NOVEMBER 6 — The electoral devastation suffered by President Donald Trump and the Republican Party in the November 3, 2026; midterm elections cannot be explained by the war with Iran alone.
It was also a repudiation of the manner in which the United States has allowed its relationship with Israel, especially under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, to shape American foreign policy, military commitments and domestic political priorities.
This distinction is fundamental.
Americans did not necessarily vote to abandon Israel as a sovereign state or reject its legitimate security concerns. Rather, a growing proportion of the electorate appears unwilling to accept an almost unconditional strategic relationship that can draw the United States into costly wars without sufficient accountability.
The Democratic capture of both chambers of Congress represents a major political setback for Trump. Yet its significance extends beyond Washington.
It raises the possibility that the longstanding bipartisan consensus underpinning American support for Israel is entering a period of structural change.
The Iran war exposed a deeper problem
For decades, the US–Israel relationship was treated as virtually untouchable in American politics.
Republican and Democratic administrations differed over settlements, Palestinian statehood, diplomatic negotiations and the appropriate use of military force. Nevertheless, both parties generally regarded Israel’s security as an enduring American strategic commitment.
Netanyahu increasingly disrupted this arrangement by cultivating Republican support, particularly through his close association with Trump.
The joint US–Israeli military campaign against Iran, launched in February 2026, brought the consequences of that alignment into sharp relief.
The war disrupted energy supplies, increased economic uncertainty and exposed American households to higher costs.
A conflict presented in strategic terms in Washington was experienced economically by ordinary Americans.
Yet only 2 per cent identified the war as their single most important voting issue.
This apparent contradiction is revealing. Foreign policy did not have to dominate campaign speeches to influence the election. Its economic consequences had already entered American households.
The war with Iran therefore became the most visible manifestation of a deeper question: why should American families continue bearing the financial and strategic consequences of decisions so closely associated with the Netanyahu government?
The erosion of unconditional support
The electoral repudiation of Trump coincided with a substantial deterioration in American public attitudes towards Israel.
The Chicago Council’s October survey placed Americans’ average favourability towards Israel at just 44 out of 100, its lowest recorded level in that survey series.
Among Democrats, the figure had declined from 52 in 2022 to 30 in 2026.
More significantly, 56 per cent of Americans supported either reducing or eliminating US military assistance to Israel.
Among Democrats and independents, the corresponding figures were 72 per cent and 64 per cent respectively.
These findings indicate that the shift cannot be dismissed as a temporary emotional reaction to the Iran war.
It began earlier, particularly following Israel’s devastating military campaign in Gaza after the Hamas attacks of October 7, 2023.
The destruction in Gaza, civilian casualties, humanitarian suffering and prolonged absence of a credible political settlement progressively undermined Israel’s standing among important sections of American society.
The Iran war accelerated this deterioration.
For many voters, Gaza and Iran were no longer separate conflicts. They became interconnected examples of an American foreign policy increasingly identified with Netanyahu’s military priorities.
This does not establish that every Democratic voter rejected the US–Israel alliance. The midterms were also shaped by inflation, tariffs, dissatisfaction with Trump and other domestic concerns.
Nevertheless, the evidence strongly suggests that unconditional support for Israel has become a political liability rather than an automatic electoral advantage.
Trump recognised the political danger too late
Perhaps the most revealing development occurred on election day itself.
Trump unexpectedly suggested that the United States would discontinue nearly US$4 billion in annual military assistance to Israel, arguing that Israel no longer required such assistance.
Yet his proposed replacement through arms sales raised questions about whether the financial and strategic relationship would fundamentally change.
The Guardian interpreted this last-minute announcement as an acknowledgment that support for Israel had become politically costly.
The timing was extraordinary.
A president who had closely identified himself with Netanyahu appeared to be seeking political distance from Israel precisely when American voters were preparing to deliver their verdict.
This was hardly evidence of a carefully developed new Middle East strategy.
It suggested political damage control.
Trump’s subsequent acknowledgment that the Iran war contributed to Republican losses was equally revealing. Vice-President JD Vance had already identified the conflict as a major cause of the electoral disaster.
Trump accepted much of that assessment but insisted that the military campaign had been necessary to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
The contradiction is unmistakable.
Trump recognises the political costs of war while remaining committed to defending the decision that produced them.
The American electorate, however, appears increasingly unwilling to separate the stated strategic objectives of the conflict from its economic and humanitarian consequences.
Michigan demonstrates the changing political landscape
The election of Abdul El-Sayed as the first Muslim senator in American history is particularly significant.
His victory in Michigan came despite an intensive campaign by pro-Israel political interests opposing his candidacy.
According to The Guardian, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, or AIPAC, spent more than US$40 million in efforts to defeat him.
Yet El-Sayed prevailed.
The result challenges the assumption that candidates openly advocating Palestinian rights must inevitably suffer politically.
Indeed, The Guardian reported exit-poll findings indicating that El-Sayed secured majority support among Jewish voters in Michigan.
This illustrates an important distinction between criticism of the Israeli government’s policies and hostility towards Jewish Americans.
The two should never be conflated.
The broader lesson is that American electoral politics is becoming more receptive to candidates who question the conventional boundaries of US Middle East policy.
Such changes are particularly significant among younger voters, progressive activists and constituencies concerned with human rights and the appropriate use of American military power.
Nevertheless, a single election cannot establish that pro-Israel political influence has disappeared.
AIPAC and other organisations retain substantial institutional resources, while important segments of both major parties continue supporting Israel.
What has changed is the assumption that such support necessarily guarantees political advantage.
Netanyahu has become a strategic liability
The consequences extend directly into Israeli domestic politics.
Netanyahu’s political survival has long depended partly on his claim that he possesses exceptional access to Washington.
His close relationship with Trump was presented as an asset that could strengthen Israel’s security, expand its diplomatic influence and provide political protection.
The American midterms have severely weakened that argument.
Israel’s own recent election left Netanyahu’s right-wing coalition without a parliamentary majority, although the opposition has not secured a straightforward route to forming a government.
Israeli opposition leaders have already used the Democratic victories to argue that Netanyahu has undermined the bipartisan foundations of American support.
Yair Lapid and Yair Golan have both questioned the damage Netanyahu has inflicted on Israel’s international position.
The significance is considerable.
That assumption is now less secure.
Netanyahu’s decision to identify himself so closely with one American political movement may have compromised Israel’s ability to sustain equally strong relationships across the American political spectrum.
In other words, Netanyahu may have mistaken Trump’s personal political influence for the permanent support of American society.
The two are not identical.
A Democratic Congress will demand accountability
The incoming Democratic majorities in the House of Representatives and Senate will possess substantial institutional powers to scrutinise American military commitments.
Congress can conduct investigations, summon officials, examine arms transfers, question military expenditure and impose conditions through legislation and appropriations.
Such powers could increase pressure on the Trump administration to explain the costs and objectives of its Middle East strategy.
They could also create greater scrutiny of Israeli military operations in Gaza, Lebanon and Iran.
However, this does not mean that Congress can simply terminate the US–Israel relationship.
Trump retains considerable presidential authority over foreign policy and can veto legislation. Overriding a veto requires a two-thirds majority in both chambers.
Moreover, the Democratic Party itself remains divided over the extent to which American military assistance to Israel should be restricted.
Thus, the most immediate change may not be the termination of assistance but the end of unquestioned political deference.
That alone would represent a significant departure from longstanding practice.
The implications for Asean and the Muslim world
For Malaysia, Asean and the wider Muslim world, these developments require careful interpretation.
The American election should not be mistaken for a wholesale conversion of Washington towards Palestinian statehood or an immediate commitment to ending military involvement in the Middle East.
American strategic institutions, defence relationships and regional military deployments cannot be transformed overnight.
Nevertheless, the political environment in which American Middle East policy is formulated is changing.
Malaysia should welcome stronger congressional scrutiny of military operations, greater accountability for civilian casualties and renewed diplomatic efforts to secure a comprehensive ceasefire.
Asean, meanwhile, has a direct economic interest in reducing tensions around the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea.
Disruptions to energy shipments affect inflation, industrial production, food security and international trade throughout Southeast Asia.
The lesson is that regional peace cannot depend indefinitely on military escalation.
Malaysia and Asean should broaden and deepen diplomatic engagement with the United States, Iran, Israel’s regional neighbours and other relevant parties to support a durable settlement.
The objective must be to prevent the Middle East from becoming a permanent source of economic and strategic instability.
A repudiation of strategic subservience
The deepest significance of the 2026 American midterms may therefore lie in the changing relationship between foreign policy and democratic accountability.
American voters are increasingly questioning why their government should provide extensive military and financial commitments abroad while struggling to address domestic affordability, public services and economic insecurity.
This is not necessarily a repudiation of Israel’s existence, nor of the right of Israelis to live in peace and security.
It is a challenge to the proposition that American strategic commitments should remain unconditional regardless of the conduct of an allied government.
It is also a warning against allowing close personal relationships between political leaders to substitute for durable institutional legitimacy.
Trump and Netanyahu built their political partnership around the assumption that military strength and political determination could overcome resistance.
The American electorate has now demonstrated that even powerful leaders remain accountable to democratic opinion.
The Iran war may have accelerated the Republican collapse. But the growing rejection of unconditional American support for Netanyahu’s policies suggests something more enduring: the political foundations of the US–Israel relationship is being renegotiated.
Whether this produces a more balanced American Middle East policy will depend on the decisions of the new Congress, the Democratic leadership and ultimately the American electorate in 2028.
For now, one conclusion is increasingly difficult to escape.
The 2026 midterms were not merely a verdict against Trump’s war with Iran.
They were also a warning that American voters can no longer be expected to provide unlimited political consent for the strategic choices of Israel’s government.
And that warning will reverberate far beyond Washington and Jerusalem.
* Phar Kim Beng, PhD is the Professor of Asean Studies at International Islamic University of Malaysia and Director of Institute of International and Asean Studies (IINTAS).
** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.
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