JULY 26 — Much has been written about the latest twists and turns in the relationship between PAS and Umno. One election they are bitter rivals. The next, they become strategic partners. 

This is akin to the Malay comedy in 1990s known as Pi Mai Pi Mai Tang Tu: a play on the phrase Pergi-Mari-Pergi-Mari-Macam-Itu. The problem governance is not mere play. 

Rather amazingly, Quranic verses are replete with warning that this world is not mere game. One should not assume that anyone is in this world for mere fun to while away the time, lease of all issues verging on governance.

At any rate, the defining feature of PAS and Umno is that they like exchanging accusations time and again.

Soon after winning Johor on July 11, by June 24 2026 Hadi Awang was already referring to the tendency of Umno to select bad leaders without fail. That’s less than two weeks of first revealing to the world that PAS and Umno have both reached a political understanding.

To younger Malaysians and older voters, these shifts may appear confusing, even contradictory. But PAS and Umno have always locked in bitter sometimes dangerous rivalries with Hadi Awang produced his “Amanat Hadi,” that refers to Umno as “Kafir,” (Infidels); much as the Quran further warned that on matters of faith and the heart, only God knows best. 

It is the affair of mortals, who cannot see the content of the heart of all men and women — children and elderly for that matter — to assume they know who are believers and who aren’t.

At any rate, history tells a more coherent story. While PAS and Umno have alternated between cooperation and competition, the deep reservoir of mistrust that continues to define their relationship today can be traced to one watershed moment: the 1977 Kelantan constitutional crisis.

The rivalry itself is much older. PAS emerged in 1951 after a group of Muslim scholars and activists broke away from Umno, believing that Malay nationalism alone could not adequately represent Islamic political aspirations. 

Umno, by contrast, saw itself as the principal vehicle for Malay political advancement within a plural society. 

From the very beginning, both parties competed for the same Malay-Muslim electorate but offered different visions of leadership.

For the first two decades after independence, however, this rivalry remained largely political. 

They fought elections, criticised one another and sought to expand their influence, but they also recognised each other’s legitimacy as competitors within Malaysia’s democratic system.

The relationship changed dramatically after the trauma of May 13, 1969.

Seeking national stability, Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak persuaded PAS to join the newly formed Barisan Nasional in 1973. 

For a brief period, many believed the long-standing rivalry had finally been overcome. Malay political unity appeared achievable through cooperation rather than confrontation.

That optimism proved short-lived.

The turning point came in Kelantan in 1977. Internal divisions within PAS over Menteri Besar Mohamed Nasir escalated into a constitutional crisis. 

When Mohamed Nasir refused to step aside after losing the confidence of his own party, the dispute evolved from an internal political disagreement into a confrontation involving the federal government. 

Emergency rule was declared in Kelantan, PAS was subsequently expelled from Barisan Nasional, and the following election saw Umno-backed forces make significant gains at PAS’s expense.

From PAS’ perspective, this episode represented more than an electoral setback. It became a lasting symbol of political betrayal. 

From Umno’s perspective, the federal government had acted to restore constitutional order during a period of instability. 

These contrasting interpretations have endured for nearly half a century.

The consequences extended far beyond parliamentary politics.

During the 1980s, political competition increasingly acquired a religious dimension. 

As PAS embraced a stronger Islamist orientation under its ulama leadership, disagreements with Umno were no longer confined to questions of governance or economic policy. They increasingly touched on religious authority, identity and legitimacy.

In parts of rural Malaysia, political divisions seeped into everyday life. Families found themselves divided by party loyalties. Separate congregations emerged in some communities. 

Social relationships became strained by political affiliation in ways that would have been difficult to imagine during the earlier decades of independence.

The 1985 Memali incident further deepened these wounds. Regardless of differing interpretations of the operation, it became another defining episode reinforcing mutual suspicion between PAS supporters and the Umno-led federal government.

Yet Malaysian politics has always demonstrated an extraordinary capacity for reinvention.

PAS later worked with Semangat 46. It subsequently entered coalitions alongside parties that had once been its political adversaries, including DAP and PKR under different political arrangements. 

Umno, too, has repeatedly recalibrated its alliances according to changing electoral realities. 

The formation of Muafakat Nasional in 2019 showed that even decades of hostility could temporarily give way to strategic cooperation.

However, tactical cooperation should never be mistaken for historical reconciliation.

Political alliances may change because circumstances change. Electoral arithmetic evolves. Leadership changes. National priorities shift. 

But institutional memory remains remarkably resilient. Political parties remember past conflicts. Grassroots supporters remember perceived betrayals. 

Those memories influence negotiations long after the personalities involved have left the stage.

This is why every new attempt at PAS-Umno cooperation inevitably encounters scepticism from within both parties. 

It is not merely a disagreement over policy or seat allocations. It reflects decades of accumulated mistrust that cannot simply be erased by signing another political agreement.

Understanding this history is essential for Malaysians seeking to make sense of today’s political landscape.

The PAS-Umno relationship has never been a simple story of friendship or enmity. 

Rather, it has been characterised by recurring cycles of rivalry, reconciliation and renewed competition. 

Such cycles are common in democratic politics, especially when two parties compete for largely overlapping constituencies.

The lesson, therefore, is not that reconciliation is impossible. Nor is it that conflict is inevitable.

Instead, history reminds us that durable political cooperation requires more than shared electoral interests. 

It demands mutual confidence, respect for institutional commitments and a willingness to confront unresolved grievances honestly.

Nearly 50 years after the events of 1977, the shadow of Kelantan still hangs over Malaysian politics.

Until that historical legacy is fully acknowledged by both sides, every rapprochement between PAS and Umno is likely to remain just that — a tactical arrangement rather than a genuinely settled partnership.

* Phar Kim Beng is a professor of Asean Studies and a director at the Institute of International and Asean Studies, International Islamic University Malaysia.

** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.