JULY 28 — Politics is often driven by electoral expediency. For lack of a better phrase, Malaysia has become accustomed to political promiscuity. Alliances are made, broken, revived and rebranded with remarkable frequency.

With at least ten Malay-based political parties competing for the same electorate, coalition-building has become less a matter of principle than of arithmetic.

Yet once political actors discover an electoral formula that appears to work, they rarely abandon it voluntarily.

Following their cooperation in Johor, Barisan Nasional (BN) and Perikatan Nasional (PN) are attempting another experiment in Negeri Sembilan. Should it succeed again, the temptation to reproduce the formula in Melaka and eventually in the next general election will be overwhelming.

The issue, however, is not whether BN and PN can work together.

The more important question is what Malaysia stands to lose if such cooperation becomes the country's dominant political model, especially with Hadi Awang-led PAS occupying a pivotal position.

The first consequence is the normalisation of permanent political uncertainty. BN and PAS have spent decades attacking one another, only to rediscover each other whenever electoral necessity demands it.

Such reversals may be politically convenient, but they gradually weaken public confidence in parties that appear willing to sacrifice long-held principles for short-term gains.

Elections become less about coherent policies and more about assembling the broadest possible coalition to secure victory.

Second, the arrangement risks creating perpetual instability within government itself.

Even if BN and PN win elections together, they would still confront unresolved questions over leadership, ministerial appointments, patronage, economic priorities and the direction of national governance.

Winning an election is one matter; governing effectively is another. The tensions postponed during campaigns often re-emerge with greater intensity once power has to be shared.

Third, Hadi-led PAS introduces an additional layer of complexity. PAS is not merely another coalition partner. It has its own ideological priorities, organisational discipline and long-term political aspiration.

Any coalition in which PAS occupies a central role will inevitably need to accommodate those priorities.

Whether that accommodation reassures or unsettles Malaysia's multi-ethnic society will shape investor confidence, business sentiment and national cohesion.

Fourth, repeated electoral success could encourage all parties to rely increasingly on communal mobilisation instead of governance performance.

If victory is consistently achieved through identity politics rather than improvements in productivity, education, healthcare or institutional reform, Malaysia risks locking itself into a cycle where political competition becomes progressively more polarised while economic competitiveness receives less attention.

Fifth, the consequences extend beyond Peninsular Malaysia. Sabah and Sarawak possess political cultures that differ substantially from those of the peninsula.

Their leaders have consistently emphasised moderation, constitutional balance and respect for the Malaysia Agreement 1963. Should a BN-PN formula increasingly revolve around PAS, East Malaysian parties may become more cautious about deeper federal political integration, widening rather than narrowing the political distance between both sides of the South China Sea.

Ironically, the greatest strength of the BN-PN understanding could become its greatest weakness.

Every electoral victory would reinforce the belief that the same formula should be repeated.

Political leaders, much like military commanders, often prepare for the next battle using lessons from the previous victory.

Success creates habits, and habits become doctrine. The good will stops there. Why?

More often than not, outright political victories do not automatically translate into national success.

Coalitions that are electorally efficient are not necessarily administratively effective. Kedah, Kelantan, Terengganu and Perlis are all becoming economically lagging.

Alliances held together primarily by the objective of defeating a common opponent frequently discover that governing together demands a far higher degree of coherence than campaigning together.

Thus, states with PAS in the fray tend to want to do the least in order not to wreck their Coalition altogether. It is a ruse.

Malaysia therefore faces a larger question than who wins Negeri Sembilan or Melaka in course.

The issue is whether the country's political evolution should be driven by temporary electoral calculations or by a durable vision of inclusive governance capable of commanding confidence across all communities and regions.

Analysts who believe BN and PN will continue cooperating may well be correct. Electoral incentives are powerful, and political survival often overrides political memory.

But if Hadi-led PAS remains central to that formula, Malaysians should evaluate not merely whether the alliance can endure, rather whether its long-term consequences will strengthen or weaken the Federation of Malaysia. It can since PAS is not well liked in Sabah and Sarawak.

The durability of an alliance should never be confused with the durability of national unity.

A coalition may survive election after election, yet still leave Malaysia more polarised, less cohesive and increasingly distracted from the urgent task of building a competitive, inclusive and confident nation.

* Phar Kim Beng, PhD is the Professor of Asean Studies at International Islamic University of Malaysia and Director of Institute of International and Asean Studies (IINTAS). Lutfy Hamzah is a research fellow at IITAS.

** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.