OCTOBER 19 — Indonesia’s announcement of its US$9 billion deal with China for 42 Chengdu J-10 multirole fighters is more than a defence procurement – it is a declaration of strategic intent.

With President Prabowo Subianto confirming that the jets will soon “fly over Jakarta’s skies”, Indonesia has signalled a historic pivot in its approach to air power and great-power alignment.

For decades, Indonesia balanced between Western and Russian suppliers to maintain a semblance of autonomy. Its Air Force fleet, a hybrid mix of American F-16s and Russian Su-27/Su-30 Flankers, reflected this duality.

Yet the acquisition of the Chinese J-10C – a 4.5-generation multirole fighter capable of precision strike and network-centric operations – marks a strategic recalibration towards an emerging Asian defence ecosystem.

A break from the past

The deal’s magnitude, both financially and symbolically, places Indonesia in the same league as China and Pakistan – the only other operators of the J-10. This move underscores Indonesia’s confidence in diversifying its defence partners beyond the traditional Western bloc.

After years of frustrations over spare-parts restrictions, technology-transfer delays, and the bureaucratic constraints of Western arms deals, Jakarta has decided to bet on a platform that promises operational sovereignty.

This is not Indonesia’s first flirtation with diversification. In 2022, it ordered Rafale fighters from France, explored joint projects with South Korea’s KF-21 programme, and expanded defence-industrial cooperation with Turkey – a rising military producer whose drones, armoured vehicles, and missile technologies have attracted global attention.

Indonesia’s purchase of Turkish-made Anka unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and its cooperation on defence production through state-owned enterprises represent another crucial component of this broader diversification strategy.

Together with the J-10C acquisition, these purchases signal a multi-vector approach: engaging Europe for high technology, China for scalable deterrence, and Turkey for indigenous co-development. The result is a more autonomous defence ecosystem, one that balances affordability, performance, and sovereignty.

Beijing’s expanding footprint

For China, the sale is a strategic coup. It demonstrates that Beijing can export not only cheap drones or basic airframes but also sophisticated, high-performance combat aircraft. The J-10C’s export success in Pakistan has already validated Chinese reliability under combat conditions.

With Indonesia’s entry, Beijing adds Southeast Asia’s largest economy and archipelagic nation to its growing clientele – a sign that its defence industrial complex has matured into a global competitor.

Moreover, the deal strengthens China’s political capital within Asean.

As the region’s defence procurement trends diversify, China’s arms diplomacy – rooted in non-interference, affordable pricing, and rapid delivery – appeals to middle powers seeking alternatives to the US-dominated global arms regime. The symbolism of Chinese-built jets flying over Jakarta, rather than Lockheed Martin’s F-16 Vipers, will not be lost on Washington, Tokyo, or Canberra.

Strategic implications for Asean

Indonesia’s J-10 acquisition must be read against the backdrop of Asean’s fragile military equilibrium. The Philippines has leaned closer to the United States; Vietnam continues to modernise with Russian and Israeli support;

Singapore maintains a Western-leaning, technology-intensive air force; and Malaysia remains cautious, preferring small-batch modernisation. Indonesia, by contrast, is now testing a “third-way” approach – diversifying without aligning.

This recalibration could embolden other Asean members to pursue similar defence diversification strategies. It strengthens Asean’s collective negotiating power by widening the technological base from which its members can choose.

At the same time, it risks deepening the bloc’s internal asymmetries. Countries that rely exclusively on Western or Russian systems may struggle to integrate operationally with neighbours flying Chinese platforms.

Yet the deal also embodies the very essence of Asean centrality – strategic autonomy through multiple alignments. By buying from Beijing and working closely with Ankara, Jakarta asserts its independence from both Washington and Moscow. It also subtly reminds its Asean counterparts that sovereignty must be defended with capabilities, not rhetoric.

A new layer in the Indo-Pacific chessboard

The timing of this procurement is geopolitically charged. The Indo-Pacific region is experiencing an unprecedented military build-up: Japan is rearming, the Philippines is expanding its US-assisted basing network, and Australia is advancing the AUKUS nuclear-submarine programme.

Indonesia, sitting astride key maritime chokepoints like the Malacca and Sunda Straits, cannot afford to be a spectator.

By acquiring the J-10C, Indonesia gains a credible deterrent without fully subscribing to any alliance.

The aircraft’s range and payload capacity make it suitable for defending both western Sumatra and eastern Papua – territories crucial to Indonesia’s archipelagic integrity.

More importantly, the deal enhances its leverage in negotiating the South China Sea Code of Conduct, where air-power parity matters as much as diplomatic finesse.

Washington may view the sale as yet another example of China’s creeping influence in the Indo-Pacific. But Indonesia’s move should not be misread as a tilt towards Beijing.

Instead, it reflects Jakarta’s determination to pursue “strategic diversification” in the same spirit that it leads Asean’s “Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” – a vision of inclusivity, not alignment.

Sovereignty and the economics of deterrence

The US$9 billion investment is a political statement that defence modernisation is a national-sovereignty imperative, not a luxury.

The spending also carries economic multipliers: local maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) facilities, potential co-production of avionics components, and technology-transfer opportunities that can stimulate Indonesia’s nascent aerospace industry.

If managed well, the J-10C programme could complement the existing state-owned aerospace firm PT Dirgantara Indonesia’s ambitions to become a regional maintenance hub.

Together with Turkish partnerships in drone technology and defence electronics, Indonesia can build a sustainable supply chain that reduces dependence on any single foreign supplier.

The future of regional air power

The J-10C’s arrival will reshape Asean’s aerial order of battle. Once operational, Indonesia’s combined inventory of Rafales, F-16s, J-10Cs, and Turkish Anka drones will represent one of the region’s most diverse – and potentially most adaptable – air forces. Its hybrid doctrine will test new models of interoperability, forcing Jakarta to balance Western precision logistics, Chinese systems engineering, and Turkish modular production.

In the long run, the success of this diversification strategy will depend on Indonesia’s ability to maintain autonomy in software, weapon integration, and pilot training. Over-reliance on any single supplier, even China, would undercut the very sovereignty Jakarta seeks to protect.

A decisive ascent

Indonesia’s choice to purchase 42 J-10Cs from China, while deepening cooperation with Turkey and France, is not simply about jets – it is about a nation taking flight towards strategic adulthood.

The aircraft will soon “fly over Jakarta’s skies”, as President Prabowo Subianto declared, but their true altitude will be measured in Indonesia’s ability to navigate between dependence and deterrence, between partnership and prudence.

As great-power rivalries intensify, Indonesia’s skies will not just be filled with new fighters; they will reflect a new balance – one where Asean’s largest state has chosen to soar on its own terms.

* Phar Kim Beng is Professor of Asean Studies and Director of the Institute of International and Asean Studies (IINTAS), International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM); Luthfy Hamzah is Research Fellow, IINTAS; and Rahmah Azizan is Senior Research Associate, SPIPA.

** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.