SEPTEMBER 18 — Operation 1027 has redrawn the contours of Myanmar’s civil war. Launched on 27 October 2023 by the so-called Three Brotherhood Alliance — the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and the Arakan Army (AA) — this campaign has been the most effective offensive against the junta since the 2021 coup. 

It has shaken Naypyidaw’s confidence, weakened its control in border regions, and altered the balance of power across Shan, Rakhine, and Sagaing. 

Yet within this apparent triumph of ethnic armed organizations lies a darker story: the ascendance of the Arakan Army in Rakhine state may prove to be the most lethal threat to the already vulnerable Rohingya.

A war of momentum

Operation 1027 was conceived as a coordinated strike to dismantle military bases, seize strategic towns, and cripple the junta’s hold over trade corridors. 

In northern Shan, the alliance captured dozens of outposts. In Rakhine, the Arakan Army seized the moment to push deep into Maungdaw and other townships bordering Bangladesh. B

By doing so, the AA has effectively expanded its footprint across swathes of territory once tightly controlled by the Tatmadaw. 

For many observers, this signifies the rise of a parallel administration in Rakhine, with the AA increasingly acting as both a military force and a de facto governing authority.

The rise of the Arakan army

The AA is no longer a guerrilla outfit. It commands thousands of fighters, enjoys tactical sophistication, and has capitalized on local resentment of central rule. Its forces have captured military garrisons, secured vital roads, and extended their influence to border trade routes that connect to China, India, and Bangladesh. 

Such control not only weakens the junta but also empowers the AA to dictate the daily lives of communities in Rakhine. In theory, this could have opened a door to a more inclusive local governance. 

In practice, however, the rise of the AA may intensify the suffering of the Rohingya.

Rohingya: From victims of the state to prey of new powers

For decades, the Rohingya have endured persecution, statelessness, and mass displacement under successive Burmese governments. 

The military’s clearance operations in 2017 created one of the largest humanitarian crises in Southeast Asia. But as the junta weakens and the AA advances, the Rohingya are not automatically better off. 

Instead, they find themselves trapped between two forces — a collapsing military regime that still views them as pariahs, and an ascendant Arakan Army that has yet to recognize them as equal stakeholders in Rakhine.

Reports from the ground suggest that the AA has taken control of territories where Rohingya communities live, including Maungdaw. 

This control gives the AA leverage to impose movement restrictions, dictate humanitarian access, and potentially treat Rohingya villages as buffer zones in its conflict with the junta. 

Even if the AA does not adopt an explicit policy of persecution, the Rohingya are likely to suffer collateral damage: bombardments, displacement, and deprivation of aid. 

With communications cut and international monitors barred, abuses can easily go unrecorded.

Dangerous crosscurrents

Another risk lies in the shifting alliances of war. Recently, the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO), a small armed faction, has found common ground with the junta in fighting the AA. 

Such developments further complicate the picture: if the AA perceives Rohingya groups as aligned with its enemy, retaliation against Rohingya civilians could escalate. 

This dynamic transforms the Rohingya from passive victims to perceived threats, a perilous turn in a conflict where military logic often trumps humanitarian considerations.

A wider geopolitical storm

The rise of the AA in Rakhine has implications beyond Myanmar’s borders. Bangladesh, already host to nearly one million Rohingya refugees, fears a new influx if fighting intensifies. 

China, with its strategic interests in the Bay of Bengal and its energy corridor through Rakhine, is watching closely. India, too, is wary of instability spilling into its northeast. 

The Rohingya, unfortunately, remain pawns in this wider geopolitical contest. As regional powers hedge their interests, the community itself has no state to speak for it.

The way forward

What Operation 1027 reveals is not just the weakness of Myanmar’s junta, but the fragility of Myanmar’s minorities. 

While the Arakan Army may tout itself as a liberating force for Rakhine Buddhists, its rise could herald a new phase of marginalization for the Rohingya. 

Unless international actors, including Asean, press the AA to commit publicly to protecting the rights of all communities under its control, the Rohingya will continue to face existential threats.

Asean must treat this as more than an internal Myanmar affair. Rakhine borders the Bay of Bengal, a strategic waterway linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans. 

Any escalation involving the AA and the Rohingya risks regional instability, mass displacement, and even maritime insecurity. Protecting the Rohingya is not just a moral duty; it is a strategic necessity for regional order.

The world may celebrate Operation 1027 as proof of the junta’s declining grip. Yet for the Rohingya, it may merely exchange one persecutor for another. 

Unless their rights are secured in the shifting sands of Myanmar’s conflict, they risk being forgotten once again — this time in the shadow of a new power rising in Rakhine.

* Phar Kim Beng, PhD is the Professor of Asean Studies at International Islamic University of Malaysia and Director of Institute of International and Asean Studies (IINTAS).

** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.