SEPTEMBER 9 — The latest Houthi attacks deep inside Saudi Arabia should be understood for what they are: another warning that the conflicts of West Asia are becoming dangerously interconnected.

The Houthis launched missiles and drones against targets in southern Saudi Arabia, including energy infrastructure in Abha, Najran and Jizan and an airbase at Khamis Mushait.

Saudi authorities said at least 73 civilians were wounded, including women and children.

Fires broke out at energy facilities and some operations were temporarily suspended.

The Houthis, for their part, said their attacks came in response to more than 120 Saudi strikes against Yemen over the preceding three days.

Saudi Arabia has described the Houthi operations as a dangerous escalation and reserved its right to defend itself.

This cycle is precisely why Aseancannot regard West Asia as a distant strategic theatre.

The lesson is becoming painfully clear. There can be no durable peace based on a succession of retaliatory strikes.

One missile invites another. One drone attack creates the political pressure for retaliation.

Retaliation then produces another justification for escalation. Eventually the original causes of the conflict become obscured by an accumulating ledger of attacks and counter-attacks.

What West Asia needs now is a comprehensive ceasefire.

Not a temporary pause involving only one front. Not an understanding covering one country while missiles continue flying elsewhere.

And certainly not an arrangement in which one maritime corridor is protected while another becomes increasingly dangerous.

A comprehensive ceasefire must attempt to lower tensions simultaneously across the principal theatres of confrontation, including Iran, Yemen and the Red Sea, while creating diplomatic space for the wider conflicts that have fuelled regional instability.

Aseanhas every reason to support such an approach.

First, West Asia is intimately connected to Southeast Asia through energy.

The latest escalation immediately demonstrated this vulnerability. Brent crude moved towards US$100 a barrel following the attacks and the wider regional tensions.

For Aseaneconomies, sustained increases in energy prices do not remain confined to petrol stations.

They move through transportation, aviation, electricity generation, manufacturing, fertilisers, food production and logistics.

Inflation imported from geopolitical conflict can eventually become domestic political pressure.

Second, Aseandepends heavily on maritime stability.

The Strait of Hormuz, Bab al-Mandeb, Red Sea, Indian Ocean, Malacca Strait and South China Sea should not be viewed as disconnected bodies of water. Together they form arteries of the global trading system.

This is becoming especially important because Bab al-Mandeb has acquired even greater significance as disruptions around Hormuz complicate Gulf energy exports.

Renewed fighting in Yemen has simultaneously moved towards areas adjoining this critical maritime chokepoint.

If both Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb become persistently insecure, the consequences will travel eastwards very quickly.

Singapore is one of the world’s most important maritime and refining centres.

Malaysia and Indonesia sit astride the Strait of Malacca. Thailand, Vietnam and the Philippines depend heavily on international trade and energy flows.

There is therefore nothing remote about West Asian instability from an Asean perspective.

Third, the continued widening of the conflict risks drawing more states and armed groups into the confrontation.

The danger is horizontal escalation.

A conflict beginning between two protagonists becomes three. Three become five. Militias, governments, external powers and military alliances become progressively entangled until political leaders find it increasingly difficult to retreat without appearing weak.

This is precisely where diplomacy becomes indispensable.

Aseandoes not possess the military power to determine events in West Asia. Nor should it pretend otherwise.

But Aseanpossesses something potentially more useful: decades of experience in keeping communication functioning among countries that disagree profoundly.

Asean’s diplomatic instinct has traditionally been to prevent disagreement from becoming irreversible confrontation. That instinct is needed now.

Malaysia and Indonesia have longstanding relations across the Muslim world. Singapore maintains extensive commercial and strategic relationships with the Gulf states.

Aseancollectively enjoys working relations with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Türkiye, Iran and other important regional actors.

These relationships should be used quietly rather than theatrically.

Aseandoes not need to become another mediator competing for diplomatic visibility.

Oman, Qatar and other states already possess important channels capable of facilitating negotiations.

Aseanshould instead reinforce every credible attempt at de-escalation.

The message should be uncomplicated: attacks on civilians must stop; attacks on critical energy infrastructure must stop; maritime commerce must be protected; humanitarian assistance must flow unhindered; and diplomacy must replace the expanding architecture of retaliation.

Saudi Arabia has legitimate security concerns. Yemen cannot endure another devastating cycle of war. Iran cannot be permanently isolated from the regional security architecture.

And the international community cannot assume that global energy markets will absorb repeated attacks on infrastructure indefinitely.

None of these propositions contradicts the others.

Indeed, they point towards the same conclusion.

Security in West Asia cannot ultimately be achieved through the permanent insecurity of one’s adversaries.

Aseanlearned something similar through its own turbulent history.

Southeast Asia was once described as the Balkans of Asia. Wars, insurgencies, ideological confrontations and great-power competition appeared capable of tearing the region apart.

Aseandid not eliminate geopolitical rivalry.

It learned to manage it.

West Asia faces a vastly different strategic environment, but the underlying principle remains relevant: diplomacy must create enough political space for adversaries to stop shooting before they can begin resolving why they are shooting.

The attacks on Saudi Arabia are therefore not merely another episode in the Yemen conflict.

They are another alarm.

The longer the conflicts of West Asia merge into one another, the harder they will become to separate.

Aseanshould consequently speak with one clear voice.

A comprehensive ceasefire is no longer merely desirable.

It is becoming an economic, humanitarian and strategic necessity for West Asia — and increasingly for Southeast Asia too.

*Phar Kim Beng, PhD is the Professor of Asean Studies at International Islamic University of Malaysia and Director of Institute of International and Asean Studies (IINTAS).

** This is the personal opinion of the writers or publication and does not necessarily represent the views ofMalay Mail.