty, institutional tensions and geopolitical instability.
They require credible economic management, constitutional stability and political leadership capable of sustaining national confidence.
Umno and PAS may eventually establish another tactical understanding.
However, such cooperation would remain fragile without mutual trust, institutional clarity and assurances that Malaysia’s plural character would be respected.
The Unity Government is not without contradictions. Its durability depends on implementation, fiscal discipline and continued cooperation among its component parties.
Nevertheless, the central distinction is becoming clearer.
Umno and PAS are still negotiating how to divide power. PH and Umno, notwithstanding their differences, have demonstrated how power can be exercised together.
Malaysia’s political future cannot rest exclusively on Malay-Muslim consolidation while Sabah, Sarawak and the country’s diverse communities become increasingly apprehensive.
The ultimate test of political leadership is not merely the ability to win elections, but the capacity to govern a plural federation with competence, moderation and constitutional restraint.
Invariably, in PAS itself, while the Chief Minister of Kelantan welcomed the budget of Anwar, Fadhli Shaari of the same party disagreed with the former. Such contradictions in Umno and PAS are often very deeply embedded but not revealed openly.
* Phar Kim Beng, PhD is the Professor of Asean Studies at International Islamic University of Malaysia and Director of Institute of International and Asean Studies (IINTAS).
** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.
