Nov 4 — President Donald Trump has already signalled how he intends to govern should the Republicans lose control of both the House of Representatives and the Senate. He will become “Mr Veto”.

Speaking ahead of the November 3, 2026 midterm elections, Trump declared that he would veto legislation passed by a Democratic-controlled Congress, although he acknowledged that negotiations could eventually follow.

His remarks were not merely campaign rhetoric. 

They revealed a potential strategy for governing under divided government, with the presidency and Congress controlled by opposing parties.

For the United States, this raises an important constitutional question. 

How effectively can the world’s most powerful presidency function when its legislative branch becomes an institutional counterweight ?

The American Constitution was deliberately designed to prevent the concentration of power in any single institution. Congress legislates. 

The president executes laws. The judiciary interprets their constitutionality.

Yet the practical functioning of this arrangement depends on compromise.

Trump’s proposed reliance on vetoes could place that principle under considerable strain.

A presidential veto is constitutionally legitimate. Congress can override it with a two-thirds majority in both chambers.

But when vetoes become a systematic negotiating instrument, the legislative process can become increasingly confrontational.

There is an important distinction between vetoing legislation because of substantive disagreement and using repeated vetoes to force political concessions.

Trump appears to contemplate both.

Indeed, he has suggested that after a period of vetoes, Democrats would eventually return to the negotiating table.

Such an approach could produce agreements. It could equally prolong legislative deadlock.

More importantly, a Democratic takeover of Congress would not necessarily render Trump powerless.

Reports indicate that White House officials have been examining how the administration could continue implementing policies through executive authority.

These include immigration restrictions, tariffs, housing policies and federal expenditure.

This suggests that Trump is preparing for two parallel forms of government.

The first would involve resisting congressional legislation through presidential vetoes.

The second would involve advancing his administration’s priorities through executive orders and existing statutory powers.

Both approaches have constitutional foundations, although executive actions remain subject to statutory limits and judicial review.

The consequences would extend far beyond Washington.

For Asean, the prospect of prolonged confrontation between the White House and Congress introduces another dimension of uncertainty.

Trade policies could remain subject to presidential initiatives, while congressional oversight could intensify.

Tariffs, export controls and technology restrictions could therefore remain contentious even under divided government.

Malaysia and other Asean economies would need to distinguish between policies that the American president can implement independently and those requiring congressional approval.

This distinction matters especially for semiconductor supply chains, artificial intelligence, energy security and investment.

American foreign policy would also face competing pressures.

Congress possesses substantial authority over appropriations, sanctions legislation and oversight.

The president, meanwhile, retains considerable authority over diplomacy and military command, subject to constitutional and statutory constraints.

In an increasingly unstable international environment, institutional disagreements in Washington could complicate the consistency of American commitments.

However, divided government need not automatically produce paralysis.

American history demonstrates that presidents and opposition-controlled legislatures can reach consequential agreements.

Trump himself confronted a Democratic-controlled House during the latter half of his first presidency.

The critical issue is therefore not whether Trump possesses veto authority. 

He unquestionably does.

It is whether that authority becomes an instrument for eventual compromise or a prolonged confrontation between two branches of government.

For Malaysia and Asean, the appropriate response is neither alarm nor complacency.

Regional governments must broaden and deepen their diplomatic and economic relationships while maintaining constructive engagement with Washington.

They must also recognise that American political institutions are capable of both conflict and correction.

Ultimately, Trump’s declaration that he could become “Mr Veto” reveals the central dilemma of his remaining presidency.

The president may retain substantial executive authority even without congressional majorities.

But executive power cannot replace every function of Congress.

The real test of American democracy will not be how many bills Trump vetoes, but whether the presidency and Congress can continue governing despite their differences.

For a world already confronting geopolitical conflict, economic fragmentation and technological disruption, that distinction could prove consequential.

* Phar Kim Beng, PhD is the Professor of Asean Studies at International Islamic University of Malaysia and Director of Institute of International and Asean Studies (IINTAS).

** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.