JULY 21 — The assumption that Barisan Nasional (BN) and Pakatan Harapan (PH) can continue their present political understanding uninterrupted until the 16th General Election (GE16) deserves closer examination.
While the Unity Government has provided Malaysia with a measure of stability after years of political turbulence, electoral politics follows a different logic from governing.
Coalitions that cooperate in office do not necessarily remain aligned when the country returns to the ballot box.
Three structural realities suggest why BN and PH may ultimately have to chart separate electoral paths before GE16.
The first concerns electoral strategy. General elections are contests of organisation, timing and surprise.
Any coalition hoping to prevail seeks to deny its opponents the opportunity to prepare a coordinated response.
If BN simultaneously maintains a close political understanding with PAS while remaining within the Unity Government, Pakatan Harapan would lose one of the greatest strategic advantages available in any competitive election: strategic surprise.
The principal challenge confronting PH is not BN itself but a PAS led by Tan Sri Abdul Hadi Awang that has consistently refused to moderate its political approach or broaden its ideological appeal beyond its existing base.
Should BN remain deeply intertwined with PAS while still governing alongside PH, the opposition would gain unprecedented access into the thinking, campaign machinery and electoral calculations of the Unity Government.
Such an arrangement would inevitably weaken PH’s ability to mount an effective campaign capable of catching its opponents off guard.
Successful elections often reward flexibility and strategic ambiguity.
Excessive transparency between competing political camps reduces that advantage.
What serves the purpose of governing with BN today may become an electoral liability tomorrow for PH.
The second consideration lies across the South China Sea.
Sabah and Sarawak are no longer peripheral actors in Malaysian politics.
They are indispensable pillars of any coalition aspiring to form the federal government.
Their parliamentary strength ensures that no viable national coalition can afford to disregard East Malaysian political sentiment.
Yet both states have historically maintained a distinctly different understanding of religion, federalism and multicultural coexistence.
Christian communities in Sabah and Sarawak have for generations used the word “Allah” in their worship and religious literature.
Attempts by political actors in Peninsular Malaysia to restrict or prohibit such usage have generated deep unease in East Malaysia.
Consequently, any perception that BN is moving closer towards a PAS-led political framework risks creating discomfort among political leaders and voters in both Sabah and Sarawak.
This is not merely an issue of electoral arithmetic but one of political compatibility.
The leaders of Sarawak and Sabah have consistently emphasised moderation, constitutional federalism and religious harmony as defining characteristics of their political culture.
Their priorities differ significantly from the ideological emphasis championed by Hadi Awang’s PAS.
Pakatan Harapan therefore requires continued cooperation with Sabah and Sarawak if it hopes to assemble another governing majority after GE16.
Any political arrangement that appears to privilege PAS at the expense of East Malaysian sensitivities risks weakening that crucial partnership i.e. between Pakatan Harapan and the two Borneo states.
The third challenge is one of political psychology.
Following Barisan Nasional’s victory in the Johor state election, PAS quickly asserted that the result reflected its own contribution to BN’s success.
Such public claims demonstrated that electoral cooperation with PAS is unlikely to remain a relationship among respectful equals.
Instead, PAS under Hadi Awang has repeatedly projected itself as the indispensable catalyst behind the electoral fortunes of its partners. Ego reigns supreme in a Hadi-led PAS.
Should this narrative continue unchecked, pressure may gradually emerge for BN to acknowledge PAS as the dominant partner. That’s when Umno becomes a miniaturised party, a second stringer, which Umno will not accept.
Such expectations extend beyond symbolic recognition.
The logical political demand of PAS would be for BN to distance itself entirely from Pakatan Harapan, particularly DAP, under the familiar slogan of Malay-Muslim unity.
Yet this slogan raises difficult constitutional and political questions. In the latter, DAP is already embedded into Pakatan Harapan.
Besides, Malaysia’s Federal Constitution already accords Islam its special position while simultaneously protecting the rights of other faiths.
The country’s constitutional monarchy, civil service and security institutions remain deeply rooted in Malay-Muslim leadership.
Against this backdrop, a Hadi-led PAS that calls incessantly for an exclusive form of Malay-Muslim political unity risk becoming less about constitutional necessity and more about political mobilisation.
For many Malaysians, especially those in Sabah and Sarawak, such rhetoric appears increasingly detached from the broader realities of governing a diverse federation.
This brings Datuk Seri Ahmad Zahid Hamidi into an increasingly delicate position.
As Deputy Prime Minister I, Zahid occupies one of the most important offices in government.
His continued relevance depends not merely upon holding office but demonstrating that Barisan Nasional remains fully committed to the Unity Government while preserving its own political identity.
Should BN drift excessively towards PAS, Zahid risks finding himself trapped between incompatible political commitments.
Conversely, should he decisively reaffirm BN’s commitment to the Unity Government and moderate politics, he preserves his standing as a national bridge-builder capable of working across political divides.
In this sense, Zahid may ultimately have little choice but to execute a political U-turn away from any perception of strategic dependence upon PAS.
Failure to do so carries risks beyond Umno itself.
Deputy Prime Minister II, Datuk Seri Fadillah Yusof of Sarawak, represents a political tradition fundamentally different from PAS.
His leadership reflects the consensus-oriented politics of East Malaysia, where moderation, interfaith accommodation and pragmatic federal cooperation remain paramount.
Unlike leaders associated with PAS, Fadillah carries none of the ideological baggage surrounding debates over religious exclusivity or sectarian political mobilisation.
As Sabah and Sarawak continue to grow in strategic importance within Malaysia’s parliamentary landscape, Fadillah’s political stature may naturally rise.
Should Zahid appear unable to reconcile BN’s competing relationships with PAS and Pakatan Harapan, his influence within the federal coalition could gradually diminish while Fadillah’s role as a trusted national consensus-builder becomes increasingly prominent.
Such an outcome would not necessarily result from personal rivalry but from structural political realities.
Malaysia’s evolving federation increasingly rewards leaders capable of reassuring every region of the country rather than appealing primarily to one political constituency.
Ultimately, GE16 will not simply determine which coalition forms the next government.
It will also determine which political philosophy best reflects Malaysia’s future: one grounded in broad-based constitutional moderation across Peninsular Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak, or one increasingly shaped by narrower ideological contestation.
That choice will influence not only electoral outcomes but the long-term stability of the Malaysian federation itself.
Come what may, Datuk Seri Zahid Hamidi and Umno always have a choice of a U-turn away from PAS.
Only will this option spare an ignominious and early end to a partnership with Pakatan Harapan that has strangely worked since the economy is growing at 5.8 per cent in the second quarter with inflation at 1.9 per cent only.
* Phar Kim Beng, PhD, is a professor of Asean Studies, International Islamic University Malaysia.
** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.
