SEPTEMBER 21 — The recent High Court verdict involving the 15-year-old boy who was acquitted of murder on grounds of insanity should make us pause before rushing to explain horrific violence through fashionable labels such as violent extremism, nihilism or terrorism.

The case was undeniably tragic and the loss of life devastating. But the court’s finding reminds us of a fundamental principle of criminal justice: the seriousness or brutality of an act does not, by itself, determine its legal or criminological classification.

An act can be violent without being terrorism. It can be shocking without being violent extremism. And a young person can commit a horrific crime without being ideologically radicalised.

This distinction matters at a time when there appears to be an increasing tendency to interpret serious youth violence through the lens of violent extremism.

The problem is particularly acute when “nihilism” or the absence of ideology is itself treated as an ideology. 

If no ideology can become an ideology, then the boundaries of violent extremism become virtually meaningless. Any unexplained act of violence can potentially be labelled extremism, and any disturbed or troubled young person can become a potential terrorist.

That is not only conceptually problematic. It is dangerous. Violent extremism is not synonymous with terrorism.

In the context of terrorism, violence is generally connected to a broader ideological worldview or cause, whether religious, racial, ethnonationalist, supremacist or political. But even ideological violence does not automatically constitute terrorism in law.

There must be a demonstrable ideological nexus and a legally sustainable basis for categorising conduct as terrorism.

We cannot simply take a violent act and retrospectively search for an ideology because the consequences are shocking.

The absence of an obvious motive does not automatically establish the presence of an ideological one.

Terrorism must never become a residual category for violence we do not understand.

Malaysia has confronted this distinction before. During the height of the Jemaah Islamiyah and later Islamic State threats, the police did not arrest everyone who attended the funerals of some known notorious individuals. Not everyone present subscribed to the ideology of JI or IS. Some were relatives. Others were neighbours.

The same principle must apply elsewhere. Sympathy for an oppressed community is not automatically support for terrorism. Ethnic or political solidarity is not necessarily terrorist allegiance.

The law must distinguish carefully between sympathy, association, ideology, support and actual participation in terrorism.

Once these categories become interchangeable, the threshold for state intervention becomes dangerously low.

Of course, young people can be radicalised. There are genuine cases involving minors who have embraced extremist ideologies, pledged allegiance to terrorist organisations or prepared violence in furtherance of an ideological cause.

Where such evidence exists, the threat must be taken seriously. But the assessment must begin with evidence of radicalisation, not with the assumption that violence itself proves extremism.

A child exhibiting disturbing behaviour may require psychiatric intervention. Another may be experiencing trauma or social alienation. Another may have committed a serious crime. Another may genuinely have been ideologically radicalised.

These are not the same thing.

To collapse them all into the broad category of violent extremism risks replacing proper diagnosis and intervention with securitisation.

The recent verdict is a powerful reminder of this. The court was required to consider not merely what happened, but the accused’s mental capacity and legal responsibility at the time. 

Criminal justice requires precisely this kind of distinction, even when the facts are horrific and public emotions are understandably strong.

The same intellectual discipline must apply to terrorism.

We cannot decide that an act is terrorism because it was particularly violent. We cannot decide that a young offender is an extremist because the conduct appears irrational. And we cannot treat “no ideology” as sufficient ideology simply because we need a label for violence we find difficult to understand.

There is a danger in expanding counter-terrorism frameworks to encompass every form of serious violence.

When everything becomes extremism, genuine extremism becomes harder to identify. Intelligence and enforcement resources are diverted from real ideological threats. Vague indicators can replace evidence, and counter-terrorism risks becoming profiling.

Precision does not weaken counter-terrorism. It strengthens it.

Crime should be treated as crime. Mental illness should be addressed through appropriate medical and legal processes. Child vulnerability should trigger protection and intervention. And terrorism should remain a distinct category requiring clear evidence of the elements that define it.

Not every violent act has an ideology. And not every ideology produces terrorism.

And the absence of ideology should never become an ideology merely because we are searching for an explanation.

The tragedy of the recent school killing demands serious reflection. But we must resist the temptation to securitise what we do not understand.

If we get the label wrong, we may also get the response wrong. And in criminal justice, that can have consequences far beyond a single case.

* Dr Haezreena Begum Abdul Hamid is a Criminologist and Senior Lecturer at the Faculty of Law, Universiti Malaya, and can be reached at haezreena@um.edu.my

** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.