MARCH 16 — The intensifying military pressure on Iran’s energy infrastructure is producing consequences that extend far beyond Tehran. 

While the intention behind striking or threatening Iran’s oil facilities may be to weaken the Iranian regime, the immediate effect is far more global: a rapid tightening of oil supplies and escalating energy prices.

Nowhere is this risk more evident than at Kharg Island, the nerve centre of Iran’s oil export system.

Kharg Island handles the overwhelming majority of Iran’s crude oil exports. Any damage to its loading terminals, storage tanks, or offshore infrastructure would immediately disrupt the country’s ability to ship oil to global markets. 

Even if Iran’s oilfields remain operational, the inability to export crude would force Tehran to cut production significantly.

Energy analysts estimate that such disruptions could remove as much as one million barrels of oil per day from global supply. 

That loss would come at a time when markets are already strained by disruptions affecting several Gulf producers whose oil shipments have been delayed or rerouted due to security concerns.

The result is clear: the world is entering a phase of energy anxiety.

Global oil markets are exceptionally sensitive to disruptions in the Persian Gulf.

Roughly one-fifth of the world’s traded oil moves through nearby sea lanes, particularly the Strait of Hormuz. 

Even small supply interruptions can produce outsized price movements because traders respond not only to actual shortages but also to perceived risks.

Thus, the targeting of Iranian infrastructure is less likely to produce immediate political change within Iran than it is to trigger volatility across the global economy.

This distinction is crucial.

Modern economies are deeply interconnected through energy markets. When oil prices rise sharply, the consequences ripple across transportation, manufacturing, agriculture, and consumer goods. A sudden surge in crude prices can accelerate inflation in both developed and developing countries.

For emerging economies in Asia, the effects can be particularly severe.

Countries such as India, Indonesia, and Thailand rely heavily on imported energy to sustain industrial growth. 

When oil prices climb rapidly, governments are often forced to expand subsidies to cushion the impact on households and businesses. This places pressure on fiscal balances and slows economic momentum.

Even the United States, despite being one of the world’s largest oil producers, cannot fully insulate itself from such shocks.

Oil is a globally traded commodity, and domestic prices are still shaped by international supply conditions.

Ironically, therefore, military actions intended to weaken Iran may end up strengthening one of Tehran’s most potent strategic tools: energy disruption.

Iran has long understood that its geopolitical leverage lies not only in missiles or drones but also in the vulnerability of global energy supply chains. 

The concentration of oil production and shipping infrastructure within the Persian Gulf creates a strategic chokepoint where even limited disruptions can send shockwaves through global markets.

If Kharg Island were severely damaged, the consequences would not be confined to Iran.

The Gulf region would face a renewed wave of economic uncertainty.

Shipping insurance premiums would surge, tanker routes would become riskier, and energy traders would begin hoarding supplies. 

These reactions alone could push oil prices higher even before actual shortages occur.

Moreover, the geopolitical fallout could deepen divisions among major powers.

China, Japan, and South Korea remain among the largest consumers of Middle Eastern oil. Europe, still grappling with energy insecurity following the Russia-Ukraine war, would also feel the strain. 

A prolonged disruption in Iranian exports could accelerate competition for alternative energy sources, intensifying global economic rivalries.

For Southeast Asia, the stakes are equally significant.

Malaysia and its Asean neighbours are closely tied to global energy markets. 

While higher oil prices may temporarily boost revenues for oil-exporting countries like Malaysia, the broader economic impact is far more complex. 

Rising fuel costs increase transportation and food prices, which in turn place pressure on governments to expand subsidies.

Beyond a certain threshold, higher oil prices cease to be beneficial even for producing countries.

They begin to undermine growth.

Thus, the current strategy of targeting Iran’s oil infrastructure risks creating a paradox. 

Rather than weakening Tehran’s political resolve, it may instead destabilize global markets and amplify economic pressures on countries far removed from the battlefield.

History suggests that energy infrastructure is a double-edged sword in conflict. 

While damaging oil facilities may appear tactically attractive, the globalized nature of energy markets means that the consequences quickly spill across borders.

The world has seen this before.

From the oil shocks of the 1970s to disruptions during the Gulf wars, attempts to control or damage energy supply lines have often triggered unintended economic consequences. Inflation rises, growth slows, and geopolitical tensions intensify.

The present moment carries similar risks.

If Kharg Island becomes a target or suffers serious damage, the immediate victim will not only be Iran’s oil industry but also the fragile balance of global energy markets.

Removing one million barrels per day from supply would tighten markets dramatically, pushing prices upward and spreading economic strain across continents.

In the end, the fundamental question remains whether such actions truly achieve their intended political objectives.

Oil infrastructure can be destroyed or disrupted, but regimes often endure far longer than markets can tolerate sustained volatility. 

If the goal is long-term stability in the Middle East, strategies that inadvertently trigger global energy crises may ultimately prove counterproductive.

The pressure generated by attacks on Iranian oil infrastructure is therefore falling less on Tehran’s political leadership than on the global price of oil.

And in a deeply interconnected world economy, that pressure is felt everywhere.

* Phar Kim Beng is professor of Asean Studies and director of the Institute of International and Asean Studies, International Islamic University of Malaysia 

 ** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.