DECEMBER 26 — Ceasefire talks between Thailand and Cambodia have resumed, yet clashes continue along the border. 

This uneasy coexistence of diplomacy and violence reveals a deeper truth: the conflict is no longer driven solely by territorial disputes or military miscalculation. 

It is now sustained by domestic political forces that conventional ceasefires are ill-suited to contain.

Thai nationalism today is not primarily about borders or historical grievances. 

It is increasingly shaped by public anger over cross-border scams, trafficking syndicates, and cybercrime—and by the widespread belief that these activities persist because enforcement remains weak, selective, or compromised. 

This has given rise to a distinct political phenomenon: anti-scammer nationalism.

Understanding this shift is essential to understanding why the conflict is so difficult to stop. This is all the more the case when elections turn security into identity.

How?

As Thailand moves through an election cycle, security ceases to be a technocratic issue. It becomes a moral and political test. 

Political actors are rewarded not for caution, but for toughness. Voters expect leaders to demonstrate resolve against anything perceived as undermining social order.

Scam networks have become a powerful symbol of state failure. They victimize ordinary citizens, drain family savings, and exploit digital vulnerability. 

When these crimes are believed to operate across the border with impunity, public anger is redirected outward.

Geography becomes politicised, even when the real target is criminality rather than another state.

In such an environment, restraint carries political risk. 

A ceasefire that does not visibly disrupt criminal activity appears meaningless.

Diplomacy without enforcement credibility looks like weakness. This is one of the reasons why ceasefires do not hold.

For what it is worth, traditional ceasefires are designed to silence guns. 

They are not designed to reassure electorates that lawlessness has been neutralised.

Yet, this mismatch explains the fragility of the current truce. 

Even when talks resume, any incident—real or alleged—can be framed domestically as proof that negotiations have failed to protect citizens. 

Once that narrative takes hold, military pressure becomes politically useful rather than costly.

The conflict sustains itself not because leaders actively seek war, but because domestic politics penalises de-escalation. 

In election conditions, showing restraint is easily interpreted as tolerating crime.

Asean’s structural Gap is undeniable. To be sure, Asean has played a vital role in convening dialogue and preventing diplomatic breakdown. But dialogue alone is no longer sufficient.

The core problem today is not the absence of talks. It is the absence of credible, visible, and continuous enforcement observation.

Asean’s observer arrangements—when activated—have traditionally focused on military disengagement. That approach is now inadequate. 

The political driver of escalation lies not only in troop movement, but in the belief that scam compounds, trafficking routes, and criminal networks remain operational.

Without mechanisms empowered to verify: sustained cross-border law-enforcement action, the dismantling of scam centres, disruption of trafficking corridors, and genuine cooperation between security agencies, ceasefires will lack legitimacy in the eyes of domestic audiences.

Why enforcement credibility matters

Public reassurance today depends less on joint statements and more on proof of action. 

Voters want to know that something tangible has changed on the ground. They want evidence that impunity is no longer tolerated.

An Asean observer mechanism that can only report on troop movements, but not on enforcement outcomes, will fail to stabilise the situation. 

Worse, the absence of credible observers risks feeding nationalist narratives that regional diplomacy shields inaction behind procedure.

This is how trust in mediation erodes—not because Asean intervenes too much, but because it intervenes without sufficient authority.

The strategic reality is rather straightforward for now; although when historical factors are brought in the Thai Cambodian war is indeed complex.

Be that as it may, this is not a war driven by hatred of Cambodia as a nation. It is a conflict sustained by electoral pressure, public insecurity, and enforcement deficits.

Unless Asean recalibrates its role—from facilitator of dialogue to guarantor of observable enforcement—ceasefire efforts will remain vulnerable to domestic political backlash. Stability cannot be achieved when citizens believe crime continues unchecked.

In contemporary Thailand, security is no longer judged by silence at the border alone. It is judged by whether scams stop.

Until Asean’s observer mechanisms are strengthened to verify that outcome, diplomacy will remain one step behind domestic politics—and peace will remain fragile.

* Prof Dr Phar Kim Beng is the Director of the Institute of International and Asean Studies (IINTAS) at the International Islamic University of Malaysia

** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.