NOVEMBER 20 — Turkiye’s willingness to contribute troops to an International Stabilisation Force in Gaza has generated intense regional and global interest. 

At a moment when Gaza’s humanitarian catastrophe deepens and political uncertainty expands, Ankara’s readiness appears decisive and morally compelling. Yet readiness alone is not the same as legality. For all of Turkiye’s enthusiasm, key conditions under international law — and under the United Nations system — remain unmet. Until those conditions are fully satisfied, Turkiye cannot go all in on the US-brokered Gaza peace plan. And Asean must pay attention.

The reports emerging from Ankara reflect a serious level of preparation. Turkiye is said to be assembling a brigade-sized contingent, roughly two thousand troops, drawn from various branches of the armed forces. 

These are not symbolic units. They include engineers, logisticians, medics, and explosive ordnance disposal teams — precisely the kind of personnel needed for complex stabilisation missions in devastated environments.

The proposed International Stabilisation Force (ISF) is linked closely to Washington’s new Gaza peace framework. The ISF is envisioned as a multinational presence that would support reconstruction, protect humanitarian corridors, and help manage security in the fragile months ahead. But this remains an aspiration, not a legally authorised mission. A peace plan discussed among capitals is not the same as a Security Council mandate. Without that mandate, no country — Turkiye included — can enter Gaza as part of an internationally sanctioned force.

Turkiye understands the legal terrain clearly. Ankara has repeatedly stated that any deployment must be grounded in a United Nations resolution. Without that legal backing, sending troops into Gaza could be seen as a breach of international law, a provocation to regional actors, or a violation of Gaza’s political sovereignty. Turkiye insists the operation must be multilateral and must carry a clear humanitarian foundation. This insistence is not only logical but essential.

Complicating matters is Israel’s outright opposition to any Turkish involvement. Tel Aviv has made it clear that it does not trust Turkiye’s political posture on Gaza or its broader Middle East policies. This resistance places the United States, the architect of the Gaza stabilization plan, in an awkward position. Washington may wish to build a robust multilateral force, but without Israeli buy-in, the logistical and political viability of such a mission is uncertain.

Turkiye has also been explicit that it will not participate in a stabilisation force that seeks disarmament through force. Ankara insists the mission must focus on humanitarian relief, reconstruction, and civilian protection. Any military enforcement role — especially one aimed at coercing Hamas — risks transforming peacekeepers into combatants. That would require a more forceful UN authorisation under Chapter Seven, something unlikely given current geopolitical divisions among Security Council members.

This is why Turkiye’s framing matters. A humanitarian-first mission is both politically plausible and legally workable. A coercive mission is neither. And Beijing, Moscow, Washington, and London all know this.

Reports also suggest that Turkiye has already begun identifying volunteers and specialists from multiple army branches. These preparations reflect a serious intention, but they do not change the legal reality. No matter how ready a country is, it cannot deploy without a mandate that defines troop numbers, command structure, rules of engagement, mission duration, and coordination with local authorities. None of these elements has been finalised.

The United Nations Security Council’s latest resolution endorsed the broad outline of the US-drafted peace plan. But endorsement is not authorisation. The resolution did not provide the operational clarity required to activate a stabilisation mission. It set political principles, not military parameters.

This is why Asean should pay close attention. The Gaza conflict has global reverberations, and South-east Asia is not insulated. A stabilisation force without legal grounding could trigger broader regional instability, inflame Muslim-majority states, and complicate Asean’s humanitarian diplomacy. Moreover, Asean itself has long championed the need for international law and UN legitimacy in peacekeeping operations. Turkiye’s case reinforces why that principle must be defended.

For Asean, the message is simple: genuine humanitarian assistance must be grounded in legal legitimacy. Without it, even the best-intentioned missions risk being viewed as political interventions. Turkiye may be ready, and its intentions may be constructive. But until the United Nations clarifies the mandate, any deployment remains premature.

The verdict is therefore clear. Turkiye’s preparations are real. Its commitment is genuine. Its willingness to support Gaza’s reconstruction is unmistakable. But the conditions required for a lawful and effective deployment are not yet in place.

Asean must not mistake political enthusiasm for legal readiness. A stabilisation mission in Gaza will only succeed if rooted in international consensus and UN authorisation. Until that happens, Turkiye — like the rest of the international community — must wait.

*Phar Kim Beng is Professor of Asean Studies and Director, Institute of International and Asean Studies (IINTAS), International Islamic University of Malaysia. Luthfy Hamzah  is a Research Fellow at IINTAS.

**This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.