MARCH 31 — The war involving Iran, the United States, and Israel has entered a dangerous phase – one defined not by decisive victory, but by persistent escalation.

What is unfolding is not a short, sharp conflict, but a grinding confrontation in which both sides retain the capacity to inflict pain, even as neither can secure outright dominance.

Over the course of the conflict, the United States and Israel have demonstrated overwhelming tactical superiority. Their coordinated strikes have successfully targeted senior Iranian political and military figures, degraded Iran’s missile production capabilities, and inflicted substantial damage on its naval assets.

From precision airstrikes to cyber-enabled disruption, the Western-Israeli axis has imposed real costs on Tehran’s strategic infrastructure.

Yet to interpret these developments as evidence of imminent Iranian collapse would be a grave misreading.

Iran has proven itself to be resilient, adaptive, and capable of sustaining asymmetric retaliation.

Despite suffering heavy losses, Tehran continues to launch regular salvos of drones and missiles – not only at Israel, but also at US military installations across the Gulf and, increasingly, at critical infrastructure in Gulf Arab states.

This capacity for sustained retaliation underscores a fundamental reality: Iran is not fighting a conventional war.

It is leveraging a hybrid strategy that blends conventional deterrence with irregular warfare, strategic depth, and regional proxy networks.

Nowhere is this more evident than in the Strait of Hormuz.

A series of attacks on commercial vessels in and around the strait has already begun to disrupt one of the most vital arteries of global trade.

Even limited interference in this narrow waterway – through which roughly a fifth of the world’s oil supply flows – has had disproportionate effects. Shipping traffic has slowed, insurance premiums have surged, and energy markets have reacted with volatility.

The strategic implication is clear: Iran does not need to “close” the Strait of Hormuz to achieve its objectives.

It merely needs to render it uncertain, contested, and dangerous.

Such a strategy is far more sustainable – and far more destabilising.

Against this backdrop, discussions of potential off-ramps and negotiations have begun to surface. Diplomatic feelers, back-channel communications, and tentative proposals for de-escalation suggest that some actors recognise the immense risks of allowing the conflict to spiral further.

But these efforts face a fundamental obstacle: the deep irreconcilability of Washington’s and Tehran’s strategic positions.

For the United States, the objectives remain expansive – ranging from the dismantling of Iran’s missile and nuclear capabilities to the neutralisation of its regional proxy networks. For Iran, however, the war is existential.

It is not merely about preserving military assets, but about ensuring regime survival, maintaining sovereignty, and resisting what it perceives as external coercion. These positions are not easily bridged.

As a result, the likelihood of escalation remains high.

For Washington, escalation could take the form of direct deployment of ground forces onto Iranian territory – an option fraught with immense risk. Iran’s geography, population size, and decentralised command structures make it a profoundly difficult environment for any external military intervention. The lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan loom large, yet may not be sufficiently heeded.

Alternatively, the United States may seek to intensify its efforts to control or neutralise Iran’s ability to disrupt the Strait of Hormuz. But such a move would almost certainly provoke further retaliation, deepening the cycle of escalation.

For Iran, escalation may not come in the form of conventional confrontation, but through the activation of its regional network of allies.

The potential entry of the Houthis in Yemen into a broader regional conflict represents a particularly dangerous development.

Already capable of targeting shipping in the Red Sea, their involvement would effectively extend the theatre of conflict from the Persian Gulf to one of the world’s other critical maritime chokepoints.

This would create a dual-front disruption – Hormuz and the Red Sea – placing unprecedented strain on global supply chains.

The consequences would be profound. Energy prices would surge further, exacerbating inflationary pressures across both developed and developing economies.

Supply chains – already fragile from years of pandemic disruption and geopolitical tension – would face renewed shocks.

Food prices, fertiliser costs, and transportation expenses would rise, disproportionately affecting vulnerable populations.

For South-east Asia, including Malaysia, the implications are especially acute.

As a trade-dependent region, Asean is deeply exposed to disruptions in global shipping and energy markets.

Higher fuel costs would translate into increased production expenses, rising food prices, and mounting fiscal pressure on governments already grappling with subsidy burdens.

Malaysia, while not in immediate crisis, cannot afford complacency.

The effects of a prolonged conflict in the Middle East would reverberate across its economy – from energy and transportation to agriculture and manufacturing.

This is why the war in Iran must not be allowed to escalate further.

The current trajectory points toward a widening conflict with no clear endgame.

Tactical victories on either side are unlikely to translate into strategic resolution. Instead, they risk entrenching a cycle of retaliation that becomes increasingly difficult to contain.

Diplomacy, therefore, is not a sign of weakness. It is a strategic necessity.

The international community – including medium sized powers such as Malaysia, Turkiye, and Indonesia – must play a more active role in advocating for de-escalation.

Track 1.5 diplomacy, which brings together official policymakers and credible non-state actors in semi-formal settings, offers a pragmatic pathway to bridge gaps that formal negotiations alone cannot resolve.

At stake is not merely regional stability, but the integrity of the global economic system.

If the war in Iran is not stopped, it will not remain confined to its current theatre.

It will expand – geographically, economically, and politically – with consequences that the world is ill-prepared to absorb.

The time to act is now, before escalation becomes the only remaining path.

* Phar Kim Beng is professor of Asean Studies and director of the Institute of International and Asean Studies, International Islamic University of Malaysia.

** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.