APRIL 22 — East Asia’s economic miracle has long been powered by a fragile assumption: that energy from West Asia will always flow uninterrupted. That assumption is now dangerously obsolete.

With approximately 84 per cent of crude oil and 83 per cent of liquefied natural gas (LNG) imported from West Asia, East Asia—especially Asean—stands exposed to one of the most persistent and predictable vulnerabilities in modern geopolitics.

While the Philippines is the Chair of Asean and Related Summits this year, by the first quarter of 2026, President Ferdinand Marcos Junior has had to call for a national emergency due to the energy and oil crisis.

The lesson of oil or energy crisis is not new. It has simply been ignored for too long.

History has issued repeated warnings.

The oil crisis of 1973 demonstrated how quickly supply disruptions could cripple industrial economies.

Triggered by geopolitical retaliation, oil embargoes sent shockwaves through global markets, forcing countries like Japan to fundamentally rethink their energy strategies.

Yet Asean, still in its developmental infancy then, absorbed the lesson only partially.

The second oil crisis of 1979, following the Iranian Revolution, reinforced the same message: political instability in West Asia translates directly into economic instability in East Asia.

Prices surged again, inflation spiked, and energy security became synonymous with national security. But even then, diversification remained more rhetorical than real across much of South-east Asia.

The pattern repeated itself with alarming consistency. The Gulf War of 1991 exposed how military conflict in West Asia could instantly threaten global supply chains.

The Libyan Civil War in 2011 disrupted energy markets despite Libya being geographically distant from East Asia’s primary supply routes, illustrating the interconnectedness of global energy systems.

The Russia-Ukraine crisis beginning in 2015, followed by the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, further underscored how energy geopolitics is no longer regionally confined but globally contagious.

Now, in 2026, the unfolding US–Iran conflict has brought the issue to its most dangerous crescendo.

The Strait of Hormuz—through which roughly one-fifth of global oil flows—has once again become a chokepoint of global anxiety.

Any sustained disruption here does not merely raise prices; it threatens systemic economic paralysis across East Asia.

And yet, Asean continues to behave as though energy vulnerability is a distant abstraction rather than an immediate strategic threat.

This is no longer tenable.

Energy dependence is not merely an economic issue—it is a structural constraint on sovereignty.

When a region relies overwhelmingly on external suppliers, particularly from a conflict-prone zone, its policy autonomy is compromised.

Decisions on foreign policy, trade, and even domestic subsidies become entangled with the need to maintain stable energy flows.

In effect, dependence becomes a quiet form of strategic subordination.

East Asia’s industrial giants—Japan, South Korea, and increasingly China—have at least begun to internalize this reality.

Strategic petroleum reserves, long-term supply contracts, diversification into renewables, and investments in nuclear energy are all part of their evolving response.

Asean, however, remains uneven and fragmented in its approach.

Malaysia and Indonesia possess domestic energy resources but are not immune to global price shocks.

Thailand, Vietnam, and the Philippines are heavily import-dependent. Singapore, despite its sophistication, remains structurally reliant on external supplies.

Collectively, Asean lacks a coherent, region-wide strategy for energy independence. This must change—and urgently.

Without which Asean cannot be the fourth largest economy in the world after China, the US and India.

First, Asean must treat energy independence as a strategic imperative, not merely a developmental goal.

This means accelerating investments in renewable energy—solar, hydro, geothermal—not as climate commitments alone, but as instruments of geopolitical resilience.

The region’s abundant natural resources provide a foundation that has yet to be fully exploited.

Second, the diversification of supply sources must go beyond West Asia.

While complete disengagement is unrealistic, over-reliance is a strategic error. Africa, Central Asia, and even intra-Asean energy trade must be explored more aggressively.

The Asean Power Grid and Trans-Asean Gas Pipeline, long discussed but slowly implemented, must be operationalised with urgency.

Third, nuclear energy—particularly small modular reactors (SMRs)—must be reconsidered without ideological hesitation.

The stigma surrounding nuclear power in Southeast Asia has hindered serious discussion, yet technological advancements have made it safer and more adaptable. Energy security cannot be sacrificed at the altar of outdated fears.

Fourth, Asean must build strategic energy reserves in due course when the prices of fossil fuels----touch wood----do climb down one day at both national and regional levels.

The ability to cushion short-term disruptions is essential in a world where crises are no longer exceptions but recurring features of the international system.

Finally, there must be a shift in mindset.

Energy policy, for that matter Renewable Energy (RE) policy, can no longer be treated as a technical domain confined to ministries and regulators.

It is a central pillar of national security, economic stability, and geopolitical autonomy.

The recurring crises—from 1973 to 2026—are not isolated but part of a structural pattern. Each conflict, each disruption, each price shock is a reminder that dependence carries consequences. The tragedy is not that these warnings exist, but that they have been repeatedly ignored.

Asean now faces a stark choice. It can continue to rely on a fragile external energy architecture, hoping that geopolitical tensions will somehow stabilise.

Or it can act decisively to build a more resilient, independent energy future.

The time for gradualism has passed.

The era of post-normality, defined by overlapping crises and systemic uncertainty, demands strategic clarity and political courage.

Energy independence is no longer optional.

It is survival.

* Phar Kim Beng is a professor of Asean Studies and director at the Institute of Internationalization and Asean Studies, International Islamic University of Malaysia. 

** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.