DECEMBER 31 — The entry into force of the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) between Japan and the Philippines in September 2025 has been greeted with a mixture of enthusiasm, anxiety, and strategic over-interpretation.

That Japanese armed forces are back in the Philippines for the first time in 1945.

But Japanese Official Security Assistance (OSA) – while extended to the Philippines – is also given to the likes of Malaysia, Bangladesh and Fiji.

These are countries with no interest in militarization of the Straits of Malacca, South China Sea, Bay of Bengal or the Pacific sea respectively.

Headlines have framed it as a major deterrent against China, while some analysts have portrayed it as another step toward bloc formation in the Indo-Pacific.

Such portrayals, however, does exaggerate both the intent and the actual strategic weight of the agreement.

Properly understood, the Japan–Philippines RAA represents calibrated bilateralism – useful, limited, and deliberately restrained.

At its most basic level, the RAA is an administrative and legal instrument.

It simplifies procedures governing the entry, temporary stay, and exit of military personnel and equipment for purposes such as joint exercises, training, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief.

It addresses practical matters – customs, jurisdiction, logistics, and force protection – rather than grand strategy.

Crucially, it does not establish permanent bases, nor does it oblige either party to come to the other’s defense in the event of armed conflict.

There is no equivalent to Nato’s Article 5, and no automaticity built into the agreement. This distinction is fundamental.

In international relations, not all defense agreements are alliances, and not all military cooperation signals imminent confrontation.

The tendency to inflate the RAA into an Asian collective defense pact risks misunderstanding the careful legal and political boundaries that both Tokyo and Manila have deliberately maintained.

Overstatement fuels suspicion, especially in a region where historical memory and strategic anxiety already run deep.

For Japan, the RAA fits within a long-term but cautious evolution of its security posture.

Tokyo has steadily expanded defense cooperation with selected partners, while remaining constrained by its post-war constitutional framework and domestic political sensitivities.

Agreements of this kind – already concluded with Australia and the United Kingdom – are part of Japan’s effort to enhance interoperability, preparedness, and non-traditional security cooperation.

The Philippines, frequently exposed to natural disasters and maritime contingencies, is a logical partner in this regard.

The RAA thus reflects normalization, not militarization.

For the Philippines, the agreement serves a different but equally pragmatic purpose.

Manila continues to anchor its external defense posture in its alliance with the United States, yet it has also sought to broaden its security partnerships to avoid excessive reliance on any single power.

Cooperation with Japan brings technology transfer, training, and diplomatic reassurance without imposing alliance obligations.

This is not a rejection of strategic autonomy, but a way of reinforcing it through diversification.

China’s presence looms large in any discussion of regional security, and it would be disingenuous to suggest that maritime tensions in the East and South China Sea are irrelevant.

Yet it would be equally misleading to claim that the RAA is designed primarily to “contain” China.

The agreement does not authorize joint combat patrols, forward deployment of strike assets, or coordinated war planning.

Its deterrent effect, if any, is indirect and modest – derived from improved readiness and cooperation rather than explicit threat signaling.

Deterrence here is about raising the costs of coercion, not about preparing for confrontation.

From a broader Asean perspective, the RAA should not be read as undermining regional multilateralism.

Asean has long accommodated bilateral and minilateral security arrangements among its members, provided they do not erode Asean centrality or force the region into rigid camps.

The Japan–Philippines RAA binds only two states and does not speak for Southeast Asia as a whole. It coexists with Asean-led mechanisms, rather than replacing or bypassing them.

Indeed, Asean’s resilience has often depended on flexibility. Member states differ in threat perception, geography, and strategic culture.

Allowing space for selective bilateralism has helped prevent the imposition of a single, divisive security template.

In this sense, the RAA is consistent with Southeast Asia’s long-standing preference for overlapping, non-exclusive arrangements rather than formal blocs.

The agreement also reflects a wider Indo-Pacific trend toward what might be called “networked bilateralism.”

Instead of rigid alliances, states are constructing a web of functional, issue-specific partnerships focused on interoperability, capacity-building, and crisis response.

Such networks can enhance stability if they remain transparent, limited, and anchored in international law.

Problems arise only when these arrangements are exaggerated into instruments of encirclement or ideological confrontation.

It is also important to highlight the non-military dimensions often overlooked in strategic commentary.

Japan’s engagement with the Philippines has long included development assistance, infrastructure financing, maritime safety cooperation, and disaster management.

The RAA strengthens the foundation for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations – areas where speed, trust, and coordination matter far more than power projection.

In a region increasingly affected by climate change and extreme weather, these capabilities are not peripheral but central to human security.

Exaggeration, therefore, is not merely analytically flawed; it is strategically counterproductive.

Casting the RAA as a dramatic escalation risks hardening attitudes and narrowing diplomatic space.

It invites zero-sum thinking and encourages external actors to respond to imagined threats rather than real capabilities.

In international politics, perception can be as destabilizing as reality, and inflated narratives can generate self-fulfilling tensions.

A sober reading recognises the agreement for what it is: a modest, bilateral instrument designed to manage risk and enhance cooperation without altering the regional balance of power.

It reflects caution rather than adventurism, pragmatism rather than provocation.

Both Japan and the Philippines have been careful to keep the agreement within legal and political limits precisely to avoid unnecessary escalation.

Ultimately, stability in the Indo-Pacific will not be secured by dramatizing every defense pact. It will depend on restraint, continued dialogue, respect for international norms, and the peaceful settlement of disputes.

Bilateral agreements such as the Japan–Philippines RAA can contribute positively only if they are understood in proportion and context.

Seen in this light, the RAA neither heralds a new Cold War nor signals an irreversible strategic realignment. It is simply bilateralism going forward – measured, functional, and deliberately understated.

* Phar Kim Beng is professor of Asean Studies and director of the Institute of International and Asean Studies at the International Islamic University of Malaysia

** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.