AUGUST 9 — The belated release of the Royal Commission of Inquiry (RCI) report into Lembaga Tabung Haji is unquestionably a minus. 

Malaysians were entitled to know much earlier what had happened to one of the country's most important and symbolically sensitive institutions. Instead, it was released just days prior to the August 1 State election in Negeri Sembilan.

But the release is also a plus. While Pakatan Harapan did not win the State Election —recusing it from being seen as using the RCI Tabung Haj to render it into a political weapon — the likes of PAS who has remained sheepishly quiet on the machinations of TBI is now put on the spot. Can PAS, which touts itself as a defender of Muslim and Malay unity, defend the indefensible?

Of course, PAS will try. But its callous disregard for RCI on Tabung Haji will be clear to all. 

The RCI report on Tabung Haji is now available for public scrutiny. That further changes the nature of the debate. 

Malaysia can no longer remain trapped in speculation, political accusation and counter-accusation. The question is increasingly straightforward: what must be done?

An RCI is not established merely to produce an impressive document.

Nor should its report become another heavy volume gathering dust on government shelves. A Royal Commission exists because the issues under investigation have become sufficiently serious to require an authoritative examination of what happened, why it happened, where institutional safeguards failed and what must be done to prevent recurrence.

Tabung Haji makes these questions particularly important.

This is not an ordinary financial institution. Millions of Malaysian Muslims have entrusted their savings to Tabung Haji partly because they hope eventually to fulfil the fifth pillar of Islam: the Haj pilgrimage to Mecca.

Consequently, stewardship of these funds carries responsibilities extending beyond ordinary financial management. It involves amanah — trust.

Any weakness involving governance, accounting, investment decisions, political interference or institutional oversight therefore deserves serious examination.

The first lesson from the RCI must consequently be that disclosure cannot be the final stage of accountability. It is merely the beginning.

Where the report identifies weaknesses in governance, those weaknesses must be corrected. Where legislation created excessive concentrations of authority, Parliament should examine whether the relevant provisions require amendment.

Where accounting practices proved inadequate, accounting standards and internal safeguards must be strengthened. Where investment procedures allowed excessive discretion, stronger checks and balances must be introduced.

And where there is credible evidence suggesting possible breaches of law, the relevant enforcement institutions should examine that evidence independently.

This distinction is crucial.

An RCI is not a criminal court. Its findings should therefore not automatically be converted into declarations of criminal guilt against individuals.

Due process remains fundamental.

But due process cuts both ways. It protects individuals against unjust accusations while simultaneously requiring authorities to investigate credible evidence of wrongdoing.

The government should therefore establish a transparent mechanism to explain which RCI recommendations have been accepted, which require further study, which have already been implemented and which matters have been referred to the appropriate authorities.

Without such follow-through, publication alone becomes performative transparency.

Malaysia has seen too many controversies where enormous public attention accompanies the release of a report, only for public interest to disappear several months later.

Tabung Haji cannot be permitted to follow that trajectory.

The second lesson concerns institutional design.

If an institution responsible for billions of ringgit and the savings of millions of Malaysians can become vulnerable to excessive political influence, weak oversight or questionable financial practices, simply changing the personalities at the top will never be sufficient.

Institutions must be designed to survive bad leadership.

Indeed, that is precisely why governance systems contain boards, auditors, risk committees, regulators, parliamentary scrutiny and professional management structures.

Good governance assumes that human beings are fallible. Checks and balances exist precisely because no minister, chairman, chief executive or board should possess unlimited discretion.

Reform should therefore reduce opportunities for political intervention while strengthening professional independence and fiduciary responsibility.

Appointments to the board and senior management should be based primarily on competence, integrity and relevant professional experience. Independent directors must genuinely be independent. Risk committees must possess the expertise and authority to challenge questionable decisions.

Auditors must be able to raise alarms without fearing political repercussions.

The third lesson is broader than Tabung Haji.

Malaysia has an enormous ecosystem of government-linked companies, government-linked investment companies, statutory bodies and public funds. Collectively they control substantial portions of national wealth.

Every ringgit managed by these institutions ultimately carries a public responsibility.

The Tabung Haji episode should therefore become an opportunity to examine whether similar governance vulnerabilities exist elsewhere.

That does not mean assuming that every government-linked institution is badly managed. Many are professionally administered.

It means recognising that prevention is cheaper than another crisis.

The government should consider conducting systematic governance stress tests across major public institutions: examining board independence, appointment procedures, audit mechanisms, investment mandates, conflicts of interest and ministerial powers.

Malaysia should not wait for the next scandal before discovering another structural weakness.

The fourth lesson concerns politics.

Accountability must never become selective.

If investigations are pursued only against political opponents while allies receive different treatment, institutional reform will immediately lose credibility.

The standard should be simple: investigate the evidence, not the political affiliation.

Anyone who acted properly deserves protection from reckless accusation. Anyone against whom credible evidence of wrongdoing exists deserves proper investigation regardless of political position.

This is particularly important because Tabung Haji belongs neither to Barisan Nasional, Pakatan Harapan, Perikatan Nasional nor any other coalition.

It belongs to its depositors.

Indeed, attempts to reduce the RCI merely to ammunition in partisan warfare would diminish the importance of the report itself.

The real question is not which coalition can extract the greatest political advantage from the findings. The question is whether Malaysia can build institutions strong enough to prevent the conditions identified by the inquiry from recurring.

There is also a moral dimension that cannot be ignored.

The very name Tabung Haji invokes religious responsibility. Islam places enormous importance on the proper discharge of trust and condemns the misuse of property entrusted to one's care.

The appropriate response to institutional weaknesses involving Tabung Haji therefore cannot consist merely of louder religious rhetoric.

The answer must be better governance.

Integrity cannot exist only in sermons. It must appear in balance sheets, boardrooms, procurement procedures, investment decisions, audit reports and ministerial accountability.

That would be the strongest possible defence of Tabung Haji as an Islamic institution.

The delayed publication consequently remains a minus. Malaysians are entitled to ask why information of such importance was not made available earlier.

But Malaysia should not allow frustration over the delay to obscure the opportunity created by disclosure.

Publication has opened the door.

Now Parliament, the government, regulators, enforcement agencies, Tabung Haji's leadership and civil society must walk through it.

Set deadlines for implementing recommendations. Report progress publicly. Strengthen the Tabung Haji Act where necessary. Improve board independence. 

Tighten financial oversight. Investigate credible evidence of wrongdoing. Protect due process. And make institutional reform permanent.

Only then will the RCI have achieved something greater than exposing the past.

It will have protected the future.

The worst outcome would be for Malaysians to debate the report intensely for several weeks and then forget it.

The best outcome would be considerably different: that the belated disclosure becomes the starting point of a stronger Tabung Haji and a wider reform of Malaysia's public institutions.

The release may have come late.

But accountability does not have to arrive later still.

Now that the RCI has spoken, action must follow.

* Phar Kim Beng is a professor of Asean Studies and a director at the Institute of International and Asean Studies, International Islamic University Malaysia.

** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.