OCTOBER 22 — National security is no longer determined exclusively by the number of soldiers, fighter jets, naval vessels or missile systems that a country possesses.

Increasingly, it is shaped by something far less visible: the digital footprints of its political leaders, military commanders and strategic decision-makers.

The concerns of Malaysia’s National Cyber Security Committee over geolocation-enabled devices must therefore be taken seriously. What appears to be an ordinary smartphone, smartwatch, fitness tracker or location-sharing application can become a potential vulnerability in the national security architecture.

This is especially dangerous in an era when artificial intelligence (AI) can process enormous volumes of information, identify patterns of movement and assist military planners in determining the whereabouts of high-value individuals.

The implications extend beyond conventional espionage.

They raise the possibility of AI-assisted decapitation strikes designed to eliminate a country’s political or military leadership at the outset of a conflict.

A decapitation strike seeks to incapacitate an adversary’s command structure by targeting its senior leadership.

Such operations are not new. What has changed is the technological environment in which they can be contemplated and executed.

Previously, locating senior commanders required extensive human intelligence, satellite surveillance and prolonged reconnaissance.

Today, commercially available geolocation information, when combined with other intelligence sources, can potentially reveal sensitive patterns of movement.

AI may accelerate the analysis of these patterns. It can identify recurring locations, associations between individuals and unusual changes in behaviour.

Yet these systems are not infallible.

Location information may be incomplete, misleading or deliberately manipulated. The danger lies precisely in the possibility that imperfect intelligence can nevertheless influence lethal military decisions.

The wars in Ukraine and West Asia have demonstrated how drones, precision-guided weapons and digital intelligence are transforming modern warfare.

The January 2020 American drone strike that killed Iranian General Qassem Soleimani in Baghdad illustrated the strategic consequences of targeting senior military leadership.

It should not be assumed, however, that commercially collected geolocation data or AI algorithms determined that particular operation.

The broader lesson is unmistakable. When senior officials can be located and tracked, their physical security becomes inseparable from information security.

For Malaysia, this is not a theoretical concern.

As a strategically located maritime nation, Malaysia sits astride vital commercial routes linking the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean.

Its political stability, military command structure and strategic infrastructure are indispensable to the wider security of Southeast Asia.

A successful cyber intrusion into sensitive location information could compromise not only individual officials but also the functioning of important national institutions.

Consider the risks associated with devices carried into confidential meetings, military installations or sensitive diplomatic engagements.

Even when conversations are encrypted, location metadata may expose who was present, how frequently particular individuals met and where important decisions were potentially being coordinated.

The accumulation of seemingly insignificant digital information can produce a far more revealing intelligence picture.

This is where AI becomes particularly consequential. Its ability to analyse multiple datasets can reduce the time needed to identify relationships that human analysts might otherwise take weeks to establish.

In a crisis, that compression of time could increase the danger of pre-emptive military action, miscalculation or attacks against national command structures.

Malaysia must therefore regard geolocation security as an integral component of national defence.

The National Cyber Security Committee is justified in drawing attention to these vulnerabilities. 

However, public concern must be translated into a coherent national strategy.

First, sensitive government and military environments require clear restrictions on personal devices, location-sharing functions and applications that collect unnecessary information.

Second, cybersecurity awareness must extend beyond technical personnel to ministers, senior civil servants, military officers and those entrusted with sensitive national responsibilities.

Third, Malaysia should strengthen the protection of commercially collected location information, including examining how data brokers, application developers and foreign technology platforms handle information concerning Malaysian users.

Fourth, government procurement must place greater emphasis on secure communications, independently assessed technology and the management of supply-chain vulnerabilities.

Finally, Malaysia should deepen cooperation with Asean partners on cybersecurity standards, digital resilience and the protection of critical national infrastructure.

Asean cannot assume that its relative distance from major-power wars guarantees immunity from technologically enabled threats.

The emergence of AI-assisted targeting creates risks for small and middle powers whose strategic autonomy depends on maintaining credible national institutions.

Malaysia’s commitment to neutrality, diplomacy and peaceful coexistence remains essential. But diplomacy cannot substitute for technological preparedness.

Indeed, the more complex the international security environment becomes, the greater the need to protect the individuals and institutions responsible for managing national crises.

The ultimate danger is not merely that a device reveals someone’s location.

It is that the aggregation of digital information can expose an entire pattern of national decision-making.

In an age of AI-enabled warfare, the distinction between a harmless digital convenience and a serious intelligence vulnerability is becoming increasingly blurred.

Malaysia must recognise that national security can be compromised long before a missile is launched.

The first stage of a decapitation strike may begin not with an explosion, but with the exposure of a digital footprint.

That is why the National Cyber Security Committee’s concerns deserve the full attention of the government, armed forces and wider Malaysian public.

* Phar Kim Beng is professor of Asean Studies, and director at the Institute of International and Asean Studies, International Islamic University Malaysia.

** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.