AUGUST 14 — The decision confronting more than 4,200 DAP delegates is larger than the internal future of one political party. 

If DAP were to leave the federal government — or weaken its commitment to Pakatan Harapan (PH) — the greatest strategic beneficiary would arguably not be DAP, Umno, Bersatu or even the broader opposition. It would be a Hadi-led PAS.

This is because PAS has constructed much of its contemporary political mobilisation around DAP as a convenient adversary. 

Whether DAP remains in government or leaves it, PAS can adapt the narrative. The difference is that departure would hand PAS an enormous political opening.

There are ten reasons.

First, DAP will almost certainly continue to be pilloried by PAS whether it is inside or outside government. 

Since November 24, 2022, the Madani administration has depended on a broad and sometimes unwieldy coalition architecture incorporating PH, Barisan Nasional (BN) and other political forces. 

Yet PAS's attacks have repeatedly personalised this arrangement around DAP. If DAP leaves, the attacks need not end. Their vocabulary merely changes.

Second, a decision by thousands of DAP delegates to withdraw from government could expose genuine differences within DAP itself. Some would favour remaining outside. Others could eventually argue for returning. 

PAS would then have an extraordinarily useful narrative: DAP is divided because some of its leaders supposedly want to return to government to "control" it.

The allegation that DAP can simply seize Malay constitutional rights is deeply misleading. Malaysia's constitutional order, federal institutions, monarchy, Parliament, civil service and electoral system impose constraints that no single political party can casually overturn. 

Yet political narratives do not have to be constitutionally credible to become electorally useful.

Third, PAS would therefore be able to transform an internal DAP disagreement into evidence of its own political effectiveness. 

After years of portraying DAP as the principal obstacle to its conception of Malay-Muslim political consolidation, PAS could declare that sustained pressure had finally fractured its opponent.

This would be particularly consequential because DAP has been an indispensable component of PH's electoral architecture. 

Weakening DAP does not merely weaken one party. It potentially weakens the coalition mathematics that have underpinned PH.

Fourth, PAS could take this supposed victory directly to Umno, MCA and MIC. All three contain constituencies that are uncomfortable with DAP to varying degrees. 

PAS could argue that where BN had been compelled to coexist with DAP within the Madani framework, PAS had succeeded in forcing DAP onto the defensive.

The implications for the balance between PN and BN would be considerable. PAS could present itself as the indispensable Malay-Muslim political force capable of setting the agenda rather than merely reacting to it.

Fifth, this would strengthen PAS inside PN itself.

The struggle for primacy within opposition politics is not merely about ideology. It is about seats, machinery, candidates, resources and ultimately the authority to determine electoral strategy. 

If PAS can portray itself as the party that forced a major rearrangement of federal politics, Bersatu's bargaining power becomes weaker. Any bridging role envisioned for Wawasan would similarly face an increasingly dominant PAS.

PAS would move closer to the top of the opposition food chain.

Sixth, this fits Abdul Hadi Awang's politics of maximum manoeuvre. PAS under Hadi has repeatedly demonstrated an ability to enter, leave and reshape political arrangements according to changing circumstances. 

Its objective is not simply participation. It is maximisation of political leverage.

That strategy becomes especially important in Melaka. PAS's ambitions there must be understood not as an isolated state-level negotiation but as part of the wider contest over who commands the Malay electoral space.

If PAS insists on contesting 16 seats in a 28-seat assembly, it is effectively staking a claim to potential dominance. 

Its ambitions would become easier to justify internally if DAP's departure from government could be presented as evidence that PAS's confrontational strategy works.

Seventh, PAS could subsequently retreat from 16 seats to 14 and portray the concession as moderation.

This would be politically clever. Half of a 28-seat legislature is hardly a negligible demand. Yet after establishing a higher negotiating position, PAS could claim that accepting fewer seats demonstrates flexibility toward Umno and BN.

For BN, this creates a serious dilemma. If Umno wants to contest approximately 21 seats, its arithmetic collides directly with PAS's ambitions. DAP's withdrawal would therefore not necessarily strengthen BN. It could strengthen PAS's hand in bargaining with BN.

Eighth, PAS could recalibrate its attacks against DAP once DAP was outside government.

The attacks need not disappear. They could simply become less intense whenever PAS finds moderation tactically useful. 

PAS could then present itself as comfortable with Malaysia's multiracial character while simultaneously maintaining a political model heavily centred on its own interpretation of Malay-Muslim governance.

The record of PAS administration in Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah and Perlis deserves careful examination precisely because governing practice matters more than campaign rhetoric. 

The central question is not whether PAS can occasionally employ inclusive language. It is how political pluralism, cultural diversity and constitutional federalism operate where PAS possesses sustained governmental power.

Ninth, DAP's departure could help PAS intensify pressure on Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim at precisely the moment when the government would want economic performance to dominate the national conversation.

Even strong growth figures cannot automatically compensate for political instability. 

If Malaysia were registering growth approaching 6 per cent while its governing coalition was simultaneously fracturing, PAS could shift public attention away from economic performance toward the question of political survival.

Anwar would then be forced to spend political capital stabilising his coalition rather than converting economic gains into a broader reform programme.

Tenth, the timing would be especially consequential following the controversy surrounding the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Tabung Haji.

Questions of governance, accountability, institutional responsibility and political interference should properly remain matters of national importance. 

Yet a dramatic DAP withdrawal could overwhelm that discussion with an entirely different narrative: Who controls Putrajaya? Who determines the political temperature? Who can make or break governments?

PAS would be delighted for the answer increasingly to become PAS.

The consequences could extend beyond Peninsular Malaysia. Sabah and Sarawak possess substantial bargaining power in federal politics precisely because no major Peninsular coalition can casually disregard them. 

Their continuing pursuit of the Malaysia Agreement 1963 reflects not merely historical grievances but the constitutional reality of the Malaysian federation.

A PAS capable of reorganising Peninsular coalition politics around itself could attempt to replace this federal conversation with a predominantly Peninsular Malay-Muslim political axis. 

That would be strategically unhealthy for Malaysia. MA63 cannot become collateral damage in a struggle for supremacy among Peninsular parties.

DAP delegates must therefore distinguish dissatisfaction with government from the strategic consequences of abandoning government.

Leaving does not necessarily punish one's adversaries. Sometimes it rewards them.

For PAS, the ideal political battlefield is one in which DAP is isolated, PH is weakened, Anwar is destabilised, BN becomes dependent on Malay electoral cooperation, Bersatu is subordinated, and PAS acquires the ability to raise or lower Malaysia's political temperature.

That is why the consequences of DAP's decision extend well beyond DAP.

A withdrawal undertaken as an act of protest could become an extraordinary strategic gift to Abdul Hadi Awang. PAS could emerge stronger within PN, stronger in negotiations with BN, stronger in Melaka and stronger in its claim to define the political agenda of Peninsular Malaysia.

DAP may have many reasons to be dissatisfied. But dissatisfaction should never be confused with strategy.

If DAP delegates walk away without understanding who gains most from their departure, Hadi-led PAS could win without having to defeat DAP at the ballot box.

It would merely have to watch DAP remove itself from the field.

* Phar Kim Beng is a professor of Asean Studies and a director at the Institute of International and Asean Studies, International Islamic University Malaysia.

** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.