OCTOBER 23 — The High Court's decision to stay the deregistration of Perikatan Nasional (PN) may have given the opposition coalition a temporary political lifeline. 

Yet the restoration of its ability to function does not necessarily translate into electoral strength, especially in Melaka, where Barisan Nasional (BN) remains deeply entrenched.

Indeed, even if PN enters the November 14 state election with its familiar blue flag fluttering beside BN's equally recognisable blue banner, the latter has little to gain from such an arrangement.

The reasons are structural, historical and electoral.

First, Melaka is not Kedah, Kelantan or Terengganu, where PAS enjoys a formidable grassroots presence. Neither is it a state where PN has demonstrated an ability to displace BN as the principal political force.

In the 2021 Melaka state election, BN secured 21 of the 28 seats in the legislative assembly. Pakatan Harapan (PH) won five, while PN managed only two.

That electoral arithmetic remains important. It demonstrates that BN possesses an established political machinery, extensive local networks and a recognisable governing identity that PN has yet to replicate.

Second, BN's political strength in Melaka is not merely the consequence of its electoral logo. It is rooted in decades of organisational penetration through Umno, MCA and MIC, supported by local relationships that extend from villages and small towns to urban constituencies.

These networks cannot be manufactured overnight by PN, regardless of whether its registration is legally protected.

The court's intervention may preserve PN's political existence. It cannot automatically confer electoral legitimacy or grassroots depth.

Third, the internal divisions within PN have already exposed weaknesses in its organisational coherence.

The dispute involving Bersatu and PAS, culminating in the Registrar of Societies' decision to deregister the coalition, has demonstrated that PN's leadership structure is far from settled.

A coalition struggling to maintain internal consensus is hardly in a position to offer BN a dependable partnership.

BN would therefore be assuming additional political risks without securing commensurate electoral benefits.

Fourth, the two coalitions are competing for overlapping segments of the Malay electorate.

While some political strategists may argue that cooperation between BN and PN would consolidate Malay votes, such calculations overlook the differences between their respective political identities.

Umno remains a Malay nationalist party with a long history of governing a multiracial federation.

PAS, conversely, draws much of its political identity from religious mobilisation.

These differences are not necessarily irreconcilable. 

However, they complicate any attempt to forge a seamless electoral understanding, particularly in a state where BN already possesses a strong advantage.

Fifth, cooperation with PN could undermine BN's efforts to rebuild confidence among moderate Malays, Chinese, Indians and other communities.

Melaka's electorate is neither politically homogeneous nor uniformly receptive to religiously framed political mobilisation.

For BN, maintaining its multiracial character is essential to preserving its traditional appeal.

An electoral partnership that appears excessively dependent on PAS could create unnecessary anxieties among non-Malay voters without guaranteeing substantial additional Malay support.

Sixth, BN has already demonstrated renewed electoral competitiveness in Johor and Negeri Sembilan.

These developments have strengthened the argument within Umno that the party should recover its political confidence rather than perpetually seek alliances from a position of uncertainty.

The strategic question for BN is therefore not how much PN can contribute, but whether PN's involvement would dilute BN's ability to claim an independent mandate.

In Melaka, the answer may be particularly straightforward.

Seventh, PN's presence could complicate BN's relationship with PH under Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim's Unity Government.

Although federal cooperation does not automatically require identical electoral arrangements at the state level, political consistency remains important.

BN cannot indefinitely benefit from federal stability while simultaneously entertaining competing political alignments that may weaken confidence in the governing coalition.

Such contradictions would become increasingly difficult to explain as Malaysia approaches the 16th general election.

Eighth, PN's political predicament is fundamentally its own.

The legal controversy surrounding its registration originated from disputes within the coalition, particularly over Bersatu's participation in its decision-making processes.

BN has no compelling reason to inherit these difficulties.

Even if the courts provide PN with temporary protection, the underlying problems of leadership, trust and coalition management remain unresolved.

A judicial stay is not a political reconciliation.

Ninth, the presence of two competing blue flags could confuse rather than consolidate voters.

BN's blue has historically represented continuity, experience and institutional familiarity.

PN's blue, meanwhile, represents an alternative political formation that has frequently challenged BN's leadership of Malay politics.

Placing both banners within the same electoral understanding risks blurring their respective identities.

For BN, whose principal objective should be to strengthen its own political brand, this would constitute an unnecessary strategic concession.

Finally, Melaka provides BN with an opportunity to demonstrate that its political recovery is genuine.

If BN can secure a convincing mandate without becoming dependent on PN, it would strengthen Umno president Ahmad Zahid Hamidi's position and reinforce the coalition's bargaining power nationally.

It would also establish that BN's electoral relevance is not contingent upon PAS or any other political formation.

This does not mean PN should be denied its legitimate right to participate in democratic elections. 

The courts must determine the legal questions independently, while voters should remain free to choose among competing parties.

But legal survival and electoral usefulness are two entirely different propositions.

PN may have regained the opportunity to fly its flag. 

Whether that flag commands sufficient support in Melaka remains another question altogether.

For BN, the calculation is simpler. In a state where its own blue flag already commands considerable recognition, BN has little reason to invite another blue flag to compete for the same political space.

Melaka should be an opportunity for BN to consolidate its recovery, not an occasion to rescue PN from its own contradictions.

Ultimately, BN has more to gain by standing confidently on its own feet than by leaning on a coalition still struggling to establish its political footing.

* Phar Kim Beng, PhD, is Professor of Asean Studies at the International Islamic University of Malaysia and Director of the Institute of International and Asean Studies (IINTAS).

** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.