OCTOBER 13 — The deadly Houthi attack on Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport on October 10, 2026, followed by another attack the next day, marks a dangerous turning point in the fragile relationship between Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

With at least 13 people reportedly killed and more than 300 injured, the assaults demonstrate the Houthis’ willingness to extend Yemen’s conflict into Saudi Arabia’s civilian heartland. 

This is no longer merely an internal Yemeni struggle but a regional security crisis with potentially serious consequences for the Middle East and the global economy.

The attacks deserve unequivocal international condemnation. 

Civilian airports are not legitimate instruments of political coercion, and targeting passengers and infrastructure cannot be justified.

They also expose three weaknesses in the regional security order: the limits of Saudi Arabia’s air defences, the destabilising influence of Iran-aligned armed movements, and the fragility of diplomatic reconciliation between Tehran and the GCC. The third is particularly consequential.

In March 2023, Saudi Arabia and Iran restored diplomatic relations through a China-brokered agreement. 

The breakthrough reflected their recognition that permanent confrontation carried enormous economic and strategic costs. 

Riyadh needed stability for Vision 2030, while Tehran sought to reduce its isolation and improve relations with neighbouring states.

The Houthis’ continued attacks now threaten that understanding. Iran’s longstanding military and political relationship with the group creates a credibility problem.

Although the Houthis pursue their own objectives and cannot simply be treated as an extension of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), their access to sophisticated missiles and drones has increased their ability to threaten Saudi territory.

This association does not prove that Tehran ordered the latest attacks; such a claim requires credible evidence. 

But Iran cannot convincingly present itself as a champion of regional stability while maintaining close ties with actors whose actions endanger its neighbours. 

At minimum, it has a diplomatic responsibility to use whatever influence it possesses to prevent further escalation.

The GCC must now consider whether its security environment is deteriorating despite years of engagement. An attack on Riyadh has implications beyond Saudi Arabia. 

The UAE has previously experienced attacks attributed to the Houthis, Bahrain remains sensitive to Iranian influence, Kuwait and Qatar favour diplomacy, and Oman has played a key mediating role. 

Their differing approaches should not obscure a shared reality: the security of all six GCC states is increasingly interconnected.

The vulnerability of Riyadh’s airport raises concerns about airports, ports, desalination facilities, energy installations and transport networks across the Gulf. Saudi Arabia’s central role in global energy security further internationalises the danger. 

With the Strait of Hormuz already exposed to geopolitical disruption, renewed Houthi interference near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait could increase shipping costs, insurance premiums, supply-chain uncertainty and inflation across Asia and Europe.

Asean energy-importing economies would be especially vulnerable. 

Malaysia, despite being an energy producer, is not insulated from higher logistics costs, imported inflation or market volatility. Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam and the Philippines would face similar pressures. West Asian instability is therefore not a distant concern but a direct economic risk for South-east Asia.

Riyadh’s emerging security cooperation with Türkiye and Pakistan, including the recently announced Mecca defence arrangement, reflects its effort to diversify partnerships. 

Condemnation of the attacks by Türkiye, Pakistan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia points to broader diplomatic alignment. Yet deterrence should not be confused with automatic military retaliation.

Effective security cooperation must combine defence, intelligence-sharing, diplomatic pressure and calibrated responses; otherwise, a conflict centred on Yemen could widen into a confrontation involving several powerful states.

Iran must recognise that its relationship with the GCC cannot endure if Iran-aligned movements continue to threaten Gulf civilians. 

The October 11 telephone conversation between the Saudi and Iranian foreign ministers, and Tehran’s offer to facilitate Saudi-Yemeni dialogue, provide a possible opening. 

But assurances must be matched by tangible de-escalation.

Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, must distinguish defending its sovereignty from launching another prolonged campaign in Yemen. 

Military action that deepens civilian suffering without producing a political settlement could perpetuate the insecurity Riyadh seeks to end.

China, having brokered the 2023 rapprochement, has a clear interest in preventing its achievement from unravelling. 

The United States and Europe should likewise recognise that Gulf security requires more than additional weapons. It requires a regional framework capable of restraining armed non-state actors and reducing incentives for escalation.

Ultimately, the Houthi attacks have placed Iran–GCC relations under their severest pressure since reconciliation began. 

The central test is whether Iran can convert diplomatic influence into meaningful restraint while Saudi Arabia and its partners exercise enough strategic patience to avoid a wider war.

The Gulf cannot afford a permanent cycle of retaliation, and neither can Asean, whose economic security is closely tied to West Asian stability. 

The tragedy in Riyadh must become a catalyst for renewed diplomacy, not the beginning of another uncontrollable conflict.

Iran and the GCC have too much to lose from allowing the Houthis to determine the future of their relationship.

* Phar Kim Beng, PhD is the Professor of Asean Studies at International Islamic University of Malaysia and Director of Institute of International and Asean Studies (IINTAS).

** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.