Electoral promiscuity of PAS and Umno: Even Hadi Awang hopes that it works, not that it will — Phar Kim Beng

JULY 24 — The relationship between PAS and Umno has never been a straightforward political partnership. It has been marked by repeated cycles of cooperation, confrontation, reconciliation and separation.

That history explains why any renewed electoral understanding between the two parties should be viewed with caution rather than certainty.

Recent statements by PAS president Abdul Hadi Awang have reinforced the perception that PAS hopes cooperation with Umno can eventually produce a pathway back to Putrajaya.

This despite the fact that Umno’s Vice President that there is an electoral pact all across the nation at all. Such denial reeks of vote fishing.

Vote fishing, however, is not the same as policy continuity and certainty. That’s where such loose and permissive pacts must be rejected. No one holds each other accountable.

True politics demand organisational cohesion, public confidence and sustained voter support across Malaysia’s highly diverse political landscape.

Yet PAS and Umno have repeatedly experimented with different political arrangements over the decades.

When each pact implodes, one or the other puts the blame on Muslims and non Muslims alike for hindering Malay Muslim Unity.

To be sure, BN and PAS governed together in the late 1970s before their partnership collapsed in Kelantan and all across the country.

PAS later aligned itself with Semangat 46 in 1990s, then worked with DAP and PKR under successive opposition coalitions before joining Perikatan Nasional (PN).

These shifts illustrate a willingness to pursue different electoral formulas as circumstances change.

Umno, too, has demonstrated flexibility.

While remaining the backbone of Barisan Nasional for decades, it now participates in the Unity Government while sections of its leadership and grassroots continue debating future political options. Such fluidity reflects the realities of coalition politics rather than ideological consistency alone.

This is why any future PAS-Umno understanding cannot simply be assumed to succeed because leaders desire it.

Leaders may negotiate, but voters ultimately decide whether such arrangements possess political legitimacy.

Malaysia has also changed significantly.

The electorate is younger, more urbanised and more connected through digital media than during earlier periods of PAS-Umno cooperation.

Economic concerns, employment opportunities, housing affordability and the rising cost of living frequently rank above ideological debates in influencing voter behaviour.

Moreover, Malaysia’s federal character complicates any electoral equation.

Political preferences in Sabah and Sarawak often differ substantially from those in Peninsular Malaysia. East Malaysian parties have repeatedly emphasised constitutional autonomy, development priorities and moderation.

Any national electoral strategy must therefore accommodate regional diversity rather than assume uniform political preferences across the federation.

Another important consideration is internal trust. Cooperation between parties requires confidence not only among leaders but also among grassroots members.

PAS and Umno supporters have spent decades competing intensely against one another.

Rebuilding trust at every organisational level is considerably more difficult than announcing cooperation from the top.

The issue extends beyond campaign logistics.

It involves candidate selection, seat allocation, policy coordination and mutual discipline throughout an election campaign.

Any disagreement over these matters could quickly undermine the appearance of unity.

At the same time, other political coalitions would not remain passive observers.

Pakatan Harapan, Barisan Nasional as presently constituted, parties in Sabah and Sarawak, and smaller regional actors would all adjust their strategies accordingly.

Electoral competition is dynamic; every new alliance generates counter-strategies from rivals.

Consequently, no political formula guarantees victory merely because it appears mathematically attractive on paper.

Perhaps the greatest uncertainty lies in public perception.

Malaysian voters increasingly evaluate parties not only on coalition arithmetic but also on governance performance, institutional credibility and the ability to address everyday concerns.

Political alignments may attract attention, but they do not automatically translate into votes.

In that sense, Hadi Awang may reasonably hope that closer electoral cooperation with Umno can strengthen PAS’s national position. Hope is an understandable political sentiment.

Yet hope should not be mistaken for inevitability.

Malaysia’s electoral history demonstrates that alliances are tested not when they are announced, but when they face voters.

Political expectations often collide with the complex realities of public opinion, regional diversity, coalition management and governance performance.

Ultimately, whether any PAS-Umno electoral understanding succeeds will depend less on what political leaders hope and more on what Malaysians collectively decide at the ballot box on August 1 In Negeri Sembilan.

In a competitive democracy, electoral outcomes remain contingent rather than predetermined.

Hope may motivate political actors, but only voters can transform political hope into political reality.

• Phar Kim Beng is a professor of Asean Studies and a director at the Institute of International and Asean Studies, International Islamic University Malaysia.

** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.