MARCH 24 — What is often misunderstood in current discussions is this: the Strait of Hormuz is not a gate that can simply be opened or closed at will. It is not a switch.

It is a complex maritime space whose stability depends on command, coordination, and control across multiple layers of authority – military, political, and institutional.

For the Strait to function safely, there must be a coherent leadership structure in Iran.

Orders must flow clearly – from the highest political and religious authorities, through the chain of command, down to operational units such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which plays a central role in maritime security and asymmetric operations in the Gulf.

Without that coherence, even a declared “opening” of the Strait means very little. Ships require guarantees of safe passage.

Navies require predictable rules of engagement.

Markets require confidence that orders issued at the top will be followed on the ground.

That is precisely where the current danger lies.

Recent weeks have seen sustained pressure on Iran’s leadership structure, including what many analysts describe as forms of “decapitation” targeting key figures within the political and security establishment.

Whether symbolic, physical, or institutional, the cumulative effect is the same: fragmentation.

From the weakening of central clerical authority to the sidelining or loss of experienced political operators, the question is no longer simply what Iran intends.

The question is: who in Iran can enforce any decision at all?

Iran is not a unitary command state in the conventional sense.

It is a complex system comprising multiple power centres: the Supreme Leadership, clerical bodies such as the Assembly of Experts, the presidency, and parallel military institutions – most notably the IRGC.

Since the mid-2000s, particularly around 2005, Iran has also developed layered provincial command and intelligence structures across its 31 provinces. This was not accidental.

It emerged from learning from the decapitation of Saddam Hussein a year earlier after the end of Operation Desert Storm in 2003.

It was designed as a resilience mechanism – to ensure regime survival even in the face of large-scale decapitation or external attack. In one sense, it is a strength.

In another, under conditions like the present, it becomes a liability.

Such decentralisation can lead to overlapping authorities, competing interpretations of orders, and uneven implementation.

In a crisis, that means fragmentation of control.

Even if a central authority signals restraint, local commanders may act differently based on their own threat perceptions.

This is where the Strait of Hormuz becomes especially vulnerable.

The IRGC, particularly its naval arm, has both the capability and autonomy to act quickly – through harassment, interdiction, or signalling operations.

But autonomy without coordination is volatility.

A single misjudgment at the tactical level can escalate into a strategic crisis.

The situation is further complicated by uncertainty at the very top.

If the authority of the Supreme Leader has been weakened or disrupted, even temporarily, then the chain of command becomes blurred.

Figures who might be seen as potential successors or power brokers do not necessarily command universal loyalty across the system.

This includes individuals often mentioned in speculative discussions of succession.

Likewise, the presidency, while important, does not exercise direct control over all security institutions.

In such a landscape, no single figure – whether political, clerical, or familial – can be assumed to have absolute authority. That is the core of the problem.

Not just escalation.

But ambiguity of control.

When no one is clearly in command, signals become inconsistent.

Orders may be issued – but not uniformly obeyed.

Intentions may be declared – but not operationalised.

In such conditions, reopening the Strait of Hormuz is not merely a political decision.

It is an organisational challenge.

It requires alignment across multiple centres of power, each with its own interests, incentives, and threat perceptions.

Without that alignment, the Strait may remain functionally unstable – even if no formal closure is declared.

This is why the current crisis is so dangerous.

It is not simply about whether Iran chooses to escalate or de-escalate.

It is about whether Iran, as a system, retains the internal coherence necessary to implement either choice.

For external actors, this creates a profound dilemma.

Pressure may compel statements. But it may not produce control.

And without control, even well-intentioned de-escalation can fail.

The Strait of Hormuz, therefore, is no longer just a geopolitical chokepoint.

It is a mirror reflecting the internal condition of the Iranian state.

If that state is fragmented, then the Strait cannot be reliably stabilised.

And if it cannot be stabilised, then the world may indeed be facing something unprecedented –

Not a Strait that is closed.

But a Strait that cannot be fully re-opened.

* Phar Kim Beng is a professor of Asean Studies and a director at the Institute of International and Asean Studies, International Islamic University of Malaysia.

** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.

Ships navigate the Strait of Hormuz, a key global oil passage whose stability depends on complex command and control within Iran – 

The world may face a Strait that cannot be fully re-opened. —