NOVEMBER 2 — Perikatan Nasional’s (PN) refusal to accept the Confidence and Supply Agreement (CSA) with Prime Minister Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim’s government is not merely about constituency allocations.

It raises a more fundamental question: whether PN’s leadership fears that accepting the CSA would weaken the determination of its Members of Parliament to remain firmly opposed to Anwar and Pakatan Harapan.

This is a political interpretation rather than an established admission by PN’s leaders. Nevertheless, the circumstances surrounding the coalition make it worthy of serious consideration.

Especially when PN itself faces the possibility of deregistration.

On September 22, the Registrar of Societies (RoS) issued PN a show-cause notice over alleged violations of its constitution.

The controversy stemmed from Bersatu’s complaint that it had been excluded from a PN Supreme Council meeting on July 16.

The RoS subsequently suspended PN’s activities before cancelling its registration on October 20.

PN challenged the decision.

On October 22, the High Court granted a stay of the suspension and deregistration pending judicial review.

However, a stay is not an acquittal.

Neither does it mean PN has been permanently restored to unquestioned legal standing.

It merely suspends the consequences of the regulator’s decision while the courts examine the dispute.

The substantive hearing is scheduled for December 7.

PN’s leaders are therefore aware that their coalition’s continued legal existence remains uncertain.

This uncertainty provides the essential background to their opposition to the CSA.

On October 29, six Bersatu MPs led by Tan Sri Muhyiddin Yassin entered into a CSA with the federal government, together with Muar MP Syed Saddiq Syed Abdul Rahman.

The arrangement provides constituency development allocations in exchange for support for Budget 2027.

It also incorporates institutional reform commitments, including limiting the prime minister’s tenure to two terms and separating the Attorney-General’s responsibilities from those of the Public Prosecutor.

Yet PN secretary-general Datuk Seri Takiyuddin Hassan subsequently insisted that the coalition had not participated in the negotiations.

He maintained that PN would not enter such an agreement merely to secure allocations.

This distinction is significant.

Bersatu’s parliamentary approach is increasingly different from that of PN’s leadership, particularly PAS.

Muhyiddin appears prepared to pursue limited parliamentary cooperation without formally joining the government.

PAS, meanwhile, continues to emphasise its opposition identity.

There are legitimate arguments for both positions.

An opposition party must preserve its independence to scrutinise the government.

But accepting a CSA does not automatically mean surrendering that independence.

It depends on the terms negotiated.

Indeed, the CSA could allow MPs to obtain constituency allocations while retaining the right to challenge government policies beyond their agreed parliamentary commitments.

The concern for PN’s leadership may therefore be political rather than merely procedural.

Once MPs begin cooperating with Anwar’s administration, even selectively, the distinction between government and opposition becomes less absolute.

Their constituents may also begin to see parliamentary cooperation as a practical alternative to uninterrupted confrontation.

This could complicate efforts to maintain a uniformly adversarial opposition strategy.

The contrast with Barisan Nasional is revealing.

Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Seri Ahmad Zahid Hamidi has indicated that BN MPs can accept constituency allocations under the government’s CSA framework.

Admittedly, BN is already part of the federal government.

Nevertheless, the broader principle remains important.

Constituency allocations are public resources intended to benefit citizens regardless of their political preferences.

They should not become instruments through which parliamentary confrontation is perpetuated at the expense of local development.

More importantly, PN’s unresolved registration dispute creates additional pressure on its internal cohesion.

Should the courts ultimately uphold deregistration, PN’s component parties would have to reconsider their political arrangements.

PAS could pursue closer cooperation with Umno.

Bersatu could continue exploring parliamentary arrangements with Anwar’s government.

Other component parties would confront their own organisational choices.

None of these outcomes is inevitable.

The courts could rule in PN’s favour.

But the underlying political differences between PAS and Bersatu would remain.

This is why the CSA controversy matters beyond Budget 2027.

It reveals competing approaches towards the government within a coalition whose legal status is already being contested.

PN’s refusal may help preserve a common opposition posture among MPs who reject cooperation.

Yet it cannot compel every component party to adopt the same strategy indefinitely.

Malaysia has previously experienced cross-party parliamentary cooperation.

The 2021 memorandum of understanding between the federal government and Pakatan Harapan demonstrated that political opponents could negotiate institutional reforms while remaining electoral competitors.

Such cooperation need not eliminate democratic scrutiny.

Nor does refusing cooperation necessarily strengthen it.

The real test is whether parliamentary decisions serve the public interest while respecting the independence of elected representatives.

PN’s leadership may regard resistance to the CSA as necessary to preserve its MPs’ resolve against Anwar.

But maintaining opposition discipline and maintaining a viable coalition are two different challenges.

One concerns parliamentary strategy.

The other concerns legal legitimacy, organisational cohesion and agreement among component parties.

PN faces both simultaneously.

With its judicial review approaching and Bersatu already pursuing a different parliamentary course, the coalition must confront a difficult reality.

Opposition to Anwar may provide a common political position. It cannot, on its own, settle PN’s legal predicament or reconcile the competing strategies of its constituent parties.

The CSA has exposed that distinction.

Whatever the eventual judicial outcome, PN’s future will depend on whether its leaders can agree on more than their opposition to the prime minister.

* Phar Kim Beng, PhD, is Professor of Asean Studies at the International Islamic University of Malaysia and Director of the Institute of International and Asean Studies (IINTAS).

** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.