JAN 2 — Japan’s decision to more than double its Official Security Assistance (OSA) allocation in fiscal year 2026—to approximately US$117 million (RM474 million)—marks a significant yet often misunderstood shift in Tokyo’s regional engagement strategy. 

It must be explained before it is exaggerated as a threat based assistance against any parties, which when left uncontrolled, can lead to a self fulfilling prophecy. Allowing the latter to happen would be devastating.

At first glance, the move to double Japanese OSA has been interpreted by some observers through the familiar lens of strategic competition, particularly in relation to China and maritime disputes in the Indo-Pacific. 

Such readings, however, miss the deeper logic of Japan’s OSA and its growing relevance to Asean—especially Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines—within the framework of Asean centrality. These three are maritime countries with Indonesia having the sixth largest Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) in the world, while the Philippines being the twelfth.

Malaysia has maritime borders with Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei, the Philippines, Vietnam, even Thailand. 

Malaysia is the only country that has jurisdiction over parts of The Straits of Malacca and South China Sea, a role almost analogous to two other littoral states such as Singapore and Indonesia. 

Unless the likes of Malaysia receives some help, it does not have enough assets to handle problems pertaining to its long coastlines let alone any activities pertaining to the Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR). 

This is a common problem of Asean too which the likes of Japan, Australia,  and the United Kingdom (UK) are beginning to understand based on the current Five Power Defense Agreement (FPDA). 

When the Monsoon season is fraught with risks, especially in light of the year end Monsoon in 2025 which is expected to last until the end of January if not February 2026, bringing rain fall that was the largest in three centuries in Southern Thailand, even Sumatera and parts of Malaysia, it is vital to get ready.

Besides OSA is not a military alliance instrument, nor is it designed to compel the recipient into confrontational postures. 

Rather, it reflects Japan’s calibrated response to the complex security realities facing Southeast Asia today—where non-traditional security threats, humanitarian emergencies, and institutional capacity gaps increasingly matter as much as conventional deterrence.

Japan’s overall defence budget for 2026, now approaching US$58 billion, has understandably drawn attention. 

Yet it is important to separate Japan’s internal defence posture from its outward-facing security cooperation. 

OSA belongs firmly to the latter category. It is about partnership, not power projection.

Unlike traditional security assistance models, Japan’s expanded OSA portfolio goes well beyond patrol vessels and maritime surveillance equipment. 

The inclusion of drones for disaster monitoring, heavy machinery for humanitarian assistance, ceasefire-monitoring tools, and infrastructure-related support signals a deliberate emphasis on functional security cooperation. 

Whether it is against piracy or unlicensed poaching of each other’s fisheries, Asean member states need to be secure with OSA.

This approach resonates strongly with Asean’s long-standing priorities to ensure its own cohesion, which was badly damaged by the border skirmish even war between Cambodia and Thailand.

More importantly, Southeast Asia’s most persistent security challenges are not interstate wars but climate-induced disasters, maritime accidents, internal conflicts, and transnational crime. 

In this context, OSA-supported assets are more likely to be deployed for search-and-rescue operations, disaster response, humanitarian relief, and maritime safety than for confrontation in contested waters.

For Asean states, this matters. The fear of being drawn into major-power rivalry has long shaped regional diplomacy. Japan’s OSA, by design, avoids that trap. It provides tools without prescribing enemies.

Now why won’t recipients use OSA against China?

That’s because China has a blue water navy. None of the member states in Asean has the near equivalent.  OSA can attenuate but not commit any member states of Asean to being hostile against China let alone any member states that encroach on its maritime territories.

Indeed, a critical point often overlooked in external commentary is that OSA recipients retain full agency. 

Equipment provided under OSA is not tied to alliance obligations, nor does it mandate specific operational use. 

Asean states, including Malaysia, are deeply committed to strategic autonomy and will deploy such capabilities according to national and regional priorities.

In practical terms, drones supplied under OSA are far more likely to be used to monitor floods in Kelantan, track illegal fishing, or assist in humanitarian operations than to shadow naval movements in disputed waters. 

Ceasefire-monitoring tools are relevant to peace processes, not power politics.

This flexibility is precisely why OSA fits comfortably within Asean’s diplomatic culture. 

It strengthens capacity without eroding neutrality.

Malaysia–Japan cooperation is a  natural fit just as Australian and UK cooperation with Malaysia and Singapore under FPDA. It is all for defensive purposes.

For Malaysia, Japan’s OSA expansion presents a timely opportunity to deepen strategic cooperation anchored in Asean centrality rather than bilateral alignment against any external third party. 

Kuala Lumpur has consistently advocated inclusive regionalism, dialogue, and confidence-building measures. Japan’s OSA complements this worldview; just as Australia and Malaysia cooperation does over the last fifty years.

Malaysia’s needs are clear: enhanced disaster-response capability, maritime safety, humanitarian logistics, and institutional capacity-building. 

These are areas where Japan has both expertise and credibility. 

Cooperation under OSA can therefore reinforce Malaysia’s role as a facilitator and stabiliser within Asean, not a frontline state in great-power competition.

Moreover, Malaysia’s position as a medium-sized power with strong diplomatic networks allows it to shape how 

OSA-type assistance can be embedded within Asean mechanisms—whether through information-sharing, joint training, or region-wide humanitarian coordination. 

This strengthens Asean from within, rather than outsourcing security to external actors.

Asean centrality preserved, not undermined

Concerns that Japan’s expanded OSA could undermine Asean centrality are misplaced. 

On the contrary, OSA works best when it is nested within Asean-led frameworks, not imposed from outside. 

Japan has consistently articulated support for Asean-led institutions, and its OSA design reflects sensitivity to regional norms.

Unlike rigid alliance structures, OSA allows Asean states to cooperate selectively, multilaterally, and incrementally. 

This reinforces Asean’s role as the primary convener of regional security dialogue—even as external partners contribute resources and expertise.

For Malaysia, which places a premium on diplomacy, inclusivity, and regional ownership, this model is preferable to security architectures that divide rather than unite.

Beyond 2026: A partnership of trust, not threat

Looking ahead, the significance of Japan’s OSA expansion lies not in the headline figures—US$117 million for OSA against a US$58 billion defence budget—but in the philosophy underpinning it. 

Japan is signalling that security in Southeast Asia cannot be addressed through deterrence alone. It requires capacity, resilience, trust, and cooperation.

For Asean, and especially for Malaysia, the challenge is not to over-interpret OSA through a confrontational lens, but to shape its application in ways that serve regional stability. 

Used wisely, OSA can strengthen humanitarian response, improve maritime safety, and support peace processes—without forcing choices between major powers.

Japan’s expanding OSA, if anchored firmly in Asean centrality and aligned with Malaysia’s cooperative diplomacy, should therefore be seen not as a source of tension, but as a strategic asset for regional resilience.

*This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.