MAY 13 — President Donald Trump may insist that Iran is not central to his summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing. Yet the strategic reality suggests otherwise. Iran will inevitably dominate the background of the talks.

Trump recently declared that he did not need Xi’s help in resolving the conflict that began more than two months ago following the massive joint US-Israeli strikes on Iran. According to Trump, the United States has Iran “very much under control.” 

But if Iran is truly under control, why is Washington escalating sanctions against Chinese-linked satellite and technology firms allegedly assisting Iran?

That contradiction is impossible to ignore.

In recent days, the United States imposed sanctions on multiple Chinese and Hong Kong-linked entities accused of supporting Iran’s military procurement systems, missile development and drone programs. 

Several Chinese satellite-imagery firms were also sanctioned for allegedly providing imagery that enabled Iranian military operations against US forces in West Asia. 

The timing is highly significant.

These sanctions were announced just days before Trump arrived in Beijing for one of the most important US-China summits since his return to office.

This means the Iran conflict is no longer confined to West Asia alone.

It has become deeply intertwined with US-China strategic competition.

The White House may wish to focus publicly on trade, tariffs, rare earth minerals, artificial intelligence and market access. Indeed, Trump has repeatedly emphasized economics as the central focus of the summit. 

Yet Washington’s own actions have already internationalized the Iran conflict.

By sanctioning Chinese firms, the United States is effectively telling Beijing that Chinese commercial technology, satellite systems and financial networks are now viewed as part of Iran’s broader military ecosystem.

That is not a minor issue.

It strikes at the core of China’s technological ambitions and sovereign interests.

Beijing has responded sharply. Chinese authorities condemned the sanctions as unilateral and extraterritorial while reiterating that Chinese companies should not comply with American secondary sanctions targeting Iranian trade. 

This creates a dangerous escalation spiral.

The United States increasingly views economic security as national security. 

China, meanwhile, sees Washington’s sanctions regime as an attempt to weaponize the global financial and technological system against Chinese firms.

Thus, even if Trump does not want Iran to dominate the summit, Iran has already entered the room structurally. There is also the energy dimension.

China remains the largest buyer of Iranian oil despite years of US sanctions. More than 80 per cent of Iran’s shipped crude reportedly continues to head toward Chinese refiners. 

This alone ensures that Iran cannot be separated from US-China relations.

Washington may demand tighter Chinese compliance with sanctions. 

Beijing, however, sees Iranian energy as important to its long-term economic resilience and strategic autonomy. Neither side can easily compromise.

The consequence is that the Iran conflict now acts as an amplifier of broader US-China distrust.

For Asean, this development is deeply worrying.

Southeast Asia depends on stable sea lanes, open trade and predictable energy markets. 

The prolonged conflict around the Strait of Hormuz has already increased risks to shipping, insurance premiums, and commodity prices.

Any further deterioration between Washington and Beijing over Iran would intensify global fragmentation even more.

Malaysia and Asean therefore, have every reason to advocate de-escalation.

The region cannot afford simultaneous instability in both West Asia and East Asia.

The larger issue is that the world is entering an era where conflicts are no longer geographically isolated. Wars now spread through sanctions, supply chains, satellite systems, financial networks and technological restrictions.

That is precisely what is happening with Iran.

Trump may genuinely believe that the United States possesses overwhelming leverage over Tehran. Militarily, Washington certainly retains enormous advantages.

But geopolitically, the conflict has already expanded beyond Iran itself.

The sanctions on Chinese satellite firms prove that.

In reality, Trump cannot avoid discussing Iran in Beijing because Washington itself has linked Iran directly to Chinese companies, Chinese oil imports and Chinese technology networks.

The summit may still produce economic agreements or temporary trade understandings.

Yet beneath those negotiations lies a much deeper reality: the Iran conflict is increasingly becoming part of the wider contest over global power, technological dominance and the future structure of the international order.

That is why the Beijing summit matters far beyond China and the United States alone.

* Phar Kim Beng is a professor of Asean Studies and director of the Institute of Internationalisation and Asean Studies, International Islamic University of Malaysia. 

** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.