AUGUST 19 — There is no political organisation in Malaysia officially known as MATGA. Nor has Perikatan Nasional (PN) formally adopted such an acronym. 

Yet the direction of an increasingly strident discourse on Malay-Muslim unity raises an uncomfortable question: has Malaysian politics begun drifting towards what can analytically be described as MATGA — Malays All Together Against All?

The distinction is important. There is nothing inherently objectionable about Malay political cooperation. 

Malays constitute the largest ethnic community in Malaysia. Islam occupies a constitutionally recognised position in the federation. 

Malay political parties have every democratic right to cooperate, negotiate seats and construct electoral alliances.

The problem begins when Malay unity ceases to mean cooperation among Malays and begins to require the identification of an adversary.

The political formula then becomes dangerously simple: Malays are divided; because Malays are divided, Malays are supposedly weakened; because Malays are weakened, their rights are allegedly threatened; therefore Malays and Muslims must unite politically; and anyone outside this political enclosure can gradually be portrayed as an obstacle to Malay-Muslim interests.

That is where Malay unity risks mutating into MATGA.

The author argues that Malay-Muslim political unity becomes dangerous when built around perceived enemies, and should instead focus on inclusive nation-building across Malaysia’s diverse federation. — Picture by Hari Anggara
The author argues that Malay-Muslim political unity becomes dangerous when built around perceived enemies, and should instead focus on inclusive nation-building across Malaysia’s diverse federation. — Picture by Hari Anggara

The question must consequently be asked of PN, and especially the Hadi Awang-led PAS. 

If Malay-Muslim unity is genuinely about strengthening Malaysia, why must DAP repeatedly be presented as its antithesis? 

Why must political cooperation with multiracial parties constantly be portrayed as compromising Malay interests?

Malaysia's constitutional structure makes the more extreme versions of this argument difficult to sustain. 

The position of Islam, the Malay rulers, the Malay language and the special position of Malays and the natives of Sabah and Sarawak are embedded in the Federal Constitution. 

These arrangements cannot simply be erased because one political party wins more parliamentary or state seats.

Malay-Muslim unity therefore cannot be premised indefinitely on a psychology of siege.

Indeed, the emerging cooperation among PN, PAS and BN contains another contradiction. Malay unity sounds impressive when electoral numbers are aggregated. 

Under Malaysia's first-past-the-post system, preventing several Malay-based parties from competing against one another can certainly produce formidable electoral outcomes.

But electoral numbers are not political cohesion. Nor are electoral numbers a nation-building programme.

Once seat negotiations begin, every party wants constituencies where it believes it can win.

Umno must protect its traditional territories. PAS wants recognition for its expanding electoral strength. 

Bersatu cannot accept being reduced to an appendage. Smaller political actors will demand their share of influence.

Thus the harder the seat negotiations become, the more brittle this supposedly seamless Malay-Muslim unity may prove.

This exposes the fundamental paradox of MATGA: if everyone must unite, someone must determine who leads the unity.

And once leadership, candidacies, state executive positions and ultimately the premiership enter the equation, unity can rapidly become rivalry; even within BN let alone PN. 

There is another parallel worth considering. MATGA bears an uncomfortable resemblance to the American slogan MAGA — Make America Great Again. 

The two are obviously products of very different societies and political histories. Yet as political slogans, both can become remarkably empty when they are not accompanied by a serious programme of nation-building.

A slogan is not an industrial policy. It is not educational reform. It does not raise productivity, improve universities, strengthen healthcare, build technological capabilities, reduce inequality or create better jobs. 

It cannot by itself strengthen institutions or prepare a country for artificial intelligence, climate change and intensifying geopolitical competition. Without these elements, what exactly is being made great?

If politics consists primarily of identifying enemies, consolidating supporters and winning elections, the nation-building content can become zero — if not negative.

The United States offers a warning about the volatility of populist political promises. Political enthusiasm can be followed by disappointment when slogans encounter the much harder realities of governing. 

Voters can experience buyer's remorse when expectations generated during campaigns fail to translate into improvements in everyday life.

Malaysia should pay attention because something similar could eventually confront voters following the Johor and Negeri Sembilan state elections.

Those elections have produced governments that will ordinarily govern for as long as five years. 

Voters therefore have to live with the consequences of the political choices that have been made. Campaign rhetoric eventually ends. Governments must then govern.

The test is no longer whether Malay votes can be consolidated. 

The test is whether Johor and Negeri Sembilan can generate investment, create high-quality employment, improve public transport, strengthen water security, manage housing pressures, modernise state administration and give young Malaysians compelling reasons to build their futures at home.

If MATGA cannot deliver these outcomes, voters may discover that they purchased an electoral proposition rather than a governing programme.

This is why sheer electoral numbers cannot substitute for nation-building; especially when BN has never trusted PN to begin with. However, there is a larger problem still. 

Winning Malay-majority constituencies across parts of Peninsular Malaysia is not synonymous with governing Malaysia successfully. Malaysia is a federation of extraordinary complexity. Why?

Sabah and Sarawak are foundational components of the federation created in 1963. The two comprise 64 percent of the Malaysian landscape.

Malaysian Chinese and Indians are citizens whose families have contributed to the country's development across generations. 

The indigenous peoples of Sabah and Sarawak possess their own histories, rights and political expectations.

A political strategy designed primarily to consolidate one ethnic electorate may therefore succeed tactically while weakening Malaysia strategically.

The greatest danger of MATGA may ultimately be to the Malays themselves. 

Malays who support PKR, Amanah or other multiracial political formations are no less Malay. 

Muslims who disagree with PAS do not cease being Muslims. Umno members who reject PAS dominance cannot automatically be described as opposing Malay unity.

There is a crucial difference between Malay leadership and Malay domination.

Malay leadership can protect constitutional arrangements while reassuring minorities. 

It can strengthen Islam without weaponising religion. 

It can advance Malay socioeconomic interests while recognising that Malaysia succeeds only when every community participates in national development.

Neither MATGA nor MAGA should become substitutes for the infinitely harder work of building a nation.

The better formula is therefore not Malays All Together Against All.

It is Malays Together With All. The emphasis on "with all," Borneo included. The latter invites no buyers remorse. 

Because Malaysia's largest community does not need enemies to demonstrate its strength. 

Its greatest strength would be the confidence to lead a diverse federation while building something tangible for everyone who calls Malaysia home.

* Phar Kim Beng, PhD is the Professor of Asean Studies at International Islamic University of Malaysia and Director of Institute of International and Asean Studies (IINTAS). 

** This is the personal opinion of the writers or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.