AUGUST 8 — When more than 4,000 DAP delegates converge for the party’s National Conference on August 16, there will inevitably be anger, introspection and demands for accountability.
There should be. Politics without accountability becomes entitlement.
But accountability is not the same thing as political self-destruction. The likelihood that DAP delegates will demand that the party withdraw from the Federal Government remains extremely low. There are at least ten reasons why.
First, DAP’s electoral performance has to be separated from Pakatan Harapan’s overall performance.
Sabah was unquestionably disastrous. DAP contested eight seats in the November 2025 state election and lost every one of them. That was a political earthquake for a party that had previously regarded several urban Sabah constituencies as strongholds.
But Sabah did not automatically become the template for Peninsular Malaysia.
In Johor, DAP retained six seats despite the powerful BN advance. Anthony Loke himself pointed to those six victories as evidence that DAP continued to possess a substantial urban electoral base.
In Negeri Sembilan, DAP again preserved most of its representation even as PH lost the state government. The problem facing PH therefore cannot simply be reduced to “DAP has collapsed”.
Second, Sabah appears to have contained a strong local political dynamic.
Sabah voters have repeatedly demonstrated their willingness to distinguish between local and peninsula-based parties. DAP’s wipeout there was severe, but it did not reproduce itself mechanically in Johor or Negeri Sembilan.
Indeed, DAP’s experience across these elections suggests that Malaysian voters are becoming increasingly sophisticated — and increasingly localised — in how they punish political parties.
A defeat in Kota Kinabalu does not necessarily predict a defeat in Johor Bahru, Seremban or Kuala Lumpur.
Third, DAP still possesses a substantial Chinese base while retaining support among sections of Indian and Malay voters.
This matters enormously.
Whatever dissatisfaction exists with the Unity Government, many non-Malay voters remain deeply uncomfortable with the prospect of PAS acquiring considerably greater influence over the direction of the Federal Government.
DAP delegates understand this political reality. Leaving the government would not automatically strengthen DAP.
It could instead weaken the principal institutional barrier against a much sharper conservative turn in Malaysian politics.
Fourth, Anthony Loke has already accepted personal responsibility.
Following the Negeri Sembilan defeat and his own loss in Chennah, Loke resigned as Negeri Sembilan DAP chairman while remaining national secretary-general.
That distinction matters.
Resignation from a state leadership position demonstrates accountability without plunging the entire party into instability.
Politics needs proportionality. Losing Chennah warrants reflection. Losing Negeri Sembilan warrants organisational reform. Neither automatically requires DAP to abandon Putrajaya.
Fifth, DAP should not turn resignation into a political fetish.
Malaysian politics does not operate according to a convention whereby every electoral setback requires ministers to resign.
If DAP alone repeatedly imposes this standard upon itself while every competitor refuses to do likewise, the result is not necessarily moral superiority. It can become unilateral political disarmament.
Accountability must improve organisations. It should not incapacitate them.
Sixth, abandoning government would reopen internal questions without solving DAP’s external problems.
DAP contains different generations, personalities and political styles. Inevitably, any leadership vacuum would revive arguments about whether the party should return to a more combative political approach associated with earlier periods.
But DAP’s problem is not solved simply by changing personalities.
Lim Guan Eng and Tony Pua have made important contributions to the party and Malaysian public life, but returning automatically to yesterday’s political vocabulary is unlikely to constitute tomorrow’s electoral strategy.
Malaysia has changed. DAP must change with it.
Seventh, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has suffered electoral defeats, not a disqualifying scandal.
This distinction is fundamental.
Governments lose state elections. Prime ministers become unpopular. Economic reforms create resentment. Coalitions make strategic mistakes.
None of these automatically constitutes grounds for dismantling a Federal Government.
Anwar himself acknowledged during the Negeri Sembilan campaign that he had made mistakes and had weaknesses.
The appropriate response is correction, not political combustion.
DAP would need an extraordinarily serious reason to withdraw its support from a sitting prime minister and potentially destabilise the Federal Government. State-election defeats do not meet that threshold.
Eighth, PKR itself is undergoing internal adjustment.
Nurul Izzah Anwar’s position has become part of PKR’s own process of reassessment.
Earlier this year, PKR replaced her as co-election director with Amirudin Shari as part of what the party described as a strategic realignment.
The larger point is that DAP is hardly the only PH component being forced to confront uncomfortable questions.
PKR must examine its machinery. Amanah must examine its electoral reach. DAP must examine its own messaging.
Collective defeat requires collective diagnosis.
Ninth, leaving government would surrender DAP’s ability to influence policy precisely when its voters expect results.
DAP ministers hold responsibilities affecting transport, housing, local government, digitalisation and other areas directly connected to daily economic life.
Small and medium enterprises do not primarily need another round of political theatre. They need predictable regulations, functioning infrastructure, investment, jobs and economic confidence.
DAP cannot demonstrate administrative competence from outside the government as effectively as it can from within it.
Walking away would therefore risk transforming electoral frustration into governmental irrelevance.
Tenth, DAP delegates know that GE16 — not August 16 — is the real examination.
The August 16 conference should be rigorous. Delegates should demand explanations.
They should interrogate campaign strategy, communication failures, candidate selection and why sections of the electorate have become politically detached from PH.
But they should distinguish between repairing a vehicle and setting it on fire.
The Johor and Negeri Sembilan elections are warnings. Sabah was an even louder warning. Yet warnings exist so that political organisations can correct themselves before the decisive contest.
DAP’s delegates therefore have every reason to demand reform but almost none to demand withdrawal from government.
Their task on August 16 is not to decide whether DAP should run away from Putrajaya.
It is to decide how DAP can become better at governing from Putrajaya while rebuilding trust outside it.
That is the harder task.
It is also the more responsible one.
* Phar Kim Beng is a professor of Asean Studies and a director at the Institute of International and Asean Studies, International Islamic University Malaysia.
** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.
