NOVEMBER 17 — The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is confronting a strategic dilemma that cannot be resolved by purchasing more weapons, strengthening military installations or relying exclusively on the United States. The problem is no longer merely Iran. Nor is it confined to the vulnerability of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman. It concerns the future of the Gulf's entire security architecture.

When US President Donald Trump reportedly described Saudi Arabia as "disintegrating" in November 2026, the significance went beyond the unusually harsh language directed at a longstanding American partner. According to Middle East Eye's reporting, Trump also claimed that Gulf governments had urged him not to attack Iran again because they feared the consequences of another military escalation.¹

 Prime Minister Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim (second, left) poses for a group photograph with Asean leaders during the 29th Asean-China Summit, held in conjunction with the 49th Asean Summit today. — Bernama pic
Prime Minister Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim (second, left) poses for a group photograph with Asean leaders during the 29th Asean-China Summit, held in conjunction with the 49th Asean Summit today. — Bernama pic

These remain Trump's characterisations, rather than independently established assessments of Saudi Arabia's condition or the positions of every Gulf government.

Nevertheless, the episode raises an important strategic question. Can the GCC continue to depend overwhelmingly on an external security guarantor whose decisions may expose the Gulf to military retaliation, economic disruption and prolonged geopolitical uncertainty?

The answer requires a fundamental reconsideration of regional diplomacy. The GCC needs to broaden and deepen its partnerships. Asean provides an important institutional platform through which the Gulf can develop a more diversified relationship with China without becoming excessively dependent on another major power.

Asean as the strategic bridge

The first Asean–GCC–China Summit, convened in Kuala Lumpur on May 27, 2025, under the chairmanship of Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, deserves renewed attention. It was not simply another diplomatic gathering.²

The summit established a framework connecting three major economic regions through trade, investment, energy, technology, connectivity and sustainable development.³ Its joint statement emphasised international law, regionalism, multilateralism and respect for sovereignty.⁴

What appeared to be a promising economic initiative in 2025 can now be developed into a more substantial instrument of strategic cooperation. The GCC possesses substantial energy resources, financial capital and sovereign wealth funds.

Asean offers manufacturing networks, expanding consumer markets, maritime connectivity and experience in maintaining diplomatic relationships with competing major powers.

China brings industrial capacity, advanced technologies, infrastructure investment and considerable demand for energy.⁵ These strengths are complementary. Yet complementarity alone does not produce a durable strategic partnership. It requires institutions, mutual confidence and rules that prevent any single participant from dominating the relationship. This is where Asean becomes particularly relevant.

Its experience in regional diplomacy, however imperfect, demonstrates how countries with different political systems and strategic orientations can sustain cooperation without requiring complete agreement on every international issue. The GCC can learn from this experience while developing its own regional institutions.

Why China Should Not Become Another Exclusive Patron

China is already an important economic partner of the Gulf. Beijing's demand for hydrocarbons, its manufacturing capabilities and its growing commercial presence make closer cooperation economically attractive and also has diplomatic channels with both Saudi Arabia and Iran.

But the GCC should distinguish between China as an economic partner and China as a comprehensive security guarantor. These are fundamentally different propositions.

Beijing has neither an established Gulf security architecture comparable to that of the United States nor an unambiguous commitment to defend GCC members against external attacks.

Nor should the GCC assume that Chinese economic dependence on Gulf energy will automatically translate into military protection.

China has its own interests to protect, including its relations with Iran. A direct GCC–China strategic realignment, especially one perceived as replacing Washington with Beijing, could introduce new geopolitical tensions.

By contrast, a strengthened Asean–GCC relationship can provide a wider diplomatic and economic foundation for deeper cooperation with China. This does not mean that Asean must formally approve a GCC–China partnership. Rather, Asean can serve as an additional platform that makes the partnership more diversified, institutionalised and less vulnerable to major-power rivalry.

The objective should be strategic diversification, not the substitution of one dependency for another.

The Gulf Cannot Afford Another Prolonged War

The continuing instability surrounding Iran and the wider Gulf demonstrates why economic development and national security cannot be treated separately. The Strait of Hormuz remains one of the world's most consequential maritime chokepoints.⁶

Disruptions to its shipping lanes affect not merely Saudi Arabia, Qatar or the UAE, but also the energy security of China, Japan, South Korea and Southeast Asia. Higher energy costs subsequently affect transportation, food production, fertiliser supplies and manufacturing.

The consequences travel far beyond the Middle East. Asean therefore has a direct interest in preventing the Gulf from becoming a theatre of repeated military confrontation.

Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam all have economic reasons to support maritime stability and uninterrupted commercial flows. China has equally compelling reasons to avoid prolonged disruption.

An Asean–GCC–China framework could turn these overlapping interests into sustained diplomatic cooperation. It should begin with a shared commitment to the protection of commercial shipping, critical energy infrastructure and civilian populations.

Such cooperation must be grounded in the United Nations Charter and international humanitarian law, not in the assumption that military superiority alone can deliver stability.⁷ Indeed, the 2025 Asean–GCC–China joint statement already called for respect for international humanitarian law, including the Geneva Conventions protecting civilians in wartime.⁸ The diplomatic foundations therefore exist. What remains is the political willingness to translate them into practical arrangements.

Malaysia's Diplomatic Initiative Must Not Be Wasted

Malaysia's hosting of the inaugural Asean–GCC–China Summit was an important achievement of its 2025 Asean chairmanship. Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim recognised the value of connecting regions that possess complementary economic strengths but have historically operated through different diplomatic arrangements.

The summit created opportunities in energy, food security, digital transformation, renewable technologies, infrastructure and investment. Malaysia also proposed stronger business-to-business institutional links, including a regional business council.

These initiatives should not be allowed to fade into diplomatic archives.

Under Singapore's chairmanship of Asean in 2027, the relationship should be carried forward through practical implementation, stronger institutional coordination and a renewed commitment to making Asean–GCC–China cooperation a durable pillar of interregional diplomacy.⁹

Singapore's chairmanship in 2027 would be particularly significant given its established position as an international financial centre, a maritime hub and a country maintaining substantial economic relationships with both the United States and China.

Singapore has the institutional capacity to advance practical cooperation between Asean and the GCC, particularly in finance, logistics, digital governance, maritime security and technological innovation.

Its experience in managing relations with competing major powers could also provide useful lessons for Gulf governments seeking to diversify their strategic relationships without provoking unnecessary geopolitical confrontation.¹⁰

Malaysia should continue contributing to this process, especially given its experience in Islamic finance, halal industries, energy cooperation and relations with both China and the Gulf. Indonesia's demographic and economic weight gives it considerable relevance to Gulf engagement.

Vietnam and Thailand can contribute their manufacturing networks, agricultural capabilities and expanding industrial markets.

Together, Asean offers the GCC something that neither Washington nor Beijing can provide individually: an established regional grouping with diverse economic capabilities and extensive diplomatic relationships.

That is an asset worth cultivating.

From Oil Diplomacy to Technological Interdependence

The GCC's long-term future cannot depend solely on exporting hydrocarbons. Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 and the diversification programmes of other Gulf economies reflect recognition of this challenge.¹¹

Yet economic transformation requires more than capital expenditure. It demands reliable supply chains, technological partnerships, skilled labour, education and stable international relationships.

Asean can contribute to all these areas. Malaysia's semiconductor industry, Singapore's financial services, Indonesia's mineral resources and Vietnam's manufacturing capabilities offer multiple avenues for cooperation.

China can subsequently provide additional industrial scale, technological capabilities and access to its vast domestic market.

A trilateral relationship could therefore facilitate investments in advanced manufacturing, artificial intelligence, renewable energy, electric vehicles, petrochemicals and digital infrastructure.

However, such cooperation must incorporate appropriate safeguards for data security, cybersecurity, intellectual property and technological sovereignty. The Gulf should not exchange excessive dependence on Western military technologies for excessive dependence on Chinese digital infrastructure.

Nor should Asean become merely an intermediary through which competing powers export their strategic rivalries. The purpose is to build genuine economic interdependence in which all participants retain meaningful policy autonomy.

Asean and the GCC Must Strengthen Regional Agency

There is another reason why the GCC should deepen relations with Asean before expanding its strategic engagement with China. Both regional organisations confront a similar challenge. Their members possess significant economic resources, but they operate in international environments shaped by much larger powers.

Asean has spent decades managing relations with the United States, China, Japan, India and other partners. Its record is not without shortcomings. Differences among member states can impede collective action, particularly on sensitive security questions.

Nevertheless, Asean has sustained a regional diplomatic architecture that provides regular opportunities for consultation, negotiation and confidence-building. The GCC has its own experience in regional coordination, although internal differences and external security pressures have periodically complicated its cohesion. Closer institutional dialogue could help both organisations exchange practical lessons on crisis management, economic resilience and regional autonomy.

This is where the concept of an Asean Will becomes important.

Regional cooperation cannot depend indefinitely on declarations of goodwill. It requires a willingness to implement agreements, maintain dialogue during crises and defend the collective interests of member states. The GCC likewise needs a stronger collective diplomatic capacity.

A Gulf region whose members act principally through separate bilateral relationships with major powers may find it more difficult to develop common positions on regional security.

A stronger GCC–Asean partnership would not eliminate these differences. It could, however, provide additional mechanisms through which common economic and diplomatic interests are identified and advanced.

The United States Must Remain Part of the Equation

None of this requires the GCC to abandon its longstanding relationship with the United States. American military capabilities, defence agreements, investment relationships and security cooperation remain substantial.

Indeed, the continued importance of Washington makes an abrupt strategic realignment both difficult and potentially destabilising. The objective should instead be to broaden and deepen the GCC's international partnerships while preserving constructive relations with the United States.

Asean has considerable experience with this approach.

Its member states maintain different relationships with Washington and Beijing while continuing to participate in shared regional institutions. This does not mean that every Asean country is equally comfortable with either power. It means that regional cooperation can continue despite differences in national strategic preferences.

The GCC can pursue a similar approach, adapted to its own security circumstances. China should be engaged as a long-term strategic partner in economic development, energy transition, infrastructure and diplomacy.

But such engagement should complement, rather than automatically displace, existing security relationships. A more diversified diplomatic architecture could also give Gulf governments greater room to pursue de-escalation with Iran. Ultimately, no external power can substitute for a sustainable regional security settlement.

Singapore's Asean Chairmanship in 2027 Can Provide the Next Impetus

The significance of Singapore's Asean chairmanship in 2027 should not be underestimated. Singapore is not a major hydrocarbon producer. Yet it is one of the world's most important centres for international trade, maritime services, finance and investment.

These capabilities make it a potentially valuable partner in strengthening the institutional foundations of Asean–GCC–China cooperation. The challenge is to ensure that the trilateral framework does not remain dependent on occasional summits. Under Singapore's chairmanship, Asean could seek to institutionalise regular consultations among economic ministers, energy officials, financial regulators and relevant diplomatic representatives.

Singapore could also work with Malaysia, Indonesia and other Asean members to advance practical projects linking Gulf investment with Southeast Asian industrial development.

Such initiatives would give the GCC additional channels through which to expand its engagement with China. They would also help ensure that China's participation takes place within a broader framework of regional cooperation rather than through narrowly defined bilateral dependencies.

In this respect, the transition from Malaysia's Asean chairmanship in 2025 to Singapore's chairmanship in 2027 provides an opportunity for diplomatic continuity.

Malaysia helped establish the framework. Singapore can help consolidate its institutional and economic foundations.

The Philippines' Asean chairmanship in 2026 forms an important intervening stage in maintaining this continuity.¹² The success of the initiative will ultimately depend on the collective commitment of all Asean member states and their GCC and Chinese counterparts.

The Next Asean–GCC–China Summit Must Produce Concrete Results

The next phase of cooperation should be judged by implementation rather than ceremonial declarations. Five areas deserve particular attention. First, the three parties could establish a permanent consultation mechanism on energy security and maritime disruptions, with technical exchanges on emergency supply arrangements and infrastructure protection.

Second, Asean and the GCC could accelerate investment cooperation in food security, agriculture, fertilisers and logistics.

Third, the parties could strengthen collaboration on semiconductors, artificial intelligence and digital security while maintaining appropriate safeguards against technological dependence.

Fourth, educational exchanges, research partnerships and professional training could help create long-term institutional relationships beyond government-to-government diplomacy.

Fifth, regular diplomatic consultations could address regional conflicts, humanitarian protection and the peaceful settlement of disputes.

These initiatives would build upon commitments already reflected in the May 2025 summit declaration, including cooperation on energy, trade, investment, food security and people-to-people exchanges.¹³ They would also provide measurable evidence that the trilateral framework can deliver benefits to ordinary citizens.

Singapore's chairmanship in 2027 could provide a useful opportunity to advance these priorities, subject to agreement among the participating governments.

A New Strategic Equilibrium

Trump's reported remarks about Saudi Arabia should not be mistaken for proof that the kingdom is collapsing.¹⁴ Saudi Arabia retains considerable financial resources, political institutions, diplomatic relationships and economic capabilities.

Nevertheless, the episode illustrates the uncertainties that arise when Gulf security is closely associated with the decisions and rhetoric of an external power. The GCC has an opportunity to develop a more diversified international position.

Asean can contribute institutional experience, economic connectivity and an additional platform for diplomacy. China can contribute industrial scale, investment and long-term commercial engagement.

The United States can remain an important security and economic partner. These relationships need not be mutually exclusive. The deeper lesson is that regional stability cannot rest permanently on the military calculations of great powers.

It must also be sustained through regional institutions, economic interdependence, international law and persistent diplomacy.

The GCC's pivot towards Asean should therefore be understood not as a departure from Washington or a preliminary surrender to Beijing, but as an effort to strengthen its own strategic agency. Only with a broader network of dependable relationships can the Gulf engage China as a long-term strategic partner from a position of greater institutional confidence.

The Kuala Lumpur summit of May 2025 provided the initial framework.

Singapore's Asean chairmanship in 2027 offers an opportunity to translate that framework into a durable strategic architecture connecting Southeast Asia, the Gulf and China.

The future of the Gulf should not be determined solely by what Washington decides or what Beijing offers. It should also reflect what the GCC, working with Asean and other partners, can collectively build.

For the GCC, Asean should become a strategic bridge to China, not merely another economic destination.

1. "Trump Says Saudi Arabia Is 'Disintegrating,'" Middle East Eye, November 13, 2026, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/trump-says-saudi-arabia-disintegrating.

2. "Asean Kicks Off Summits with China, Gulf States amid US Tariff Threat," Al Jazeera, May 27, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/5/27/asean-kicks-off-summits-with-china-gulf-states-amid-us-tariff-threat.

3. "Gulf States, China Take Centre Stage at Summit of Southeast Asian Nations," Al Jazeera, May 28, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/5/28/gulf-states-china-take-centre-stage-at-summit-of-southeast-asian-nations.

4. Association of Southeast Asian Nations, "Joint Statement of the Summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean), the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC), and the People's Republic of China (Asean-GCC-China Summit)," Kuala Lumpur, May 27, 2025, https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Final-Joint-Statement-of-the-ASEAN-GCC-China-Summit-27-May-2025.pdf.

5. "Remarks by Chinese Premier Li Qiang at the Asean-China-GCC Summit," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, May 28, 2025, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyjh/202505/t20250528_11635023.html.

6. International Energy Agency, "Strait of Hormuz: Oil and LNG Trade Facts," accessed November 17, 2026, https://www.iea.org/about/oil-security-and-emergency-response/strait-of-hormuz.

7. United Nations, Charter of the United Nations (San Francisco, 1945), Chapter I, Article 2.

8. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), August 12, 1949, 75 UNTS 287.

9. "Singapore to Strengthen S-E Asian Unity as Asean Chair in 2027, Build Resilience to Face Crisis," Straits Times, August 23, 2026, https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/politics/ndr-2026-spore-to-strengthen-s-e-asian-unity-as-asean-chair-in-2027-build-resilience-to-face-crisis.

10. "S'pore to Seek Expanded Asean Trade Ties as Chair in 2027," Straits Times, November 15, 2026, https://www.straitstimes.com/world/spore-to-seek-expanded-asean-trade-ties-as-chair-in-2027.

11. "Saudi Vision 2030 Overview," Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, accessed November 17, 2026, https://www.vision2030.gov.sa/en/overview.

12. "About the Asean 2026 Philippine Chairship," Association of Southeast Asian Nations, accessed November 17, 2026, https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/About-the-ASEAN-2026-Philippine-Chairship.pdf.

13. Asean, "Joint Statement of the Asean-GCC-China Summit."

14. "Trump Says Saudi Arabia Is 'Disintegrating.'"

* Phar Kim Beng, PhD is the Professor of Asean Studies at International Islamic University of Malaysia and Director of Institute of International and Asean Studies (IINTAS).

** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.